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Abstract 
 
 
Is money „good‟?  The pursuit of personal wealth as a primary life „good‟ lies at the 
heart of Australian society and culture.  Yet in western culture, the traditional legacies 
of money understandings endure: as a value-neutral tool of the economy, free from 
moral considerations.  This thesis provides a sociological analysis about how people 
are morally oriented towards money.  The thesis addresses money meanings from an 
interpretative framework, in the context of in-depth interviews with forty-one young 
Tasmanian adults about what they understand is a „good life‟.  A sociological analysis 
of orientations towards what is „good‟ in life provides a framework for thinking about 
morality along similar lines to Emile Durkheim, or later, Charles Taylor, as related to 
common, social and individual dispositions towards the „good‟.  
Drawn from three different income contexts - middle-income earners, low-income 
earners and downshifters (those who have voluntary shifted to a lower-income) - this 
thesis explores contrasting money narratives that highlight alternative money 
meanings amongst participants.  In particular, the dominant money narrative points to 
a shared and culturally preferred way of understanding money: as good and 
worthwhile pursuing for a „good life‟.  Meanings that underlie this narrative are 
shown to have consequences for the motivations, identities, actions and future 
directions of all participants in the study.  These narratives are analysed drawing on a 
number of theoretical discussions both within the sociology of money and sociology 
of morality, including whether moral orientations towards money found in this culture 
are in fact „good‟.  For example, can such forms of social morality be „morality-
silencing‟ (Bauman 1989: 174) rather than something that generates individual moral 
responsibility? 
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INTRODUCTION 
Meanings, money and morality in context 
Money is like the „elephant in the room‟: it is a pervasive and central feature of 
Western culture and yet there is little sophisticated discussion about what money 
means beyond its economic and market functions.  The meaning of money is often 
subsumed within a rhetoric of the quantitative, homogenous, and „value-free‟ 
character of money, as if it were a „separate sphere‟ hostile to personal and social 
relations (Zelizer 2007: 1063).  As Michael Pusey recently noted: „money today is 
rather like capital.  We know how to measure it, but not what it means‟ (Pusey 2003: 
44). 
This thesis considers what money means - qualitatively, morally and socially.  From 
its origins as a study about the „good life‟, it is a thesis transformed through the 
process of analysis.  The thesis began with the research goal of exploring the multiple 
themes arising from one primary question: „what makes a good life‟?  Family, work, 
leisure, morality, spirituality, politics and ethics are just some of the themes born 
from interview discussions.  The importance of money, however, ran like a 
continuous thread through most topics for these young adults.  And the manner by 
which participants were oriented towards money (or not) gave depth to the 
consideration of „good‟ in moral terms.  These major themes could not be ignored; 
nor could they be given less attention than a whole thesis to explore them thoroughly.  
Thus, money and its relationship to morality emerged as a central theme through 
analytic process rather than by initial design. 
Consequently, the aim of the research became to understand personal money 
meanings in participant perceptions of the „good life‟, and identify how those 
meanings relate to commonly legitimated moral orientations.  For example, at the 
heart of this thesis is a question about how the orientations of 41 young adults 
towards what is „good‟ in life shapes their money meanings, and consequently their 
motives, values, behaviours and social interactions.  The participants are drawn from 
three income categories: middle income, low-income and downshifters (those 
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choosing to earn less income than previously for quality of life reasons).  Each 
category is explored individually, but with similar research questions: What does 
money mean to these young people? How do they talk about money and what is their 
orientation to money?  Is private money viewed differently to public money? Do 
these young adults express right or wrong ways to think about money?  And, how 
does money relate to perceptions of their futures?   
The findings uncover a number of narratives about money: the deferred money 
narrative; the flawed money narrative; the reoriented money narrative; and most 
significantly a culturally preferred story that overshadows them all: the dominant 
money narrative.  These narratives occasion a unique way to understand money 
meanings in this thesis: in moral terms.  Money meanings are explained as moral 
orientations because they constitute common dispositions towards the „good‟.  As 
such, they are understood to be centrally implicated in participant motivation, action, 
identity, and future life-direction.  The dominant money narrative for example, when 
explored as a moral orientation, confirms that when participants orient themselves 
towards money as „good‟, there are implications for the way they view not only 
money, but their own identities, their aspirations for the future, and the way they 
understand their own role as individuals in relation to other people and broader 
society.  Consequently, at the heart of this thesis lies the suggestion that everyday 
money meanings are strongly morally oriented and provide a key to understanding 
some deep-seated social issues present in our culture. 
While some sociologists (e.g. Curruthers and Espeland 1998; Singh 1997; Zelizer 
1994) have begun to explore the social and cultural meanings of money, the moral 
dimensions of the relationship between money and meaning in particular continue to 
be a black hole in sociological analyses about both money and morality.  As Little 
(2003: 433) aptly notes, money tends to „colonise our moral space‟: where the 
rationalised, calculable logic of the money economy cancels out and replaces the need 
for moral and ethical considerations in relation to it.  In this thesis, the specific 
exploration of money orientations as a moral consideration raises important questions 
and issues for both the sociology of money and the sociology of morality.  For 
example, the findings highlight a question about whether moral orientations towards 
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money in our culture are, in fact, „moral‟ and „good‟, or whether such dispositions 
can also act as a „morality silencing‟ force (Bauman 1989: 174)? 
Thesis outline  
This thesis is divided into two parts.  Part I, consisting of chapters one to four, sets the 
scene for the study of money meanings both methodologically and  theoretically.  I 
start the thesis in the perhaps unusual order of outlining the project methodology.  
The reason for this is a practical one.  The methodology begins with explaining the 
process by which I arrived at both the central thesis question and the methodological 
tools for bringing it about. Chapter one thus provides both the logical context and 
parameters of the thesis.  For example, I elaborate on the process involved in 
constructing a thesis around the central idea of „meaning‟, which tools of inquiry 
were most suited to the task, and also some of the issues that call for ethical 
discernment in this thesis.   
In chapter two I map current debates in the sociology of money.   In particular I note 
the contemporary challenge to classical theories about money, and identify the 
necessity of re-thinking money meanings with the social and cultural dimensions of 
those meanings in perspective.  Chapter three deepens this quest through the 
analytical exploration of three case studies drawn from participants in this study: 
Jessica, Kayla and Hannah.  The story of each participant highlights how social and 
cultural (e.g. familial or religious) dimensions of their subjective histories generate 
money meanings far beyond economic market-generated meanings. 
Chapter four extends the theoretical sociological exploration of money into the 
sociology of morality. This chapter is given to outlining theoretical perspectives in 
this field and establishing a basic sociological outline of what constitutes morality.  In 
this chapter I also theorise how money can be understood in moral terms: more 
specifically, that money meanings can be viewed as moral orientations because they 
constitute common dispositions towards the „good‟. 
Having established some theoretical parameters for the sociological study of money 
and morality, Part II (consisting of chapters five to eleven) turns to the task of in-
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depth analysis, findings and discussions related to qualitatively identifying how, in 
the context of talking about the „good life‟, money meanings constitute moral 
orientations amongst participants in this study.  Chapters five to ten are substantive 
chapters defined by the three participant categories used in this study based on 
income: middle-income (chapters five and six), low-income (chapters seven and eight) 
and the downshifters, or those who have chosen to earn less money for quality of life 
reasons (chapters nine and ten).  Each category follows a similar format across its two 
chapters.  I identify the different ways participants orient themselves to money and 
the consequences of these orientations, in relation to personal money meanings, 
public money meanings, and future orientations.  In each case, these meanings are 
discussed in terms of moral orientations, and the sociological implications are also 
considered.  Finally, the second of the two chapters in each category identifies one or 
more narrative type/s relating specifically to their findings.  Four narratives „mix and 
weave different narrative threads‟ (Frank 1995: 76) that provide a comprehensive 
framework for a discussion about the moral orientations of young adults‟ money 
meanings. 
The framework built over chapters five to ten then gives the basis for the final thesis 
discussion in chapter eleven.  Drawing both parts (one and two) of the thesis together, 
I address the implications of the findings, first for the sociology of money and then 
for the sociology of morality.  I argue that recognising the moral dimension of money 
meanings contributes to traditional and contemporary theories in the sociology of 
money.  For example a moral understanding of money opens opportunities to engage 
with broader social critique of money meanings, as classical theorists did, without 
falling back on two-dimensional views of money spheres that are hostile to one 
another.  The thesis findings also draw attention to new possibilities in the sociology 
of morality where the relationship between traditional conceptions of morality and 
contemporary ones have been given too little attention - to the detriment of 
sociological thought, and the society to which it contributes.  
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Part I 
My intention in this thesis is twofold: first, to further understand personal money 
meanings in participant perceptions of the „good life‟; second, to identify the 
centrality of those money meanings to moral orientations that are commonly 
legitimated, identity-defining, and future-giving.  Part I of this thesis sets the scene 
for this exploration.  Beginning with a methodological rationale for the thesis in 
chapter one, I explain how an interest in meaning and „the good life‟ came to be an 
interest in money and morality; how the data was gathered and some of the ethical 
issues encountered along the way. 
Part I also identifies the theoretical foundations of this study.  First, in chapter two, I 
present some classical and contemporary theories in the sociological analysis of 
money, primarily focusing on the contemporary view of monetary meanings by 
Viviana Zelizer.  Against the pervasive but limiting conception of money as a 
rationalising medium that shapes social relations, I outline a multi-dimensional view 
of money that is embedded with and dependent upon social and cultural relations.  
Chapter three explores some specific examples of this multi-dimensional view drawn 
from participant case studies.  For example, my analysis will show that influences 
such as family relationships, desire for economic independence, religious beliefs, or 
occupation also shape money meanings in diverse ways.  .These stories are pivotal to 
understanding the diversity of social and cultural influences that come to bear on the 
meanings of money in the everyday lives of young adults.   
Chapter four continues to establish the foundation of this thesis through the addition 
of literatures exploring how money meanings are shaped through cultural dispositions 
that are morally oriented, in particular by drawing on the theories of Charles Taylor, 
Pierre Bourdieu and Zygmunt Bauman.  These concepts provide a significant means 
to further engage with, and expand, the sociology of money from a cultural 
perspective.    
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1. Chapter One: Process, Inquiry and 
Discernment 
Introduction 
At the heart of this thesis lie questions about the relationship between money 
meanings and moral orientations: what is the meaning of money in participant‟s 
perceptions of the „good life‟?  Are these meanings morally oriented?  If so, how does 
this help us understand both money and morality (and their interrelation) better from 
a sociological point of view?  However, these key research questions didn‟t exist at 
the beginning of the project.  Rather, they arose through the research process, 
becoming clearer as the project moved on.  This chapter is about the formation of 
those key questions and designing the methodological tools to carry them out.   
More specifically, this chapter is about process, inquiry and discernment.  It is about 
the process of constructing a thesis born into early, unstructured inquisitiveness and 
developed into a systematic body of work and discussions.  It is about how inquiry 
stimulates the discovery of connections between data and theory and the tools 
necessary to facilitate their union.  It is also about discerning what makes research 
ethical, how participant voices are heard, and how my own subjectivity may inform 
the research.  „Process‟, „inquiry‟ and „discernment‟ form the structural basis of this 
chapter.  First, „process‟ outlines the project methodology, showing how the process 
of refining the research questions requires finding appropriate „hooks‟ to shape the 
project through as well as engaging with particular (interpretivist and hermeneutic) 
research traditions.  Second, „inquiry‟ draws on the method of research, including the 
tools used to uncover and reveal the data such as grounded theory and the use of 
semi-structured interviews.  Third, „discernment‟ is focused on the critical ethical 
aspects of the project, including acknowledging the things I was unable to learn by 
the people who didn‟t talk to me, and the nature of the project as social critique. 
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1.1. The process of research 
1.1.1. An interest in meaning and „hooks‟ to hang it on 
At the heart of this project lay a desire to better understand the social construction of 
„meaning‟.  I had previously researched faith pathways to meaning within the 
sociology of religion (Verdouw 2001), and wanted to shift the research focus on 
meaning to a broader field of inquiry.  For example, in the general absence of 
religiously-conferred meanings, where do people draw meaning from? What life 
experiences structure our meaning pathways?  And more specifically, how do young 
adults make a meaningful life, in this place, in this time?1 
Sociologically, meaning has significantly underpinned theoretical and methodological 
directions of research as early as Max Weber, who noted that understanding 
(verstehen) involves an interpretative grasp of meaning in social context (Weber 
1968).  Contemporary sociologists continue to engage with meaning-making as a 
central social phenomenon.  For example Eckersley (2004) opens his book about 
wellbeing with the statement that „meaning in life‟ lies at the heart of human 
wellbeing (Eckersley 2004: 2).  Maines, influenced by both Weber and symbolic 
interactionism writes: 
...[N]ot only should we focus our research directly on matters of meaning, 
but we also should examine more fully how meanings are influenced by 
situation contingencies (regardless of scale) and then take the further step to 
study how meanings become historically sedimented and subsequently 
experienced as taken-for-granted obdurancies.  (Maines 2000: 582) 
                                                   
 
1
 The implication is not intended here that „no religion means no meaning‟ but rather to draw upon 
broader sociological sources than religion to better understand how young adults make life 
meaningful. 
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It is from this interest in meaning that themes central to the project emerged2.   
Through further discussion and research, two influences became apparent as „hooks‟ 
to hang the project on to begin to give it some shape: a specific research question and 
a literature review.  
Hook one: what makes a good life? 
The first hook came from a necessary question: how could an interest as broad as  
meaning pathways in young adults lives be sociologically investigated within the time 
and methodological parameters of this thesis? Consequently, the central thesis 
question evolved:  „what makes a good life?‟ The question was intentional for a 
number of reasons.  First, it draws directly on the central interest of how people 
engage in meaning-making.  „Meaning‟, writes Dey (1993: 11), „is essentially a 
matter of making distinctions.‟  That is, meaning is implicated in the distinction 
between what is asserted to be the case (for example, „a good life‟) and what is not.  
Charles Taylor, in outlining the historic sources of the modern „self‟, states:  
To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which 
questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what is 
not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and 
secondary.       (Taylor 1989: 28) 
Second, the question „what makes a good life‟ also has an implicit relationship to 
moral orientations.  As Taylor notes, meanings – or the making of distinctions in our 
lives – are also morally oriented: 
                                                   
 
2
 Notably, the study did not begin with an interest in „money‟.  Money itself became apparent as a major 
theme only when interviews were well under way and analysis of the data had begun.  The process of 
reaching „money‟ as the major research theme is given further context throughout this chapter.   
 
  
 
 
17 
Articulating our qualitative distinctions is setting out the point of our moral 
actions.  It explains in a fuller and richer way the meaning of this action for 
us, just what its goodness or badness, being obligatory or forbidden, consists 
in.        (Taylor 1989: 80) 
Thus, the question „what makes a good life‟ allows a multi-dimensional approach to 
the understanding of „meaning‟.  The question points to qualitative distinctions about 
what people consider to be „good‟, valued, or otherwise.   It provides an opportunity 
to highlight if, and how, meanings are morally oriented.  Furthermore - and most 
importantly - the question provides a means to better understand the social processes 
underlying these moral distinctions and how some definitions of what is „good‟ or not 
may have greater legitimacy than others. 
Hook two: linking with literature 
The second „hook‟ emerged through a review of the relevant sociological literature.  
Contemporary sociologies that address how (usually western) people make sense of, 
and meaning in, their worlds tend to highlight self-identity as negotiated within an 
individualist and consumer society.  According to Bauman, for example, people are 
primarily engaged socially as consumers: 
The road to self-identity, to a place in society, to life lived in a form 
recognizable as that of meaningful living, all require daily visits to the 
marketplace.  …In „modernity mark two‟, the consumers modernity, the 
brute unquestionable fact is that one needs to be a consumer first, before one 
can think of becoming anything in particular.  (Bauman 1998a: 26) 
The ways that consumption is associated with meaning in the sociological literature is 
wide and varied.  De Certeau (2000) and Fiske (2000) stress agency within consumer 
practice as an everyday means of resisting the dominant order.  Baudrillard (2000) 
understands the system of „objects‟ or consumer goods as embodying a new language 
that symbolises hierarchies of social standing.  Douglas and Isherwood (2000) note 
that consumerism is a mode of communication central to shaping culture.  Sampson 
(in Miles 1998: 24) suggests that a culture of consumption requires that everything – 
even „meaning, truth and knowledge‟ - become consumer items.  And Bourdieu (1984) 
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views consumption as a means to secure social distinction and status through lifestyle 
„tastes‟, which as cultural resources establish symbolic systems of „habitus‟ (or 
common dispositions). 
The significance of this early literature review served as a theoretical means to 
establish some research design parameters.  If living in a consumer society is as 
pervasive to modern self-identity negotiation and meaning-generation (both culturally 
and individually) as these approaches suggest, then it follows that an ability or 
inability to consume, or agency related to consumption, may play a significant role in 
what makes a „good life‟.  As Seabrook (1982) states, “the poor do not inhabit a 
separate culture from the rich” and thus everyday understandings of what makes a 
„good life‟ may be mediated through consumer culture and the ability, inability or 
choice to engage in it - or not. 
Consequently, this review informed the structure for sampling young adults.  Three 
categories were chosen: middle-income earners, low-income earners and 
downshifters.  These categories were based on: ability to consume (middle-income); 
limited ability to consume (low-income); and expressed agency related to 
consumption (downshifters).  It is important to note here that the decision to structure 
participant categories in this manner provided not a hypothesis to „prove‟ but rather 
an existing sociological claim to explore more qualitatively and deeply in the context 
of analysing the data findings.  This relationship will be explored more fully in a later 
discussion about the cyclical relationship between data collection and analysis 
through grounded theory. 
In summary, these two „hooks‟ gave some initial shape to the research process.  The 
research question was designed to address a number of sociological issues including  
meaning-making through qualitative distinctions and moral orientations, and their 
social and cultural sources such as consumer society and people‟s ability and choice 
to engage in it. 
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1.1.2. Research traditions for methodological fit 
The concern of the central research question with understanding actions and 
meanings in their social context (Silverman 1993: 24), including qualitative 
distinctions, situates this thesis within qualitatively-driven research traditions. 
Interpretive sociology 
Similarly to much qualitative work concerned with „meaning‟, I locate the proposed 
research broadly within an interpretivist framework, as this standpoint is primarily 
concerned with the how people experience, understand, embody and interpret the 
social world and contexts in which they live.  A Weberian tradition of interpretative 
sociology is an explanatory framework for investigating the social and includes 
understanding motive as attached to the meaning the actor applies to the action.  It 
also draws on the principle of verstehen: that to explore the social the researcher must 
employ an empathetic understanding of people‟s own interpretation of the meanings 
associated with their social location (Weber 1968).    
Furthermore, „meaning‟ in this context is symbolic.  It assumes that people‟s motives, 
actions and thoughts are given significance (or meaning) by something beyond, 
underlying, or embodying them.  For example, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism, Weber (1930) understood the capitalist spirit to derive from the 
specific context of religious ideas that founded them.   Thus the meanings of ascetic 
Protestant practices from which the spirit of capitalism arose were symbolic of the 
belief-based ideas that motivated them.  Frugal practices were meaningful to 
Protestants (or made sense of) only in the context of the religious beliefs that drove 
them.   In this project, I envisage that considerations of what is a „good life‟ in the 
everyday practices of young adults - including their values, attitudes, expectations 
and life-course decisions - are symbolic of sets of ideas and socially contextual 
realities that give them meaning.  For example, one such contextual reality may be 
how income levels affect daily practices and values related to understandings of a 
„good life‟. 
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Hermeneutics 
Interpretative social science also draws on hermeneutics, a nineteenth century term 
related to „making the obscure plain‟ (Blaikie in Neuman 2006: 88) through the 
investigation of text.  Hermeneutics involves an acknowledgement that subjectivity is 
bought into textual readings, but that only a focussed analysis of the whole text will 
reveal a deeper understanding of how the parts relate to the whole.  Meaning may not 
be obvious on the surface, but can be more holistically grasped through detailed study, 
contemplation and the search for connections between different parts (Neuman 2006: 
87-8).  In this project, in-depth interviews provide the textual basis for such detailed 
study.  Taylor, following Geertz, names qualitative descriptions using this kind of 
detailed study as „thick description‟.  This is because it moves into the richer realm of 
greater cultural understanding through highlighting the meaning and reason 
underlying specific cultural and social practices and emotions (Taylor 1989: 80). 
Locating the research question and design within an interpretivist, symbolic and 
hermeneutic framework establishes a foundation for the qualitative methods of 
inquiry to follow.  They provide qualitative inquiry with the tools the project requires: 
the reflexivity and sensitivity as well as attention to detail, complexity and social 
context (Mason 1996) required in researching any expression of „meaning‟ that 
manifests in people‟s experience. 
1.2. Inquiry 
The process of thesis construction continues by developing the research direction 
through grounded inquiry.  Inquiry involves all elements of the research method, from 
participant sampling strategies, to the design and implementation of interviews, data 
analysis and thesis writing.  It also includes a discussion about the structure in which 
these methods are framed; through grounded theory.  I begin the inquiry with this 
discussion. 
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1.2.1. Grounded theory 
Grounded theory is a structured method for organising qualitative inquiry (Strauss 
and Corbin 1990: 24).  Developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967, it is an appropriate 
analysis tool for the study of „meaning‟: 
Grounded theory researchers can both gain thick description and foster 
theoretical development by…attempting to learn the unstated or assumed 
meanings of [respondents‟] statements and shaping their emerging research 
questions to obtain data that illuminate their theoretical categories.  
       (Charmaz 1995: 31) 
Grounded theory is inductive in orientation, moving from detailed observations 
toward generalisable, abstract ideas (Neuman 2006: 30).  This doesn‟t mean, as Ezzy 
notes, that Glaser and Strauss totally reject logico-deductive theory (Ezzy 1996).  
Rather, they question the purpose for using prior theory: will it stunt the process of 
new theoretical developments or open up a dialogue between itself and new meanings 
found in the data (Ezzy 1996: 75)?  In this study, consumer society literature informs 
the choice of three participant categories.  The intent of this categorisation is to 
establish a dialogical relationship between the data, analysis, new meanings located in 
them and pre-existing sociological theories. 
Components characteristic of grounded theory include: a cyclical approach to data 
collection and analysis; ongoing comparisons across data in order to identify common 
dimensions; theoretical as opposed to population sampling; and theoretical 
development beginning with grounded, substantive data which through comparative 
analysis becomes formalized and abstracted.  I acknowledge that conflict is inherent 
in such a method between the desire to faithfully represent meanings and 
interpretations communicated in the vernacular, but to also convey that breadth of 
meaning beyond the singular case.  However, if these challenges are addressed 
properly, grounded theory becomes a source of rich theoretical understanding into the 
complex and interconnected processes of social action (Star 1998: 221-4). 
Consequently, grounded theory forms the basis of inquiry for all data collection and 
tools of analysis used in this project.  The following four sections track the use of 
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grounded theory through sampling and recruitment strategies, interview techniques, 
and analysis of the data through coding. 
1.2.2. Sampling and recruitment strategies 
Corbin and Strauss (1990: 8) stress that grounded theory sampling is not about taking 
a sample of a group of individuals, for example, but rather „in terms of concepts, their 
properties, dimensions and variations.‟  Two criteria form the basis for sampling and 
recruitment in this study.  The first is based on age understood as a life-stage 
dimension - „young adult‟.  The second is based on the concept of „consumer society‟ 
where three variations of the theme are explored in terms of income level and agency. 
Recruitment criteria one: age and life-stage 
The age-range for participation was established as a „young adult‟, or person aged 
between 23 and 38 years of age.  At the time of interviewing (2004-2005), this 
included people, both males and females, born between 1967 and 1981.   This 
„generation‟ received significant critical and scholarly attention throughout the 1990‟s, 
typically in the context of the term „Generation X‟.  The term was coined by Douglas 
Coupland in his 1992 novel bearing that name.  Lynch (2002: 31), while wary of the 
tendency to stereotype an entire age-group, notes that the following attitudes and 
viewpoints may be broadly indicative of the age-group and thus useful as a reference 
point for research: 
 Capitalism and the free market are „fixed points‟ or foundations of social 
organisation while personal meanings are fluid and unclear. 
 A substantial scepticism of tradition and „pre-packaged truths‟ (in any political, 
religious or ideological form) underlies personal fluidity and uncertainty in self-
identity. 
 Although reference points for „meaning‟ may be unclear, the search for meaning 
is deemed to be an extremely important - and personal - pursuit. 
This particular life-stage of „young adults‟ is of interest for a number of reasons.  First, 
these broad generational characteristics engage with important links to the theoretical 
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literature relating to „meaning‟, and „consumerism‟.  Second, it may be assumed that 
between the ages of 23 and 38 young adults begin to (or do already) engage with 
meaningful life-course decisions regarding work, family, lifestyle, values and future-
related goals.  In addition, inherent within such decision-making may be dimensions 
of reflection and contemplation (regarding both the past and future) or meaningful 
struggle taking place through the process of lived experiences (Lynch 2002).   Also 
implicit in decision-making about goals, reflection and contemplation are clear links 
to individual choices about the „good life‟, including distinctions about what is „good‟ 
or otherwise. 
I acknowledge that there is current sociological unrest about the meaning of 
„adulthood‟, particularly with growing numbers of labels such as „adultescence‟, 
„kidults‟, or „half-adults‟ (Blatterer 2004: 2).  These labels point to an increasingly 
„ambiguous developmental stage bridging adolescence and adulthood‟ (Gordon 2005: 
1) relating to the extended avoidance of taking on „adult‟ responsibilities and 
decision-making such as leaving home, getting married and having families or 
making long-term goals (Blatterer 2004: 2).  Consequently, while the ages of 23 and 
38 may appear to be a late age to be named a „young adult‟, these age boundaries are 
intentional.  On the one hand they acknowledge that people at this life-stage may 
choose to prolong their „non-adult state‟ (Keniston in Blatterer 2004: 3), thus my 
choosing mid-twenties rather than late teens as the lower age boundary for „young 
adults‟ in the study.  On the other hand it also acknowledges that standard 
descriptions of adulthood (including stability of relationships, work and income etc.) 
are more of a cultural ideal than reality:   
In fact, research has shown time and again that standard adulthood persists 
as a norm in western societies, its common rejection notwithstanding (e.g. 
Arnett 1997; du-Bois Reymond 1998).  (Blatterer 2004: 4) 
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Thus while acknowledging that young adults may delay certain (ideal „adult‟) 
behaviours, this does not mean that their life-course decisions regarding work, family, 
lifestyle, values and future-related goals are not meaningfully or reflectively made.  
Accordingly, based on this age criteria, 41 people (19 females and 22 males)3 from 
both urban and rural (mostly Hobart-based)4 locations in Tasmania were chosen to 
participate in this study. 
Recruitment criteria two: income considerations 
In addition to fulfilling the age criteria, participants were selected in one of three 
income-related categories chosen for this study: as a middle-income, low-income or 
downshifting participant.   The middle and low-income categories were chosen in 
accordance with statistics taken from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001 
census).  The „Weekly Household Incomes by Family and non-Family Households‟ 
report indicates that 42% of Australian households fall within a weekly income of 
$499 - $1499 (or $26,000 to $78,000 per annum gross), whereas 28% of Australian 
households fall below this figure ($26,000 per annum, the approximate poverty line) 
and 18% above this figure (the remaining 12% were incomplete results).  Participants 
above a minimum income of $499 gross per week (or $26,000) per year were 
categorised as „middle- income‟.  There were no participants with a higher income 
than $130,000 per annum.  Of the 41 participants, 18 were included as „middle-
income‟ (9 females and 9 males).   
                                                   
 
3
 Note that while 41 young adults took part in this study, there were only 40 interviews.  Two males, in 
the low-income category, took part in a shared interview. 
4
 Hobart is a small capital city of Tasmania, an Island State of Australia.  As at March 2003 the 
population of Tasmania was approx. 476,000, and the population of greater Hobart was approximately 
195,000. 
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On the other hand, participants below this figure of $26,000 were categorised as „low-
income‟ 5.  Of the 41 participants, 13 participants were in this category (8 male and 5 
female).  The third category, „downshifters‟ did not have a defined household income 
range, and their incomes ranged from very low-incomes to moderate middle-incomes.  
„Downshifting‟ refers to the voluntary decision of people to put long-term lifestyle 
changes in place that include considerable reduction of their incomes and decreased 
consumption (Hamilton and Mail 2003: 8).  The choice made to prioritise values 
alternative to income and in particular how this shapes participants‟ understanding of 
a „good life‟ is of interest in choosing this category.  Of the 41 total participants, 10 
participants were „downshifters‟ (5 female and 5 male). 
Within the limitation of the age and income requirements for participation in this 
study, I sought the broadest possible representation of young adults in other 
demographic areas (see appendix one for a full descriptions of participant 
characteristics by income category).  For example, I spoke with people from a wide 
range of occupations, from professionals to tradespersons to government employees 
and service providers.  I also spoke with mothers, students, part-time workers and the 
unemployed.    I interviewed participants who were married, single, de facto, 
divorced and partnered, and of sexual orientations alternative to heterosexuality.  
Some participants had children, others did not.  I spoke with people from a range of 
educational backgrounds and spiritual or religious orientations.  Sampling a wide 
range of qualities across multiple cases is called „maximum variation sampling‟, 
although some gaps (outlined below) did appear. Of particular interest here is finding 
the common, shared patterns and experiences of participants despite these variations 
(Lindlof 1995: 126). 
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 It may be noted in the participant characteristics found in appendix one (table two)  that two low-
income participants register incomes of $26,000 - $35,000.  In both cases, their household incomes 
were just above $26,000, drawn from government pensions and also required for the care of up to 5 
dependents. 
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There were two significant gaps in sampling.  First, while a number of participants 
were included who lived well below the poverty line, I did not interview local people 
whose poverty was a catalyst for current crisis in their lives (or the converse).  For 
example, I did not talk to women in housing crisis or males in prison.  While some 
reasons for this were political, they mostly related to gatekeepers (e.g. welfare 
providers) unwilling to provide me with access to their clients.  This is discussed in 
more depth below, in the discussion on „discernment‟ (section 1.3.1). 
Second, I did not specifically sample for ethnicity.  Most of the participants in this 
study were of Anglo and Caucasian heritage with an English-speaking background.  
On the one hand, this is indicative of the homogeneity found more generally in the 
Tasmania population (Boyce and Madden 2000: 2).  Nonetheless, this research cannot 
claim to understand or describe „what makes a good life‟ for young adults from non-
English speaking or non-western ethnic backgrounds living in Tasmania.  A recently 
arrived young Sudanese refugee, for example, may view the „good life‟ in ways 
different to the general cultural understanding of participants in the study. 
Validity and saturation in theoretical sampling 
In this study, representativeness of concepts, and not people, is imperative to validity 
and reliability – a process called „theoretical sampling‟.  Corbin and Strauss explain it 
this way: 
Consistency is achieved because, once a concept has “earned” its way into a 
study through demonstrations of its relationship to the phenomenon under 
investigation, then its indicators should be sought in all subsequent 
interviews and observations.  How consistently is it found?  Under what 
conditions is it found?    (Corbin and Strauss 1990: 9) 
Consequently, interviews were continued until the theoretical categories - in this case 
meanings given to the „good life‟ in alternative income contexts - were „saturated‟.  
Categories are saturated, notes Charmaz (2006: 113), when „gathering fresh data no 
longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of your core 
theoretical categories‟.  Or, as Glaser notes (2001: 191) it is when comparisons 
between different properties of the pattern no longer continue to emerge.  When new 
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connections or pathways between participants‟ understanding of a „good life‟ no 
longer emerged both within income categories and between them, I considered the 
theoretical categories saturated and recruiting participants no longer necessary.  
Sampling strategies 
I began recruiting participants in June 2004 and continued recruiting until February 
2005.  I began with a convenience sample (Rice and Ezzy 1999) by interviewing a 
small number of acquaintances.  I followed up this with recruiting participants 
through snowball sampling in which friends and research participants were asked to 
suggest those in their own associate networks who may be interested in participation 
(Rice and Ezzy 1999).  This method proved effective particularly in the recruitment 
of middle-income and student low-income participants, reflecting my own social 
networks and the networks of those who helped me to contact other participants.  
While most downshifters were eventually recruited through snowball sampling, this 
group proved the most difficult to contact and took the longest to recruit through this 
method.    
To extend my recruiting reach, I also employed volunteer sampling as a means to 
recruit beyond participant networks.  This is a form of advertising calling for 
volunteers to contact me should they fulfil participant criteria and be willing to 
participate (Rice and Ezzy 1999: 46).  I also phoned and visited a range of service 
providers (including government and private welfare centres, housing shelters, and 
counsellors), personally informing them of my research.  Whether sought through 
convenience, snowball and/or volunteer sampling, all potential recruits were given an 
information sheet outlining the aims of the research and what the participant could 
expect if they chose to participate (shown in appendix two [a]). 
1.2.3. Interviewing 
Aims and rationale 
The in-depth interview is defined as a „directed conversation‟ that allows deep 
exploration of a topic that is useful for interpretative inquiry (Charmaz 2006: 25).  As 
Ezzy (1996: 81) states, „interviews are linguistic events that involve the negotiation of 
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meaning‟.  My interest in meaning-making, explored through the question „what 
makes a good life?‟, facilitated the interview as the primary choice of data-gathering. 
As a two-way conversation where both interviewer and participant are implicated in 
the meanings generated at the time, I acknowledge that as a researcher, my own role 
is important to the interview process, and not necessarily simply about minimizing 
the effect of my presence in how the participants reconstruct their understandings of a 
„good life‟ (Seidman 2006: 22).  As Holstein and Gubrium note, all interviews are 
„ineluctably collaborative‟ because interviewers shape conversations in terms of how 
the participants‟ past experiences and recollections are assembled at the interview 
time (Holstein and Gubrium 1995: 50).  Thus, rather than discount my role as 
affecting the data-gathering process, I understand my intrinsic involvement as a 
means to generate the qualities (such as flexibility, depth, reflection, complexity, 
sensitivity, respect, understanding, focus and expressed appreciation) required to fully 
respond to the needs of both the participant and aims of the interview (Charmaz 2006: 
26; Seidman 2006: 23). 
I also acknowledge that participants are able to tell stories about „what makes a good 
life‟ in ways alternative to their interview recounting.  As Holstein notes: 
The interviewer, in a sense, challenges the respondent to produce a coherent 
life narrative out of a designated, limited stock of mutually relevant 
resources.  The result is the respondent‟s artful but culturally grounded 
construction, assembled, in practice, out of the interpretive materials and 
orientations at hand.  Like all interview data, life stories do not simply await 
discovery and articulation, but are constituted within the interactional 
context of the interview, drawing on both situationally relevant and long-
standing resources.   (Holstein and Gubrium 1995: 51) 
In other words, participants accounts of what constitutes a „good life‟ are provided 
from within a particular context and point of view for a particular purpose – reflecting 
the interaction between what both I as interviewer and they as participant bought to 
the interview setting.  This does not mean the stories they told are less „authentic‟ or 
reflective of recollections about a „good life‟ told in other settings (Holstein and 
Gubrium 1995: 50).  Rather, it requires an acknowledgment that meanings I glean 
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from conversations with participants are to some degree a product of our negotiated 
interaction (Seidman 2006: 22). 
In recognition of these issues, I designed the interviews to accommodate contextual 
shifts (e.g. from broad to specific issues) and ongoing reflection (e.g. ability to revisit 
issues) on the part of the participant.  This required the interview schedule to be a 
guide rather than a script to work from, allowing both flexibility within the interview 
and space to explore issues as they arose.  This is constituted in the „informal‟ 
interview, aided with the use of a semi-structured interview guide (see appendix three 
[b]).  This method is „open-ended yet directed, shaped yet emergent, and paced yet 
unrestricted‟ (Charmaz 2006: 28). 
More specifically, the interviews always began with one broad, open-ended question: 
„what makes a good life‟?  This question provided the overall research direction for 
the entire conversation, an „emergent‟ form of interview where themes and ideas 
emerge throughout the interview that the interviewer can pursue as leads to give 
further insight to the research (Charmaz 2006: 29).  In grounded theory, the emergent 
nature of interviewing allows data analysis to begin from the first interview.  In this 
project, the first few interviews unexpectedly highlighted the centrality of money to 
the „good life‟ and showed that participants gave little reference to the anticipated 
sociological category of consumption.  Thus, as these connections between categories 
and themes were identified, knowledge of them was taken into the subsequent 
interviews for „checking out and revision‟ (Corbin and Strauss 1990: 11). 
Logistical and ethical considerations 
As Mason (1996: 42) states, „good qualitative interviewing is hard, creative work.‟ 
This is not least at a practical and planning level.  For example, participant comfort is 
important and was maximized through: conducting interviews in non-threatening and 
private locations (homes, in university interview rooms, or at a convenient 
community centre); establishing rapport; and engaging sensitively with participants 
throughout the interview process.    
In particular, building rapport was important in establishing relational trust both when 
meeting the participant and beginning interview proceedings.  For example I used a 
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small, structured survey (see appendix three [a]) as a means to gather information 
about participants and provide a more formal question-answer style context to begin 
the session, over refreshments and easy conversation.  This „survey‟ process took 
from five minutes to anywhere up to half an hour (not included in the stated length of 
interviews) and greatly enhanced the time available for building rapport and mutual 
familiarisation between myself and participants.  Following this, the length of 
interviews themselves fluctuated from as little as 45 minutes to up to 2 hours in 
duration.  The average interview was completed in one and one quarter hours.     
A highly practical aspect of ensuring comfort for the participant was being sensitive 
to the personal and often emotional aspects of interviewing.  Consequently, I ensured 
participants understood the interview process before it began, including the aims and 
research intentions of the project; their role in the interview and their ability to 
withdraw at any time; the anonymity and confidentiality they were entitled to; their 
need to sign the consent form (see Appendix two [b]); willingness to be recorded and 
the ethical storage of recordings and data.   
Emotional sensitivity was also required.  During the interview, I intentionally 
engaged in „reciprocity and self-disclosure‟ (Edwards 1993: 181), in particular 
answering questions openly and honestly when asked and giving participants small 
anecdotes about my own life when the occasion warranted.  As Edwards (1993) notes, 
this can have two effects.  First, it gives permission for the „research rules‟ as 
participants often perceive them (such as the one-sided question and answer format) 
to be broken, and greater intimacy broached.  Second, it confirms a sense of 
identification, particularly when critical differences between researcher and 
participant are evident; for example in gendered, educational or socio-economic 
differences (Edwards 1993: 192).   
In addition, at times talking about what makes a „good life‟ led into discussions about 
what wasn‟t good about life at all.  A number of participants recounted the recent 
deaths of loved ones.  Some participants reflected on relationship break-ups, 
sometimes after long marriages.  Other participants shared stories of abuse or 
moments of crisis and helplessness.  It was imperative that the participant felt 
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validated and supported in allowing the emotions inevitable in many of these 
accounts to be expressed.    
1.2.4. Data analysis 
Different types of data have informed this project from the beginning, including 
reading literature, note taking, paper writing, field notes and diary writing.  All of this 
includes impressions, draft ideas, observations and hunches about the research 
questions and interview process.  These gave me, as Richards (2005: 40) notes, a 
„firm step into the unknown‟ and informed the structure and design of the participant 
data collection to follow. 
The participant interviews, however, did provide the first steps into understanding the 
research question more deeply.  I began analysis by transcribing every interview 
verbatim.  Early in the analysis, it became increasingly clear that money was one of 
the central themes found in participants‟ understandings of a „good life‟.  Of course, 
money was not the only theme important to a „good life‟: many participants also 
stated that money was not the most important theme, either; it was however the most 
pervasive theme found in the data.  That is, while participants did not talk about 
money all the time, as a theme it did find its way into all of the issues we covered: 
from family to work, to leisure and pleasure, from morality to spirituality or religion, 
or nation and politics, and from personal and collective histories to personal and 
collective futures.   
As a result, the data on money alone taken from the question „what makes a good life‟ 
was rich, in-depth and complex and it was apparent that it deserved a thesis of its own.   
Consequently, the central research question shifted to become more specific: what is 
the place of money in participant‟s understanding of a „good life‟?  The beauty of this 
shift was that the original question „what makes a good life?‟, including the chosen 
participant categories and the interview schedules, all remained appropriate tools of 
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inquiry into the question about money6.  For example, had the original interview 
focus concentrated on the topic of money alone, the data would have taken a quite 
different shape, for two reasons.  First, the question would cease to be a moral one in 
its framing.  Orientations are central to the way humans construct meaning, and 
asking about what is „good‟ frames the question as a moral one; related centrally to 
orientations.  It is only through this means that the way participants talked about 
money could be better understood in moral terms.   
Second, to ask simply about all aspects of money could have limited the data findings.   
For example, as an interviewer I may have been restricted to talking about money-
related issues, and reference to values beyond money may have been addressed 
against the backdrop of conversations about money, perhaps influencing responses.  It 
may also have restricted the interview question in the mind of the participant to 
„money issues‟, and taken on very narrow meanings.  Conversely, asking about a 
„good life‟ was intended so as to not privilege the issue of money (or any other issue) 
over any other possible aspects of the term „good‟ in the mind of the participant.  
Although I did ask questions directly about money, these questions sat along side 
many other questions directed towards a wide variety of everyday life experiences.  I 
was thus able to gain both a glimpse of the moral dimensions of money as related to 
the „good‟ and a sense of how money meanings related to multiple dimensions of 
their everyday lives.   
Coding 
„Coding‟ notes Charmaz (2006: 43-45) „is the first step in moving beyond concrete 
statements in the data to making analytic interpretations.‟  Coding shapes an 
analytical frame upon which the analysis is built.  I used three grounded theory steps 
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 Note that although the research question became more specific, the interview questions remained the 
same - at the same general level of discussions about what makes a „good life‟. 
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for coding the data.  First, „open‟ coding is the breaking down of data analytically 
into concepts that help to interpret phenomena in the data (Corbin and Strauss 1990: 
12).  I did this with the assistance of NVivo7, a CAQDAS (Computer aided 
qualitative data analysis software) package.  Through open coding I identified two 
major ways that participants orient themselves to money: in terms of personal 
frameworks for thinking about money as „good‟ (or otherwise), and in terms of 
political, social or moral „money convictions‟.  Under these two major themes 
concepts were coded hierarchically (see example in appendix four). 
The second step is „axial‟ coding, evidenced in the „work of relating‟ (Konecki 1997: 
133).  Categories are related to subcategories by building relationships between them 
around the „axis‟ of a category (Charmaz 2006).  Here, I began developing the 
relationship between the three participant categories (middle-income, low-income and 
downshifters) and how they relate to the axis of „money‟.  The third coding step is 
„theoretical‟, or „selective‟ coding, which (as in this study) is more likely to occur at a 
later stage of analysis (Corbin and Strauss 1990: 14).  In this type of coding, 
relationships between categories are integrated in such a way as to „weave the 
fractured story back together‟ (Glaser 1978 in Charmaz 2006: 63) to form a whole 
thesis.  This type of coding took place through the development of the three 
categories into four major narratives (the dominant, deferred, flawed and reoriented 
money narratives) that all relate to each other through the central research question of 
„what makes a good life‟.  Narrative is a useful way to present theoretical coding 
because through emplotment and the temporal ordering of events narratives tell a 
cohesive story and clearly convey central project themes (Maines 1993: 21).  Thus in 
this case, I used „stories in service of [my] analyses‟ (Charmaz 2006: 174). 
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 Nvivo is a software tool designed to assist qualitative researchers in the management, design and 
analysis of their data.  It allows the researcher to input textual data and code the text into concepts and 
categories.  It also enables relationships between codes to be identified and mapped, as well as searches 
for concepts, text, and the relationships between them. 
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1.3. Discerning 
Of central importance to research is the ability to discern any ethical dilemmas arising 
from the specific processes and inquiries the researcher chooses to engage with.  In 
this project, two issues stood out in particular.  The research question itself („what 
makes a good life‟) lies at the heart of the first issue because the question affected 
who did and did not talk to me.  Second, I name and justify the motivations for this 
research, and engage in a discussion about the ethical scope of empirical work. 
1.3.1. What I did not learn  
The construction of the central research question „what makes a good life‟? had 
seemed to me – for the reasons listed earlier – to be a rich and multi-dimensional 
means through which to understand „meaning‟ in the lives of participants.  This 
perception was to a certain degree challenged through the participant recruitment 
process, presenting an ethical dilemma that resulted in an inability to hear the 
perspectives of an important group of people: low-income people in financial crisis8. 
As stated earlier, turning to volunteer sampling through community and social 
welfare gatekeepers was one means to broaden my ability to find participants for the 
project.  In doing so, however, I met with some hostility.  While some welfare 
providers were happy to accommodate my project aims (particularly those who I was 
able to speak at length with about the project), others questioned the ethics of asking 
people in crisis about notions of „good‟.  One gatekeeper said that this question was 
not an appropriate question to ask his community, even if worded differently9.  When 
all people can see is a cycle of violence, unemployment, poverty, hunger, and cold, he 
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 For example, those for whom a lack of money is currently presenting them with significant life 
dilemmas such as homelessness or bankruptcy.  
9
 For example we talked about changing the language of the dominant question („what makes a good 
life?‟) to „what is most meaningful for you?‟ or „what things are most important to you‟? 
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continued, then this question is only going to highlight what they lack and how badly-
off they are.  This is in line with Sieber‟s (1993: 20) view that the „needs and fears‟ of 
the population in question will contribute to the basic assumptions they make and 
their current views of the issue. 
The last thing I wished to do was create an interview environment where interviewees 
felt uncomfortable or inadequate because of the research question itself.  In all cases 
where gatekeepers felt this discomfort, I acknowledged their unease and thanked 
them for their time.  The dilemma for me as a researcher was that in not being able to 
interview this group, my research was limited.  That is, due to the research question 
itself, my study inadvertently excluded some of the participants that I set out to talk to 
in the first place.  I had wanted to talk with these participants because my interest in 
what is „good‟ about life is precisely about the distinctions we make between what is 
worthwhile, significant and what is not good, and whether people feel they have 
access to those goods or not.10  It was also directed at discovering which choices have 
greater legitimacy than others.  By implication, I felt the research question would best 
be answered in greatest depth when views representing all of these dimensions (e.g. 
what is good and what is not good) were found.  I also felt that talking to those whose 
experiences fell widely outside the middle-income understanding of „good‟ would 
give greater insight into the extent to which income was implicated in the legitimacy 
of „goods‟ claims.    
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 The fact that people in a state of money crisis felt they did not have a „good‟ life at all is itself 
illuminating for this project, although anecdotally.   In chapter eight, I draw attention to the flawed 
money narrative of the low-income group: a storying in which people feel flawed because they cannot, 
due to their low-incomes, conform to the social norms of the dominant money narrative.  Associated 
with the flawed money narrative is a sense of stigma, the failing of social expectations and inability to 
plan or have lifestyle expectations for the future.  It is clear that when money crisis leads people to a 
point in which they feel they have no „good‟ to speak of, they (like those of the flawed money narrative) 
feel that money is implicated in the constant tension they feel between needs, desires and expectations 
about what is supposed to constitute „good‟ in life. 
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Thus, while some of these questions were answered in part through the low-income 
participants who I was able to talk to, I had to acknowledge that I wouldn‟t be able to 
fully address the question from the point of view of those who feel they do not have a 
good life at all.  Regardless of my (ethical) research intentions, I acknowledge that 
such a research question may appear to be addressing an aspect of life that those in 
poverty and crisis do not feel they are experiencing.  As such, some gatekeepers 
rightly felt that their clients may be unable to contribute to such a conversation - or 
even be negatively affected by it 11.   
Consequently, with the exception of one participant, I was unable to talk to people in 
crisis, particularly of a financial nature.  Had I had more time to re-develop a context-
specific research question still appropriate to the research aims and more time to 
develop a trust-relationship with gatekeepers and their clients, I may have been able 
to address this issue.  However, as Renzetti and Lee note (1993: 27), it is apparent 
that the issue to be researched can often be constrained by the „sensitive character of 
the topic‟.  In this case, I have had to acknowledge that there may have been 
important things in this research I haven‟t learned because of those I did not talk to.  
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 Edwards (1993: 188) notes that for some community members, educational institutions are 
considered to be associated with white, middle-income people, and that as a researcher associated with 
the institution, people „placed‟ her the same way: as „white, middle class and oppressive just by the use 
of an institutional letterhead‟.  As a researcher from the University of Tasmania, I was somet imes 
similarly „placed‟.  For example, as one gatekeeper reminded me, his protectiveness of his clients was 
also due to the fact the people in his care had been researched a lot with nothing ever coming back to 
change the way things actually are.  This is a dilemma from a research point of view, as little research 
would indeed take place if this were a prerequisite for research.  As Glesne (1992: 113) states, „If the 
standard of ethicality is solving the problems of the people from whom we collect data, and solving 
them right away, then much research is doomed never to begin.‟  However, in ethical conflicts of these 
kinds, how I treat the needs of people must always be more important than the research itself.  If people 
already feel „used‟ through research, then I will not take any part in compounding that feeling. 
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1.3.2. Social ethics 
The second aspect for discernment is this: what is the motivation for this project, and 
what is its sociological scope? 
Naming my own motivations for research is important.  As Glesne points out „my 
subjectivity is the basis for the story that I am able to tell.  It is a strength on which I 
build.  It makes me who I am as a person and as a researcher.‟ (Glesne and Peshkin 
1992: 104).  There are two motivations behind this research project.  The first is a 
personal one: curiosity about human meaning bolstered by an enjoyment of the 
research process.  The second motivation is a social one: my desire to contribute to 
something beyond the project itself: in particular, an ongoing discussion about social 
ethics and morality in our society.   
This second motivation latches onto another question related to discernment here: 
what is the sociological scope of empirical work such as this?  Whether or not 
sociology should concern itself with ethical ideals has generated significant debate 
within the social sciences.  Keith Tester (1997) exemplifies one school of thought.  
Tester is clear that his writings contain no ethical ideals for two reasons: because 
ideals are of absolutely no consequence, and because sociology should not concern 
itself with ends such as what it means to be human.  This, he writes, is something a 
sociologist cannot know.  All the sociologist can do, argues Tester, is examine the 
specific social and cultural forms in which humans are treated, treat others and treat 
themselves.  Sociology is thus limited to description, beyond which research becomes 
unethical (Tester 1997: 20). 
Other sociologists disagree.  Haimes (2002), in writing about the contribution of 
theoretical and empirical work in the social sciences to the study of ethics, writes:  
 …by virtue of their theoretical as well as their empirical interests, the social 
sciences have more to contribute than just the „facts‟.  The social sciences 
see legal and ethical issues as primarily social issues and, because of this 
encompassing perspective, can contribute not only to the understanding of 
ethical issues but also to the understanding of the social processes through 
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which those issues become constituted as ethical concerns.    
      (Haimes 2002: 91) 
Haimes (2002: 92-95) outlines the substantial sociological interest in ethical debates 
in social theory.  For example, Weber felt concerned that „how one ought to be and 
how one ought to act can influence a broader cultural trend towards the emergence of 
certain types of society and away from other possible lines of development‟ (in 
Haimes 2002: 92).  Or in Foucault‟s later works, his „practices of the self‟ were 
concerned with individualism and liberalism and the ability to live ethically without 
buying into dominant moral norms.  Anthony Giddens‟ (1991) „life politics‟ raises the 
question of „how should we live‟ and includes the call for a „re-moralising of social 
life‟ as concerned with issues that modern institutions „systematically dissolve‟.   And 
Zygmunt Bauman (1993) sees postmodern ethics as the opportunity for the 
formulation of a new ethics of responsibility because in post-modernity a „radically 
novel understanding of moral phenomena has been opened‟ (in Haimes 2002: 96).12   
While the scope of sociology as an ethical contribution and social critique is a 
contentious issue, I concur with Haimes that empirical research is not just an exercise 
in „scooping up the facts‟ (Nelson in Haimes 2002: 99).  Rather, in light of the readily 
identifiable assumption that the world is a place where „problems abound‟ (O'Leary 
2005: 3), social critique – as a means of highlighting possible explanations and ethical 
responses – becomes intrinsically worthwhile.  It is my view that research can 
facilitate cultural shifts through its concern with the dignity of what it means to be 
human.  As O‟Leary notes (2005: 10), „research findings themselves may suggest the 
downside of the current culture and/or the benefits of an alternative culture‟.  The 
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 Elsewhere, Bauman  teams up with Tester for an interview (a little jarringly perhaps, given Tester‟s 
„no ethical ideal‟ stance) and there argues that social thought is of ethical concern because it is about 
humanity.  Sociology, he notes, should exist for humanity and the dignity of human beings because 
without it, sociology makes little sense (Bauman and Tester 2001b). 
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preconditions for positive change, argues Karp (1996: 202) require „knowledge and 
understanding‟ and thus I think it significant, as Lash maintains, to „want to bring 
ethics out into the streets‟ (in Haimes 2002: 98).   
Conclusion 
The central aims of this thesis, to identify personal money meanings and their relation 
to moral orientations, are embodied through the three elements of process, inquiry 
and discernment.  In reality, no one element is distinct from any other.  Like 
methodological processes that frame everything that happens in research, methods of 
inquiry and the art of discernment also infuse all aspects of the project from its 
inception to its conclusion.  For example, the methodological process of 
understanding meanings (what makes a „good‟ life?) underlies every method of 
inquiry chosen to bring those meanings to analytic life.  Within the inquiry itself – 
whether grounded theory sampling strategies, interview methods, or coding – the 
need for discernment related to the treatment of participants and handling of their 
words is constant.  And the ever-present necessity to discern my own place as a 
researcher, motivations for research and scope of the findings is in constant dialogue 
with the original methodological aims and research tasks, constituting a pervasive 
interweaving of process, inquiry and discernment. 
In addition to the necessity for good communication between these elements, I finish 
with Karp‟s criteria for good research, and apply it to my own: „the ultimate test of a 
study‟s worth is that the findings ring true to people and let them see things in new 
ways‟ (Karp 1996: 202). 
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2. Chapter Two: Money and Society 
2.1. Introduction 
When I met Jessica13 at her rural southern Tasmanain home, she was quite new to 
single-parenthood.  At 38 years old, Jessica is a mother of five dependent children 
who also studies part-time, Jessica‟s bright and engaging eyes, open and forthcoming 
manner, and optimistic demeanour belied her honest description of a hard and 
sometimes loveless life.  Her memories of abuse included more distant, childhood 
ones, and fresher memories of an oppressive marriage she had recently gathered the 
courage to end.   
Central to Jessica‟s descriptions of growing up in a large migrant family and in the 
shadow of an unequal marital relationship, is the meaning and place of money.   The 
primary meaning of money for Jessica throughout most of her adult life has related to 
her experiences of abuse.  Her own earnings, for example, were always taken from 
her control.  Money for new clothes was forbidden except in the case of the males of 
the house; as was money for meat.  Family money was primarily used for her 
husband‟s needs and his trips away from home. In many ways, money embodied 
Jessica‟s inequality – as a female, as an adult woman, and as a parent.  
Consequently, Jessica doesn‟t like money.  She has little faith in it, even now that her 
circumstances have changed.  Left with her husband‟s debts and the costs of 
sustaining a family of six on fortnightly welfare payments, life is hard.   There is 
never more food than the bare minimum, clothes are from op-shops and the 
disconnection notices are frequent.  Jessica constantly worries about money, and feels 
she is a bit of a „loser‟ with it.  In general, money usually represents what Jessica 
cannot have, rather than what she can. 
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 Like all participants in this study, Jessica‟s real name has been changed to protect her anonymity.  
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At the same time however, her changed circumstance has also shifted the meaning of 
money in other ways.  Life may be hard financially, but life is hers, and the finances 
are now hers to control.  Money now also represents independence: from financial, 
emotional and physical abuse.  She says she had to „get smart, really quick‟ in 
learning to arrange the financial aspects of her life.  Her independence allows the 
possibility of thinking about working and one day even being financially „ok‟.   
Worlds away, but only right next door in Hobart, is Carin: a single 31 year old; a 
specialist nurse earning almost $60,000 per annum; a home-owner; and a self-
confessed „addictive traveller‟.  She is a bubbly, talkative, brown-eyed woman who 
over the course of our discussion becomes increasingly contemplative and reflective 
in mood.   The question of „what makes a good life‟ makes her increasingly unsettled 
as she realises through her own responses that she isn‟t necessarily living out what 
her answers are.   
Again, money is an integral part of how meaning is constructed in her life.  Money is 
an „enabler‟ for Carin; a means to an end.  This is problematic however, as the ends 
for which she has put money to use – such as her mortgage or ten years of constant 
overseas travel - leave a bitter taste in her mouth.  She feels an inner disillusionment 
brewing over the lack of depth and direction in her life, and this taints everything 
including her work, money, and what she does with it: „It just feels a bit directionless 
really,‟ she admits. 
However, apart from her inner struggles and the fact that having a mortgage hanging 
over her head taints Carin‟s understanding of a „good life‟, the meaning of money in 
her practical uses is straightforward.  Carin chose nursing as a profession because it is 
well-paying and flexible work that allows her to do whatever she wants.  Money is 
important in this equation: if she could work less for the same income, she would.  
Money has allowed her to travel, own a house, buy paintings, renovate the house and 
plan her next trip.  She realises money won‟t buy her happiness; nevertheless it is still 
worth having. 
Jessica and Carin‟s stories suggest that how people understand the meanings of 
money in a „good life‟ are not only highly contextual but shifting along with changing 
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life circumstances and social/cultural location.  Jessica evokes descriptions of low-
income, welfare-recipient meanings of money related to financial difficulty, going 
without, restraint, worry and issues of dependence.  Carin‟s middle-income context 
affords her different meanings of money, related to choice, experiences, plans, and 
also the ability to reflect on the worth and meaning of what money buys her.   Before 
her divorce, Jessica‟s socio-economic status was mostly likely closer to Carin‟s; but 
the relational dynamic of her marriage mitigated against money having the same 
meanings for both women – instead, for Jessica, money embodied the abuse of power 
and the experience of inequality. 
For the vast majority of the participants in this study – like Jessica and Carin – money 
is a basic, everyday category imbued with particular meanings in their understanding 
of „a good life‟.  What makes the analysis of participants‟ meanings sociological is 
their embeddedness in cultural and socio-economic structures that point beyond the 
economic functions of money to the social, cultural and moral meanings of money in 
our society.   
The idea that culture and social relations influence money meanings is not a new one.  
Research given to identifying social and cultural meanings of money is gaining 
momentum in the sociology of money and related fields such as anthropology and 
even economic sociology (Zelizer 2007: 1056).  However, neither are these ideas old.  
A systematic social and cultural interpretation of money was born only in the last few 
decades and set against a traditional sociology of money understood from primarily 
economist and functionalist perspectives.  The remainder of this chapter is given to 
clarifying the evolution of thought that has taken place in the sociology of money, 
and how this thesis fits within those shifting parameters. 
2.2. The sociology of money 
2.2.1. Georg Simmel (1858-1918) 
The birth of the „sociology of money‟ is widely attributed to German-born inter-
disciplinary academic, Georg Simmel.  His major work on money, „The Philosophy 
of Money‟, was first published in 1900 and constitutes the primary reference point for 
most work within the sociology of money so far.  This is not because Simmel was the 
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first or only classical sociologist to write about money; for example, Marx before him, 
and Durkheim and Weber during Simmel‟s time also wrote about the place of money 
in a changing society (Deflem 2003).  Rather, it is because of the way Simmel wrote 
about money.   Marx, Durkheim and Weber all treated money as one element of an 
all-encompassing explanation for modern social change (e.g. the capitalist mode of 
production, shifts in social morality, or rationalisation respectively).  Alternatively, 
Simmel studied the money economy without subsuming its importance within grand 
theories of social change (Deflem 2003: 89).   
Instead, Simmel viewed the money economy independently of specific forces like the 
division of labour or capitalism, and money itself as central to social changes 
associated with modernity (Deflem 2003: 86).   Implicated in Simmel‟s refusal to 
specialise in the manner of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, was his wider social theory 
of „relationism‟.  Simmel argued that no one aspect of society can be understood 
outside of its relation to the whole.  Thus money gives insight to the social 
mechanisms of society in toto, and conversely the social structure of society gives the 
context and framework in which the nature of money can be explored as a 
phenomenon (Turner 1986: 95). 
Further to „relationism‟, Turner identifies two more central themes in Simmel‟s 
formal sociology: „sociation‟ and „social forms‟.  „Sociation‟ refers to Simmel‟s 
understanding of society as neither just individuals nor reified structures; rather, the 
„social‟ begins with social interactions and social institutions that come to exist from 
the totality of social relations.  „Social forms‟ (such as families, groups, or 
associations) are formed through ongoing sociation.  Social forms become cultural 
forms with reified structures because they take on a logic of their own, for example 
when forms like money become congealed and assume autonomy over the individuals 
who created them (Turner 1986: 95-6).  From this basis, Simmel studied numerous 
social phenomena: fashion, law, women, poverty, the city, art and money among 
others.  Simmel claimed that regardless of the focus, these seemingly disparate issues 
are related through the premise that one topic is sociologically related to all other 
phenomena of social life.  Or, as Deflem describes Simmel‟s sociology, that „any 
sociology of particularities is at once a „total‟ sociology‟ (Deflem 2003: 70).   
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It is within this formal sociology that Simmel outlined two important themes about 
money. The first is the nature of money as a symbol of economic value.  Infinitely 
divisible, interchangeable and quantifiable, money replaces every specific economic 
value (e.g. object) and is thus value-neutral (Simmel 1978: 120-8) and „colourless‟ 
(Simmel 1991: 19).  Money also represents „pure means‟ (the most independent value) 
and as such it is the most extreme example of a means that becomes an end or 
purpose: 
The inner polarity of the essence of money lies in its being the absolute 
means and thereby becoming psychologically the absolute purpose for most 
people, which makes it, in a strange way, a symbol in which the major 
regulators of practical life are frozen.  (Simmel 1978: 232)  
Simmel argued that as an ultimate expression of all values, money is abstracted above 
all objects of value and becomes the focal point through which all things opposed or 
contradictory find a common purpose or connection.  That is, the quality of money 
lies in its quantity (Simmel 1978: 237 and 259). 
The second major theme highlights how the nature of money – abstracted and 
absolute - affects social relationships.   Indifferent and objective, money 
impersonalises relations between people.  For example, money sits between person 
and association or property and owner, distancing one from the other, impersonalising 
and providing freedom and independence (Simmel 1991).  Simmel also marked the 
correlation between the modern phenomenon of the money economy and 
individuation.  For example, modern individuals are independent from any one 
particular producer or supplier.  It is the anonymity and indifference of others to a 
person – and the need to rely on oneself - that creates individualism (Simmel 1991: 
21):  
Money, as the most mobile of all goods, represents the pinnacle in this 
tendency.  Money is really that form of property that most effectively 
liberates the individual from the unifying bonds that extend from other 
objects of possession.     (Simmel 1978: 354) 
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On one hand, Simmel‟s utilitarian account is a cultural critique.  He argues social life 
will become increasingly „soulless‟ through the formation of impersonal associations: 
„The complete heartlessness of money is reflected in our social culture, which is itself 
determined by money‟ (Simmel 1991: 346).  On the other hand, Simmel was 
cautiously optimistic about money as a pure symbol signifying freedom for 
individuals, or the expansion of individual and subjective possibilities.  What is very 
clear is that for Simmel, the flux and flow of modern society and culture is largely 
dependent upon the effects and determination of the money economy.  In chapter 
eleven of this thesis, I argue that Simmel‟s understandings of the consequences of the 
money economy in social and cultural terms continue to have validity, albeit from a 
different theoretical basis.  However, through the following chapters, I will also argue 
that Simmel‟s account remains sociologically limited as there is little 
acknowledgement of the ways in which meanings are also shaped by social, relational, 
and moral dimensions of lived experience. 
2.2.2. Contemporary sociologies of money  
Despite Simmel‟s early sociological focus on money in modern society, the study of 
money is well known for its discontinuous and fragmented treatment within sociology 
during the 20th century (Baker and Jimerson 1992; Deflem 2003; Ingham 1998; 
Keister 2002; Singh 1997; Zelizer 1989).  There are a number of reasons for this.  
First, Simmel‟s outsider status as an academic of his time coupled with his refusal to 
locate his ideas in relation to a „pivotal force‟ (such as Marx‟s capitalist economy) 
lent ambiguity to his reputation as a classical thinker, and subsequently also to the 
place of his work in the history of sociological thought.  As a result, the sociological 
study of money that does exist has tended to be vague and plagued by „internal 
inconsistencies‟ (Deflem 2003: 86-7). 
Second, the primary location for the study of money in modern society has 
traditionally been within economics and the study of financial markets.  Zelizer notes 
this tendency: 
The prevailing economic view absolutized a market conception of money as 
operating in its own morally neutral sphere with autonomous laws, 
independently from social relations.   (Zelizer 2007: 1061) 
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With little disciplinary exchange between economics and sociology (Keister 2002; 
Nelson 1998), money as a sociological subject has largely been treated either as an 
incidental subject, or (as already inferred) as embedded within the context of a 
particular social force such as a Marxist interpretation of the capitalist market 
economy (Baker and Jimerson 1992: 1-3).  Most significantly, the subject of money 
within sociology has not been treated much at all.  After Simmel‟s work and up until 
recent decades, a significant „silence‟ (Singh 1997) continued to mark the sociology 
of money, punctuated only by the 1950s and 60s functionalist analysis of money by 
Parsons (1956) and Smelser (1963).  For example, Parsons and Smelser identified 
money as a „generalised medium of interaction‟ (Deflem 2003: 86), without 
significant reference to Simmel‟s theories of money at all. 
More recently there has been a shift towards re-engagement with the issue of money 
within sociology from a number of different perspectives (Deflem 2003).  Some sit 
within wider theories of modernity, such as Giddens‟ discussion about money as a 
disembedding mechanism in his structuration theory (Giddens 1990; Giddens 1991); 
or Habermas‟ reference to money and lifeworlds in his „Theory of Communicative 
action‟ (Habermas 1984).  While these particular studies give little reference to 
Simmel‟s classical theories, many more theorists are re-engaging with Simmel‟s work 
through accounts of money in cultural studies, post-modern analysis or as a focus of 
sociological inquiry in its own right (Baker and Jimerson 1992; Deflem 2003; Ingham 
1998; Keister 2002; Singh 1997; Smelt 1980; Zelizer 1989).   
Consequently, the contemporary sociology of money is multi-dimensional in 
approach.  For example, theoretical foci may include either structural or cultural 
dimensions of money, microlevel or macrolevel analysis, or presuppose money as an 
independent variable (money as a cause or facilitator) or a dependent variable (money 
as a consequence or result) (Baker and Jimerson 1992: 4-5).  Structural theorists tend 
to outline the way in which money economies structure and shape social relationships: 
for example, relationships of power or oppression, or how money flows are reflected 
in global economic structures (Baker and Jimerson 1992: 6-8).  On the other hand, a 
cultural and social perspective primarily considers the meanings, social definitions, 
cognitive classifications, and interpretations given to money.  In addressing questions 
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of how money relates to meaning and morality, this cultural/social perspective will 
now be the primary focus. 
2.2.3. A cultural approach to money in society 
Cultural perspectives tend to propose that „culture determines what money is, what is 
used as money, and how money is used‟ (Baker and Jimerson 1992: 7-9).  That is, 
cultural studies of money are more likely to treat money as a consequence of culture 
(or dependent variable) rather than claim – as Simmel did – that the money economy 
shapes culture.  Subsequently, cultural perspectives also tend to critique historical 
sociological assumptions about the meaning of money.  Among others, I will 
reference the work of Viviana Zelizer in particular, who provides a critical challenge 
to traditional conceptions of the meaning of money in society. 
Through her work, Zelizer (1989; 1994; 1998a) challenges traditional sociological 
understandings of money as both purely economic, or „colourless‟ in character and 
beyond the reach of cultural and social influence.  Zelizer (1989: 346-7) summarises 
five of the classical conceptions given to the place of money in its sociological history 
so far (citing theorists such as Simmel, Marx, Weber, Parsons and Smelser):   
1. Money is understood in economic terms as quantitative, divisible, and 
homogenous;   
2. All „market money‟ is considered equal money, and has the same meaning;   
3. Money is value-neutral and distinct from non-pecuniary values;   
4. The multiplying and corrupting nature of money leads to an inevitable 
commodification of society, where everything is drawn into its web of 
significance; and 
5. Money is able to transform non-pecuniary values, but not the converse.  For 
example, Simmel argued that money has no need for ethical consideration and 
is not tied to extra-economic limitations. 
Zelizer contends that these limited understandings of market money are blind to the 
ways in which money is invested with moral, social and religious meanings.  They 
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also discount how social relationships and values invest money with meanings and 
patterns of social use (Zelizer 1994: 18).   Zelizer (1989: 348-9) and Singh (1997: 11) 
highlight studies (e.g. Douglas and Isherwood 2000) as more useful in understanding 
the place of money in (usually non-industrial) culture outside their economic-ascribed 
meanings.  However, as Singh notes, anthropologists still tend to view western money 
markets in economic terms rather than viewing the non-western views of money (e.g. 
multiple monies with multiple economic and extra-economic meanings) as 
challenging western ones (Singh 1997: 11). 
Drawing from C.Wright Mills (1956), Singh‟s research into the place of money in 
marriage and banking highlights a different conceptualisation of the meaning of 
money in modern society: 
The sociological imagination has to embrace both market and non-market 
phenomena.  Money, banking, the economy, the operation of the market – 
not only are these fit subjects for sociological inquiry but they are central to 
the linking of personal troubles to public issues.  For instance, examining 
money as an idiom of communication and a symbol of meaning in marriage 
and banking has led to studying how people manage and control money in 
marriage; how they talk about money and construct its meaning; the way 
money symbolises and gives meaning to aspects of their marriage and 
banking; and how their marriage and banking shapes the characteristics of 
money...  It results in questioning the way the meanings of multiple monies 
have been constructed and the choices of lifestyle, work, marriage and 
family that have resulted from those meanings.  (Singh 1997: 167) 
Similarly, Zelizer asks questions related to the use of domestic money by married 
women in the U.S. between 1870 and 1930, such as how money circulates within a 
family, how it is allocated and used, and the effect of changing social relationships on 
the meaning of money (Zelizer 1989: 351).  The findings give Zelizer reason to 
counter the five classical conceptions of money with her own five-part model of 
modern money, a model she also uses in her subsequent sociological writings (Zelizer 
1989: 347):   
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1. While indeed a rational tool of the market, money also exists outside of the 
market and is influenced by cultural and social factors; 
2. There is no single or unified money; rather multiple kinds of money, each 
qualitatively distinct, earmarked in multiple ways for multiple uses, and 
imbued with meanings arising from their social and cultural context.  Market 
money is just one type of money.  In other words, „not all dollars are equal‟  
(Zelizer 1989: 343); 
3. Consequently, there is no single, „all-purpose‟ money.  Rather, money is 
qualitatively heterogeneous, subjective, and not always replaceable for other 
money; 
4. The distinction between value-neutral money and non-pecuniary values as 
mutually exclusive is a false divide; and 
5. Money as absolute freedom and power is untenable, as factors outside the 
economy shape and constrain the uses of money: who allocates it, who 
receives it, who uses it and how it is used, and who controls it.    
This model has important implications for the future of the sociology of money, as 
Zelizer herself notes:  
A fully sociological model of money must show how, how much, and why, 
even in the heartland of capitalism, different networks of social relations and 
systems of meaning mark modern money, introducing controls, restrictions, 
and distinctions that are as influential as the rationing of primitive [sic] 
money.      (Zelizer 1994: 24)  
Consequently, the model of money that Zelizer promotes highlights the place of 
social and cultural relations in the determination, interpretation and meanings of 
money.  Here, the meaning of money is also circumscribed by cultural relations, not 
merely cultural relations by money as predominantly found within traditional and 
utilitarian theories.  As such, cultural studies such as Zelizer and Singh‟s play an 
important role in building towards a greater breadth of analysis in the sociology of 
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money through the recognition that every economic or money transaction „depends 
on continuously negotiated meaningful interpersonal relations‟ (Zelizer 2007: 1060).   
Before going on, I will briefly define the meaning of „money‟ as a central concept 
related to this work. 
2.3. Defining money 
It is not necessary here to outline a general theory of money, as recent discussions in 
the sociology of money have been want to do (Ingham 2001: 306).  Nevertheless, it is 
important that what is meant by „money‟ in this research is clear. 
The emphasis in this thesis is on money meanings.  As such, the focus on money is 
from the user perspective, not primarily the producers (Dodd 2005: 401).  The 
emphasis on the definition of money for this thesis will be the kinds of money that 
young adults tend to use and account for in any description of a „good life‟.  This may 
include both „precious and base metal coin, convertible and unconvertible notes, 
cheques, plastic cards, book and electronic balances‟ (Ingham 2001: 306).  It may 
also include the types of money Zelizer identifies as „other highly liquid tokens of 
transferable rights‟ such as an (investment) art object, casino chip or an investment 
diamond (Zelizer 2000: 384-5). 
The diversity of monetary forms this encapsulates recalls Hart‟s statement that today, 
money „is more plural and dynamic than at any time previously‟ (Hart in Dodd 2005: 
402).  The danger in defining money in such broad and diverse terms, argues Dodd, is 
that there is left no „general circuit to which an equally generalised form of “money” 
corresponds‟.  Thus Dodd is justified when he returns to Simmel‟s definition of 
money in its most generic category as a „non-place‟ or „utopia‟ where „form and idea 
coalesce‟ (Dodd 2005: 409).  In other words, money is not only all those diverse 
forms of media and denominations that may be classified as such – currencies (plastic, 
paper or metal), e-money, financial investments or even air-mile redemption points.  
Money is also an enduring idea because its economic ideal represents a system of 
measurement in which everything can be given quantitative value.  This ideal doesn‟t 
exist empirically, as Zelizer‟s work clarifies (Zelizer 1994).  However as Dodd notes, 
it must be given that as an idea,  
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Simmel‟s concept of money presents a conceptual limit-edge against which 
all forms of money develop and take shape, however diverse they might be.  
       (Dodd 2005: 409) 
This broad definition of money is useful for the purposes of this thesis, because how 
participants in this study reflect upon money is not merely in terms of the forms 
money takes and what the money is transferable for.  Rather, it is also the ideas about 
money that co-exist with those forms that come to reflect the value and meaning 
participants give to money.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted some of the changes in thought about the place of money 
in society.  Of particular interest to this thesis is the shift from viewing the money 
economy as structuring and shaping social relationships to one in which money is 
understood to be shaped by cultural and social meanings, definitions and 
interpretations.  However, while a cultural approach to understanding money 
meanings provides the foundation for analysis in this thesis, there are also significant 
gaps in this field.  For example, Baker and Jimerson (1992: 11-12) identify the 
requirement to study the role of cultural influences outside of the family sphere, 
which – in particular, through Zelizer and Singh‟s work – comprise the prevailing 
focus of cultural analysis so far.   
In the following chapter, case study analyses will include the exploration of the ways 
in which social and cultural aspects of everyday life influence money meanings, with 
examples drawn from participants‟ understanding of what constitutes a „good life‟.  In 
this I will focus on expanding Zelizer‟s view of monetary meanings.  For example, 
my analysis will show that influences such as family relationships, desire for 
economic independence, religious beliefs, or occupation also shape money meanings 
in diverse ways.  These stories are pivotal to understanding the diversity of social and 
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cultural influences that come to bear on the meanings of money in the everyday lives 
of young adults14.  Consequently chapter three broadens the cultural field of inquiry 
beyond the spotlighted „family‟ focus on money meanings (Baker and Jimerson 1992: 
689).  Rather than confining analysis to a particular „type‟ of money (such as 
domestic money), the discussion opens the scope of analysis to include other relations 
in which participants‟ practices about money relate to the „good life‟ - such as the 
relation of religious belief to money meanings - that have been given scant, if any, 
analytical attention by contemporary theorists in the sociology of money.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
14
 These analyses constitute single case-studies and do not necessarily represent the attitudes or 
experiences of the wider participant group in which they are found. 
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3. Chapter Three: Social and Cultural Influences 
on Money Meanings 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Most important, from my perspective, is the…common presumption among 
economists and sociologists alike: what I call the twinned stories of separate 
spheres ...  With separate spheres, we have the assumption that there are 
distinct arenas for rational economic activity and for personal relations, one 
a sphere of calculation and efficiency, the other a sphere of sentiment and 
solidarity.       (Zelizer 2007: 1059) 
In this view of the „separate spheres‟ lies the assumption that sociality and economic 
life are separate, distinct spheres, mutually exclusive and even hostile to each other.  
In refuting the separate spheres, Zelizer goes beyond what she argues would be a 
„thin, flat relations of network analysis‟ to argue that money works through the 
relational richness of negotiating meanings that also constitute the „actual production 
of cultural meaning‟ (Zelizer 2007: 1063).  In this chapter I take up Zelizer‟s critique 
of the separate spheres view and expand on her view of money meanings through 
three case studies.  These studies highlight how monetary meanings are shaped 
through different social and cultural relations.   
First, I revisit Jessica‟s family background and current circumstances as a means to 
discuss how money meanings depend on factors - like family relations and culture – 
far beyond the economic market.  Following this, I recount Hannah‟s story to 
demonstrate how religious values and networks strongly influence money meanings.  
Finally, I highlight how in Kayla‟s case the contemporary culture of self-reliance is 
shaped through relationally generated meanings that result in money meanings quite 
different to market-driven ones.  The fact that these three case studies are all female is 
not meaningful to the study.  There are a number of male participants‟ stories that 
could have been similarly recounted, however the combination of these three 
women‟s stories allowed for the broadest set of relevant examples within the fewest 
case studies and thus provided the opportunity to minimize repetition. 
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3.2. Jessica: money and family 
Jessica‟s story has already been partly told at the beginning of chapter two.  In this 
section, I draw attention to Jessica‟s family life to show how family culture and 
family relations – both from the structural point of view and a subjective view - are 
primary life experiences through which Jessica‟s understanding of money is formed 
beyond market meanings.   
3.2.1. Structural family context 
As a divorced, single-mother on a low-income, Jessica sits firmly within a group of 
financially disadvantaged families well-documented in Australia.  A longitudinal 
study across several developed nations, including Australia, shows that personal 
wealth growth is slowed substantially by divorce: the same study also notes that in 
percentage terms, women are financially less well-off than men in both marriage and 
after divorce (Zagorsky 2005: 421-2).  Further studies show that sole parent families 
continue to be at highest risk of poverty in Australia, with one in five of all sole 
parent families in Australia currently living in poverty (Harding 2001: 15).  The 
poverty line in Australia in June 2005 was set at $615.00 per week15 after tax and 
before housing costs for a single parent not in the workforce with four dependent 
children (MIAESR 2005).  As a single parent with five dependent children, Jessica 
earns approximately $550 per week from Centrelink, consequently living well below 
the poverty line.   
Material poverty is a pervasive and limiting structure within which Jessica interprets 
the meaning of money in her life.  Research has shown financial worry to be one of 
the greatest emotional stressors in the everyday lives of single mothers (Makosky 
1982; Richards 1989).  Money was talked about at every turn throughout Jessica‟s 
                                                   
 
15
 This figure is higher than the poverty line figure detailed in section 1.2.2 because it is adjusted for 
number of dependents. 
  
 
 
55 
interview, particularly in relation to hardship and worry.  Life for her is financially 
difficult: „things are really tight‟, Jessica says.  She names multiple items that she and 
her children must do without, because there is no money to buy them.  For example, 
she explains that sometimes a „big shop‟ for her family of six is seventy dollars worth 
of food in her grocery trolley, and that meals repeatedly comprise pancakes, noodles 
and rice.  She is familiar with disconnection notices, op-shop clothes, walking, and 
the protests of her growing daughters who cannot have the „fancy‟ clothes their peers 
and the media flaunt as necessary.  In addition to constantly worrying about money, 
Jessica also describes her reliance on social security as a „hard experience‟ because, 
she says, „I‟ve felt that I‟ve had to grovel for everything‟ and that she is „branded‟ as 
a burden and a hassle.   
It is evident that Jessica‟s family status (as a single parent) and consequently her 
depressed socio-economic context, plays a primary role in the meanings she ascribes 
to money in her perception of a „good life‟.  Money means hardship and scarcity, 
worry and restraint.  In a nutshell, Jessica says of money:  
„I don‟t like money, and I don‟t like owing people money.  And my father 
bought us up with a very strong belief that money is evil, and it‟s no good.  
And you work yourself to death and you‟ve still got nothing.‟ 
3.2.2. Subjective family experiences 
But this is only part of the story.  Family plays a role in Jessica‟s meanings of money 
in a way other than the structural „family category‟ she fits within as a single, non-
earning, welfare recipient mother of five. Jessica also talks openly and at length about 
her childhood family and marriage history as peppered with physical and financial 
abuses.  Her low-income family status may provide one thread of experience through 
which to talk about money, but her history of inequality as a child, a wife, and a 
woman provides another. 
As a child, Jessica lived amongst physically abusive men and a „controlling mother‟. 
When describing her mother, money enters the picture immediately, and she says, „I 
don‟t know what values mum has except money‟.  Jessica discloses her mother‟s 
wealthy European childhood, and subsequent marriage and migration into a poor, 
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rural Tasmanian existence.  Jessica says that her mother blamed her and her siblings 
for her hard, poor life, and that she now expects her children to give her everything - 
including money - even when Jessica can‟t afford to buy things for her own family.  
Taught as girls they would become „nothing‟, Jessica viewed marriage as a „way out‟ 
of her childhood home.  However when married at the age of sixteen, „life was very 
much the same‟.  Her „controlling‟ husband hit her, prevented social contact with 
others, managed all her income, and forbade her to buy new clothes or meat for 
herself or her family (except himself and their son).  In addition, her experiences were 
mostly „hidden‟ from public view.  In her study of finance within marriage and co-
habiting relationships, Singh notes that there is a „reality of unequal incomes‟ in 
marriage that is not addressed at all when a marriage is current: 
 Married and cohabiting couples do not discuss „equality‟, „power‟ and 
„control‟.  Where there is discernible difference in financial status between 
the two partners, this helps mask the gap between the ideology of equal 
partnership and the reality of one partner‟s financial dependence.    
      (Singh and Lindsay 1996: 68) 
Jessica lived in an unequal relationship for over twenty years.  After a particularly 
severe incident of physical abuse, Jessica separated from her husband with the help of 
her family and a local welfare agency.  Left with debts she is still paying off, Jessica 
was afraid she wouldn‟t even be able to put food on the table for the children.  Since 
then, living has been financially difficult and fraught with worry. 
However, despite these financial tensions and strains, Jessica‟s experience is similar 
to that of other women reported in large-scale studies investigating the place of stress 
in the lives of single mothers.  These women are typically found to manage and cope 
with such stress in active and self-reliant ways (Olson and Banyard 1993: 54; 
Richards 1989).  For example, while it cannot be ignored that Jessica doesn‟t like 
money, she also recognises that she now manages money well and that she is learning 
about money fast.  She notes she has had to „get smart‟ and „think quick‟ when it 
comes to money problems.  For instance, she helps out her aging neighbour who 
gives her meat in exchange.   
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Jessica also refuses to abuse the welfare system.  She sees family and friends taking 
advantage of social services and declares that she wants a „clean nose‟ (a clear 
conscience) and the knowledge that she can manage without financial dishonesty: „I 
won‟t go down that path‟ she says.  In saying this Jessica reveals that she values 
financial independence and self-reliance.  For example, she is very cautious about 
relationships where financial support is an issue lest she become „caged up again‟.  
She intends to pay back all her debts in full, and doesn‟t accept charity (she would not 
even accept biscuits I bought to share for afternoon tea).  Being independent also 
gives her a chance to study and hopefully one day work so that perhaps there will 
come a time when she doesn‟t have to struggle so much financially.  This means 
being able to pay bills on time (or before) and even perhaps save some money.  Most 
important to Jessica is that she teaches her children that if they stick at it and work 
hard, they will find jobs and won‟t become reliant on government welfare. 
This part of Jessica‟s story highlights a number of further factors at play in the 
meanings Jessica gives to money.  First, it is evident that it is not only structurally 
defined family status that shapes personal meanings of money: subjective family 
experiences and histories also play a significant role.  This is because Jessica‟s 
understanding of money as something she doesn‟t like draws on experiences far more 
complex than poverty realised through the event of divorce.  Her mother‟s life-long 
bitterness over wealth and opportunities lost and a husband‟s litany of financial 
exploitations are just a few ways in which ongoing experiences of inequality have 
contributed towards and defined the meaning of money for Jessica: 
„And then I got married, and all he had was bills, bills, and always bought 
things and went away on trips he did.  And…we just had to keep picking up 
the pieces and keep going.  So I have very little faith in money.  I don‟t like 
it.‟ 
It is also evident that despite her family status or category, subjective family 
experiences and history shapes Jessica‟s view of money.  Even though previously 
married to a working male whose added income most probably kept the family 
income well above a low-income status, the reality of Jessica‟s „hidden‟ circumstance 
meant she nevertheless experienced the realities of living a low-income lifestyle 
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within the nuclear family.  For example, Jessica was also required to pay off the 
family car herself through the children‟s benefits.  Thus, despite the fact that 
statistically the family had money, this wasn‟t the reality for Jessica or her daughters 
as staple items such as food, clothing and transport were withheld or implicated in a 
form of financial deprivation. 
3.2.3. Independence 
Moreover, it is also clear that the financial deprivation Jessica experienced within her 
marriage consequently shifts the meaning of money for her in unexpected ways when 
her divorce leaves her experiencing relative poverty.  Jessica, like many other sole-
parent women faced with financial hardship, demonstrates tenacity and creativity in 
her attempts to make money ends meet.  Jessica had already experienced financial 
hardships within the marriage.  Divorce gives Jessica more than financial difficulties 
to deal with – it also gives her independence to deal with those hardships in her own 
way.  Jessica was frightened of the unknown, frightened of receiving no financial 
support from her husband, frightened about being poor and the incursion of debt 
required in establishing herself autonomously.  But the fear was a price worth paying 
for her independence: 
„It‟s really good, I wouldn‟t swap now for anything.  I would‟ve left, if I‟d 
have known [with]in myself.  I mean a million people told me, but it just 
takes something to click.  Just something.  And that was it for me.  And 
having done it, yeah, I‟ve still got a lot of fears.  And I do still worry about 
finances and everything.  But I‟m learning.  I‟m learning fast actually…‟ 
The meaning of Jessica‟s low income status therefore not only hinges on financial 
hardship, but the acquisition of independence.  In other words, the premium goal of 
independence changes the meaning of money in the structural context of financial 
difficulty.  For example, money may dominate Jessica‟s worries and define 
limitations on her existence, but her freedom from unequal relationships is the 
primary event that orients her current meanings of money: 
  
 
 
59 
„I don‟t want to be caged up again.  And that‟s the way I see it.  Because to 
me a relationship, that‟s what it means.  So I‟m very wary… very cautious 
with money.‟ 
In the light of these meanings, Jessica also expresses a very cautious hope for the 
future: 
„I would like to have a reasonable sort of a job that I‟m happy in.  And just, 
be financially ok.  Not good, or whatever, but ok.‟ 
There is a fledgling sense here that money means something other than defined by 
Jessica‟s past context of abuse and present economic limitations.  Money is 
something through which she dares hope for change.  Money, through work, offers a 
means through which her context might improve; and if not her own, she hopes at 
least for her children.  As if to explain, Jessica tells me her sister called her a butterfly 
who was once in a cocoon but is now coming out. 
3.2.4. Jessica: discussion 
As a case study, Jessica‟s story demonstrates one way in which the culture of the 
family and relations within the family play a pivotal role in constructing money 
meanings.  From her structural family and socio-economic status as a single mother 
living below the poverty line and with obvious financial limitations, Jessica‟s 
response of worry, stress and dislike of money is to be expected.  However, a 
personal family history of abuse and her inequality as a child, wife and mother show 
that financial hardship and deprivation plagued Jessica long before her structural 
status as a single mother.  These subjective experiences shaped Jessica‟s view of 
money in ways that clearly influence her view of money beyond financial hardship 
and worry when she does become a single mother: money also represents 
independence and a means to self-determination. As such, money is also implicated in 
the hope for a different future.  
It cannot be assumed therefore that Jessica‟s money meanings are simply based on 
the (market driven) economics involved in being poor and single.  When Jessica‟s 
meaningful and complex history of family relations and experiences are told, new 
dimensions emerge.   It is clear that as money also represents independence, self-
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determination and hope, Jessica is drawing on far more than rationalized market 
meanings in her understanding of what money means for a „good life‟.  As Zelizer 
notes, domestic money is „special‟ money, because it circulates in a sphere where 
both the social class and gender relations of the „money handlers‟ shape its meaning 
(Zelizer 1989: 370).    
Jessica‟s story is an example of Zelizer‟s claim that money must be viewed as „part of 
the structure of social relations and meaning system of the family‟ (Zelizer 1989: 
370).  Without doing so, money meanings are rendered one-dimensional, or at best 
„flat relations‟ (Zelizer 2007: 1063) that merely reflect market valuations of money 
within the family.  While their stories cannot be told in depth here, many other 
participants in this research reflect a similar tale: that where intimate relationships 
take on specific meanings, so also does money.   
Jessica‟s story also sits within a broader group of low-income earners whose stories 
of financial difficulty, a sense of stigma, and uncertainty about the future are reflected 
in the flawed money narrative in chapter eight.   Here, I explain that not only do 
family experiences contribute to money meanings, but that broader normative and 
moral expectations about what is „good‟ can also leave those who are unable to 
achieve them, like Jessica, with a sense feeling inadequate and flawed in their current 
relationship to money.   
3.3. Hannah: money and religious belief 
I now move beyond the sphere of the family to explain how other areas of cultural 
and social life influence money meanings.  In this section I analyse Hannah‟s story.  
Hannah is a Christian and money meanings in the context of a „good life‟ are 
dependent in large part on her religious beliefs.  In addition, Hannah provides another 
good example of the way family relations shape decision-making about money.  
3.3.1. Religion in Australia 
Historically, the dominant religious culture in Australia is Christianity.  Currently, a 
significant proportion of the Australian population remain identified with Christianity.  
In the 2001 National Census, 69% of Australians identified with Catholic, Anglican 
or other Christian denominations; and only 5% with non-Christian religions.  Just 
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over one-quarter of all Australians either stated that they had no religion, or did not 
adequately respond to the question in the census (ABS 2003). However, despite 
identifications remaining relatively high, church attendance rates in 2001 were 
estimated to be a far more modest 8.8% of the Australian population; a figure in 
steady decline over the previous decade (Bellamy and Castle 2004).  That is, while 
most Australians identify themselves in some (mostly nominal) way with Christianity, 
only a small and declining percentage are active church affiliates and practice their 
belief corporately.   
Max Weber was the earliest sociologist to write specifically about the implication of 
Christian religious belief on money meanings. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism, Weber says this of Protestant Christianity:  
One of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not 
only of that but of all modern culture, rational conduct on the basis of the 
idea of the calling, was born…from the spirit of Christian ascetism.   
       (Weber 1930: 180) 
Weber argued that the value and sense of  individual „calling‟ given to ethical and 
hard work in early Protestantism was a means to demonstrate genuine faith.  This 
ascetic understanding of life was one of the most powerful means of expanding the 
attitude necessary for the spirit of capitalism.  Weber notes that religion is no longer a 
primary economic motivator because an „economic virtue‟ has replaced it and 
resulted in the concern to „make the most of both worlds‟ (Weber 1930: 175).  An 
example of this is found in Weber‟s observations from his America travels (first 
published in a 1906 essay) that membership to Protestant „sects‟ such as the Baptists, 
or Methodists amounted to a certified business morality for the individual member: 
„Admission to the congregation is recognised as an absolute guarantee of the 
moral qualities of a gentleman, especially of those qualities required in 
business matters.‟     (Weber 1948: 305) 
Correspondingly, the capitalist success of a sect member „was proof of his worth and 
state of grace‟ and raised the profile of the sect and their ability to recruit (Weber 
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1948: 322).  In this way, the Protestant sects both legitimated and sacralised the 
economic spirit of the „modern capitalist ethos‟. 
Contemporary research coupling religion with the economy tends to focus on either 
the place of religion in a culture of consumption (Lyon 2000; Moore 1994) or the 
implications of particular religious worldviews (for example Christianity and its 
support of a neo-classical economic system) on looming environmental or ecological 
crisis (McFague 2001; White 1967).   Or, as Loy critically claims, not only is the 
market an economic system but a religious one as well, promising a „secular salvation 
that it never quite supplies‟ (Loy 1997: 289). 
It is clear that discussions about the relationship between money markets and religion 
tend to focus on the blurring of the lines between what is religion and what is of the 
market.  Research also tends to point to the ways in which the economic market 
influences religious behaviours and values, e.g. through cultural flows such as 
advertising and consumption (Lyon 2000) consuming religious goods (Moore 1994) 
or the economic market supplanting traditional religious belief systems and taking on 
the role of the dominant cultural value system itself (Loy 1997: 275).  In other words, 
the universalising and homogenising tendency of the economic market is applied to 
religious systems and belief. 
In light of Zelizer‟s counter-claim that market and money meanings also depend upon 
social and cultural relations, I will address the question of how religious belief is 
implicated as such in this study.  In this research, while some participants align 
themselves – at least in principle – with Christian values, only four participants 
actively attend a church.  In addition, one participant claims sporadic involvement in 
a pagan community.  The significant majority of participants in this study 
intentionally distance themselves from religion.  For example, many participants 
identify religion as an institutionalised or formal „structure‟ that imposes legalistic 
rules and fulfils needs that ultimately should be sought and provided through seeking 
personal fulfilment acted within a personal ethic of being „good‟ to others.  
There are parallels here to the „Moralistic Therapeutic Deism‟ identified by Smith and 
Denton amongst American youth, described as a „vision of divinely underwritten 
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personal happiness and interpersonal niceness‟ (Smith and Denton 2005: 171).  This 
kind of „self-fulfilment‟ is identified in research as „spirituality‟ and intentionally 
juxtaposed with „religion‟. In his broad observations about the new Australian 
spirituality, Tacey notes a similar pattern particularly amongst younger Australians - a 
tendency to view religion as „dogmatic and oppressive institutional structures‟.  
Similarly, he notes the inclination of young people to separate religion and spirituality, 
where religion is considered „bad‟ and spirituality „good‟ (Tacey 2000: 213). 
Without intending to trivialise these latter understandings of religious and spiritual 
identification, the following section will focus only on Hannah, one of the four 
participants who are actively engaged in Christian activities.  The rationale for this is 
two-fold.  First, Hannah represents an easily identifiable, statistical group who draw 
directly on the historical and dominant religious culture of Australians: Christianity.  
Second, in this study the participants with active religious affiliation more explicitly 
articulate the connection points between their religious beliefs and practices, and thus 
the relation between religious beliefs and the meaning of money in Hannah‟s 
articulation is clearer for analytical purposes. 
3.3.2. Hannah: God and money 
Hannah is a twenty-six year old single female who has called Tasmania home since 
birth.   A health professional by trade, Hannah is included amongst the „downshifters‟ 
of this study because of her recent decision to cut back from full-time to part-time 
work.  Her part-time income is $35,000 per annum before tax.  Hannah is involved in 
many activities outside her work: both physical recreation including climbing, 
acrobatics and dancing, as well as involvement within her church community as a 
mentor and bible-teacher to other women.  In particular, her love of bible teaching 
and sense of responsibility towards others in her community have led her to think 
about ways she can spend more time in service to them, resulting in the shift to part-
time work. 
Hannah talks easily about the relation of faith to everyday life issues and goals.  In 
fact, it is clear that she cannot talk about any aspect of her life without reference to 
her Christian beliefs.  When asked some broad questions about what makes a good 
life, Hannah answers with a testimony about her conversion to Christianity five years 
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ago.  For Hannah, there is a “before and after” response to what is „good‟ in life. 
Conversion to Christianity has, she admits, „completely changed my outlook on what 
is important‟.  For example, it is her belief in God that motivated her to cut her work 
hours to part-time:  
„I guess the point where I‟m at now, I sort of look at this world and think 
yeah, ok, God‟s the most important thing, a relationship with God is the 
most important thing.  And relationship with other people is really important 
as well.  And that‟s sort of why I work part-time rather than full-time.  So 
I‟ve got more time to just, do stuff with people, actually spend time with God 
and stuff as well.‟   
It is the same motivation that allows her to be happy with less money.  In reviewing 
whether her budget will allow her to free up some work time, Hannah concludes that 
she doesn‟t need a full-time wage, particularly because she is single with no family to 
support.  She calculates that on a part-time wage she can still manage comfortably 
and have sufficient money to be generous to others with.  This, she tells me, is the 
„obvious choice‟.  Hannah‟s relation to money is one of the significant ways she 
communicates how her attitudes and life-goals have changed since becoming a 
Christian: 
„What I was before is… you know what you sort of learn from picking up 
around you.  At just a public, secular school, and you know from parents 
who aren‟t Christians.  And then, just thinking, ok make the best of what 
you‟ve got - earn money.  You know, get a nice house, get married, have a 
few kids, have a few grandkids.  You know, you‟ll be happy.  Third year uni, 
I became a Christian.  I realise now just looking back there‟s a big 
difference in the way you know, you look at the whole world.  In terms of 
money not being important.  In terms of like you‟ve got plenty, and God 
gives plenty of what I need without actually having to not have time for other 
things to earn money and stuff.‟  
Hannah is considered about what money means to her.  She describes money as 
something „useful‟ and a requirement for living.  Predominantly, money is given her 
by God to use and be a good „steward‟ of.  That is, Hannah clarifies, to manage 
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money „usefully‟ but not as if it is „just all mine‟.  As a „commodity‟, Hannah feels 
she needs to be able to earn enough money to be able to support herself but also to 
help out others as well.  She explains the meanings surrounding her desire for good 
management of money as coming from her interpretation of Christian doctrine.  For 
Hannah it is this belief directing the management and employment of money: that is, 
away from wealth accumulation and limited self-interest.  In Jesus in Disneyland, 
Lyon remarks on the positive contribution this kind of religious framework may 
provide in our modern communities: 
Deliberately loosening the ties to time-bound schedules and choosing slow-
paced alternatives to the dominant fast world may be another positive 
contribution that Christian communities can make today. (Lyon 2000: 146) 
Interestingly therefore, on the one hand Hannah views money as a kind of „tool‟ or as 
a means to survive, and a necessary if not „neutral‟ item exchangeable for any 
commodity required to live.  On the other hand, money means observably far more 
than this.  Money is also a means for Hannah to delineate and clarify her commitment 
to God: by intentionally reducing its significance in her life, and by being generous 
with it and giving it away.  Hannah‟s active de-valuation of money is in itself a value-
laden initiative demonstrating her deference to God and her community of faith.  In 
other words, the way Hannah understands the place of money in her life is dependent 
largely upon her church community and the cultural beliefs that are valued and lived 
through that set of relations.   
3.3.3. Hannah: God, money and family 
Threading through Hannah‟s religious beliefs is another significant factor in shaping 
– and constraining – the meaning of money in her life: her family.  In a recurring 
theme across Hannah‟s interview, she identifies the place her family plays in 
restraining her decision-making in relation to money and income matters.  She 
describes the decision to downshift as sometimes difficult, because her family is 
„pretty against the idea‟.  She explains that her parents didn‟t like the idea of her 
prioritising religion over career, because their desire for her was to grow up into a 
successful professional, work full-time and receive career promotions.  Furthermore, 
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Hannah admits that because of conflict between her own and her parents‟ priorities, 
she didn‟t reduce her income as much as she would have liked: 
„I was almost going to this year do a ministry training scheme thing through 
my church.  And just work a couple of days at physio.  And ended up, well, 
not doing or at least sort of deferring that at the moment, just because mum 
particularly was so upset.  They‟re ok with me being a Christian, until it 
actually comes to the practicalities of where my money goes, where my time 
goes and that sort of thing.‟ 
Subsequently, Hannah is not entirely „free‟ to direct her use of money solely within a 
framework of religious values.  Here, another of Zelizer‟s arguments for the impact of 
culture on money meanings is given more focus.  Zelizer writes that money as 
absolute freedom and power is untenable precisely because factors outside of the 
market economy shape and constrain uses of money, including who uses it, how it is 
used, and who controls it (Zelizer 1989: 347).  While Hannah may physically control 
her own money, her family significantly impact on her feelings about those choices 
and, thus directly affect her decision-making in relation to them.   
In Hannah‟s case various factors outside the market influence her use of money.  One 
influence, as already seen, is her religious beliefs which deflate the value of money 
relative to her Christian commitments.  Religion shapes the meaning of money for 
Hannah in a way which shifts the notion of money as power and freedom toward an 
understanding that money is to serve the purposes of faith, and is thus constrained 
within a particular (conservative) ideology.  Another influence outside the market that 
constrains the use of money in Hannah‟s case is her family.  Hannah‟s desire to 
maintain good interpersonal relations with her parents - her mother in particular – 
places a limit on the sense of duty Hannah has towards the use of money as a 
Christian.   Thus, in Hannah‟s case, both religion and her family shape and constrain 
how she feels about, and uses, money. 
3.3.4. Money and the future 
Hannah is relatively clear about the differences she feels between her parents‟ attitude 
to money and her own, and they involve different conceptions about the future: 
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„My parents of course would like to see me pouring more money into my 
house now and less into, into other stuff.  So that I could pay it off and get 
less interest and stuff which makes sense.  But I just sort of think that you 
start pouring money into a mortgage now, and then it just becomes -  when 
is the end point?  Ok, so I pay off my house, and then what next?  Do I buy a 
boat and start paying that off?‟  
For Hannah‟s parents, full-time work, career, and financial security are worthwhile 
life-style goals.  On the other hand, Hannah struggles to make sense of the attraction 
of these goals through the alternative religious „goods‟ she prioritises.   What is the 
point of accumulating property and assets and money in the bank, Hannah points out, 
if „it is not very useful?‟  There is so much need in the world, she continues, and she 
would rather see money be used where needed.  For Hannah, the larger the bank 
account the greater the danger because „it would be harder to actually give money 
away‟.  Hannah‟s ideal future looks quite different than her parents:  
„I think because I look at it from like older, like really old Christians 
particularly, who are still like committed faithful Christians who‟ve just got 
joy and that hope with them.  You know, they know they‟re close to heaven, 
and you know they can look back on their life and know that as much as they 
were able they can just look back and see where God‟s just been really 
gracious to them.  I think, yeah, I‟d be totally happy with that.  Even if I was 
living in a tin shed somewhere because I couldn‟t afford mortgage 
repayments anymore, because of whatever!‟  
Hannah reveals that these conversations about money and her future with her parents 
are often heated and conflictual, requiring time to „cool‟.  Hannah‟s parents struggle 
to understand the language of Hannah‟s desires and life-goals because her goals exist 
within a different set of values than their own.  Hannah values a language of religious 
priorities that makes little sense to them.  This is because to a large extent Hannah 
chooses to make sense of money within a religious framework where a future of 
happiness and self-fulfilment lie outside of money‟s worth. 
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3.3.5. Hannah: discussion 
Similarly to Jessica, Hannah‟s story brings the importance of social and relational 
dynamics of money meanings into clearer focus.  It is not disputed that Hannah lives 
in a society where religious meanings are often transformed through consumer culture 
and the dominance of the economic market.  However, Hannah is also actively 
involved in interpreting the meaning of money for herself, through a value-system 
outside of an economically driven one.  Evangelical Christian culture forms the 
relational and value basis from which Hannah interprets what money means in a 
„good life‟.  In this sense, money is not representative of absolute freedom or power 
to her (Zelizer 1989: 347).  This is because regardless of the level of freedom or 
power that might be conferred on her from a market perspective through access to 
money, money means something different to Hannah.  In her understanding of money, 
what she does with it signifies a commitment to both God and the community of 
believers she belongs to.  In other words for Hannah, money does not signify her 
place in the economic pecking order, it is rather a means to demonstrate deference to 
her God and her church social network. 
But for Hannah other social factors beyond religious culture, such as family relations, 
also shape and constrain her choices about money.  For example, while she would 
like to earn even less money and further her ministry opportunities, her mother‟s 
difficulty with this decision creates a tension between what money means to her and 
how she can act out those meanings.  As Zelizer notes therefore, money meanings are 
implicated in a „great deal of negotiation of meaning‟ (Zelizer 2007: 1063) that is 
neither market driven nor economically rational.  
In the context of this study, Hannah is not alone in her prioritising of „goods‟ other 
than monetary ones in a „good life‟.  There are other participants, such as Cian and 
Marjorie, whose experiences within Christian culture shape their meanings of money 
in ways reminiscent of, and at the same time in ways alternative to, Hannah‟s.   Other 
participants prioritise different kinds of values such as community development or 
environmental welfare, and these influences are also implicated in how money 
meanings are negotiated in their idea of a „good life‟.   Like Hannah, however, these 
participants tend to be drawn from the „downshifters‟ category.  Later, in Part II of 
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this thesis, attention will be given to these participants in an in-depth exploration of 
how the decision to earn less income affects money meanings across the group.  In 
particular, these participants often identify with the reoriented money narrative (see 
chapter ten), which embodies a moral awareness characterised through an 
engagement with value-conflicts in which goods alternative to money are named and 
given claim. 
3.4. Kayla: money and self-reliance 
In this section I turn attention to an aspect of everyday life that draws on another 
cultural theme in Australia.   This aspect has already been flagged in the interface 
between Jessica‟s familial history and her attitudes towards money: her desire for 
economic self-reliance and self-determination.  It is clear for example that the realities 
of Jessica‟s family/gender relations and socio-economic context cannot be properly 
understood without reference to her goals of financial self-reliance and hunger for 
self-determination.  Here I focus more closely on the nature of economic self-reliance 
as a preferred cultural disposition or identity that weighs heavily on one participant‟s 
understanding of the place of money in a „good life‟.   
First, some theoretical points are made about the centrality of economic self-reliance 
as a western cultural phenomenon.  Following this, I draw on Kayla‟s story, a low-
income participant, to build on these theories inductively.  Her story gives insight into 
how the cultural preference of self-reliance is negotiated relationally and how her 
money meanings are central to this equation.  In addition, the picture of money as 
influenced by cultural and social factors broadens to encompass more of Zelizer‟s 
statements: including that „not all dollars are equal‟ (Zelizer 1989: 343). 
 
3.4.1. Self-reliance as a cultural disposition 
There is hardly a desire more widespread in the west today than to lead „a 
life of your own‟.     (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 22) 
Observations about the nature of the „self‟ in modern society are central to 
contemporary sociologies.  Pivotal to an increasing number of such sociologies are 
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observations about the centrality of the „self‟ or self-determination to personal 
biographies, including identity and decision-making.  For example, Christian 
d‟Epinay writes that in the desire for happiness, the individual is the only end and 
norm, whose trademark is „self-fulfilment‟.  „Individualism‟, he writes, „is at the heart 
of our civilisation‟ (d'Epinay 1991: 56-65).   As if to emphasise this very point, 
Charles Taylor (1991) traces modern day „authenticity‟ back to Rousseau‟s notion of 
each individual having their own „measure‟ or manner in which they are human and 
through which their life becomes authentic16.  Thus, being „true‟ to oneself became 
meaningful: if people are not true to themselves, they miss the point of life.   Taylor 
pinpoints this moral idea as a powerful one in modern society.  That is, it is crucial to 
not drown one‟s inner voice out through conformity to external pressure or 
instrumental orientations, but to listen to one‟s inner voice as the only model by 
which to live: only „I‟ can discover and articulate it, and through this realize self-
potential, definition and self-fulfillment (Taylor 1992: 28-9).  Smith and Denton 
(2005) notes something similar: that Amercian youth and adults alike are „nearly 
without exception profoundly individualistic, instinctively presuming autonomous, 
individual self-direction to be a universal human norm and life goal‟ (Smith and 
Denton 2005: 143) 
Giddens (1991: 75-80) refers similarly to the nature of the modern self as „reflexive‟.  
That is, the self-story is dominant, and central to it is choice, control awareness, and 
the consistent monitoring and reshaping of body and mind.  Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim (2001) concur: 
We live in an age in which the social order of the national state, class, 
ethnicity and the traditional family is in decline.  The ethic of individual 
self-fulfilment and achievement is the most powerful current in modern 
society.  The choosing, deciding, shaping human being who aspires to be the 
                                                   
 
16
 I acknowledge the discomfort many sociologists have with the term „authenticity‟ (for example, see 
Bauman and Tester 2001: 119-122). 
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author of his or her own life, the creator of an individual identity, is the 
central character of our time. (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 22-3)  
At the same time however, this „choosing, deciding, shaping human being who 
aspires to be the author of his or her own life‟, does not exist in a „self‟ vacuum.  As 
Wolfe (1989: 46-8) notes, „freedom in an interdependent world is not an abstract right, 
but a product of circumstance and context‟.  That is, he continues, our identities are 
understood in terms of our culture: in terms of the markers that define our similarities 
with others, including histories, languages or beliefs.   It follows that desire for self-
reliance and self-determination are cultural dispositions17 that help to define our 
similarities with other people. 
3.4.2. Economic self-reliance as a cultural disposition 
Moreover, there is often a relationship drawn between the self-reliant individual and 
the modern economy.  Bellah et al. trace the history of self-reliance back to the 
nineteenth century (1996: 55-6).  They note that since this time, the term self reliance 
has been included in a number of traditions.  For example, biblical commentary and 
republican traditions used the term in reference to the collective, for instance self-
reliance as a people.  Alternatively, traditions of utilitarianism and expressive 
individualism (e.g. Emerson‟s 1841 essay „Self-Reliance‟) tend to suppress the 
collective meaning and in its place the independent and self-made person quite 
literally came to mean the morally autonomous individual.   
Thus, note Bellah et al., embedded in the meaning of self-reliance lies the relation of 
the individual to the economy: 
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 The term „cultural disposition‟ here purposely flags the term taken from Bourdieu‟s (1990) 
explanation of „habitus‟ and will be explained more fully in chapter four.  Here, it is enough that the 
term simply refers to a disposition or orientation that is shared, and cultural in nature. 
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…in his essay, Emerson also expressed a more prosaic sense of self-reliance, 
one that has been the common coin of moral life for millions of Americans 
ever since.  Emerson says we only deserve the property we work for.  
Conversely, our primary economic obligation is only to ourselves.  
       (Bellah et al. 1996: 56) 
Bellah et al. found that this economic orientation typically informs the character of 
self-reliance 
 amongst the participants in their large-scale study of American morality.  They note 
that work, self-identity and the perceived pressure to be economically self-reliant and 
self-supporting go hand in hand.  This observation is not a new one.  Over a century 
ago, Georg Simmel also marked out a general correlation between the modern 
phenomenon of the money economy and individualisation.  In comparing the 
traditional with the modern, he notes that modern money is the most mobile of all 
goods and thus permits „progress in differentiation and personal freedom‟.  Money, as 
property, effectively „liberates‟ individuals from unifying bonds.  Through money, 
the individual assumes a social independence as never before (Simmel 1978: 354). 
The relationship between the modern „self‟ and money is also noted by Zygmunt 
Bauman who states that in late modernity, the path to self-identity and a meaningful 
life cannot be divorced from frequent visits to the marketplace (Bauman 1998a).  
More recently and cynically he notes: 
The sole character the theorists regard as deserving of attention, because this 
is the one credited with „keeping the economy on course‟ and lubricating the 
wheels of economic growth, is homo oeconomicus – the lonely, self-
concerned and self-centred economic actor pursuing the best deal and guided 
by „rational choice‟, careful not to fall prey to any emotions that defy 
translation into monetary gains.   (Bauman 2003: 69)  
Thus, as a cultural disposition, the self-reliant actor has also come to be referred to as 
the self-reliant economic actor.  Or, from a money perspective: „money means your 
own money‟ (my emphasis) (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 23).  The rationale for 
highlighting self-reliance as a shared cultural disposition is two-fold.  First, Kayla‟s 
  
 
 
73 
story shows that as a cultural preference, self-reliance strongly intersects with money 
meanings and becomes central to the way individuals negotiate those meanings 
personally and relationally.  Second, her story also demonstrates that individuals 
„attach money practices to social relations‟ (Zelizer 2007: 1063) to the extent that 
cultural categories such as economic self-reliance take on relationally generated, 
negotiated meanings quite often alternative to the logic expected of the economic 
market. 
3.4.3. Kayla and economic self-reliance 
Kayla is a twenty-seven year old woman who fits uneasily amongst the three 
participant categories in this study.  Placed intentionally amongst the „low-income‟ 
group, in reality Kayla straddles the low and middle-income groups.  At the 
beginning of the interview, Kayla stated her income as around $400 net per week 
including child allowance and student support pension.  As the interview progressed, 
it became evident that Kayla was no longer studying and that she was earning 
undeclared money in addition to the initial sum specified (most likely enough to put 
her into the middle-income group).  Because her income remained unspecified, and 
Kayla reflected at length about her experiences of living on a low-income, I left her in 
the low-income group. 
For Kayla, who struggles to make sense of her own self-identity and life-direction, 
her single most clearly articulated goal involves being independent and economically 
self-reliant.  This goal has not always been within her reach.  Kayla become a single 
mother at a young age and has since experienced periods of unemployment 
interspersed with casual work and more recently, part-time study.  Although she has 
always desired to work to earn her own money, Kayla explained that she would 
probably never hold down a „normal‟ job because of mental illness related to work 
pressures.   
Kayla is generous in describing her dislike of being poor: the difficulty keeping the 
bills down, her „horrible‟ financial struggles, her son missing out on so many things, 
the way in which family members would make her „feel poor‟, her feelings of 
irresponsibility because she found it hard to provide for her son, her social 
embarrassment at having little money, her hatred of being reliant on others, and the 
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depression she experienced over „feeling dependent‟.  The words of Bauman ring true 
here: that the term „dependency‟ is „fast becoming a derogatory term‟ (Bauman 2003: 
90).  Economic dependency and reliance on others for Kayla is a condition that 
deeply and negatively affects her sense of self, both personally and socially. 
Kayla explains that self-reliance and self-responsibility can be achieved through 
earning money, her own money.  After talking about her work and recent ability to 
earn her own income, Kayla talks about what money means to her: 
„Money means I can do things.  Money means I can be independent.  Or 
think that I‟m independent!  And it means freedom to me.  It means that I 
can choose more, it gives me choice.  Money is choice.  Yeah, and it gives 
me choices to do a lot more things.  And buy some more things!  But also 
provide nice things too.  It means that I can give nice things to my son, you 
know. Like it was really horrible going to a birthday party and being so 
broke, like having to go to Chickenfeed to buy someone something.  It‟s a 
horrible feeling, it‟s terrible.  So money means buying nice things for people!  
And when I‟ve got more money, I don‟t count how much I put in the tins, like, 
you know when people are asking for charity or anything like that.  I don‟t 
count. I just take the change and just plonk it in there.  And it feels so good 
to be able to do that, instead of going, „oh, geez I can‟t really afford to give 
them that, or give them a dollar‟.  So, money is like an expansion.  It means I 
can go beyond any limitation.‟   
In his study of the experiences of middle (income) Australians, Pusey notes that over 
half of respondents felt that for a woman, the best way to be independent is to have a 
job.  Far less (under 30%) viewed staying at home as being as fulfilling as paid 
employment (Pusey 2003: 84).  Similarly, work provides Kayla with money, and 
money gives her independence, freedom, choice, expansion and the removal of any 
limits she is used to experiencing.  Consequently, Kayla likes to describe herself as 
the aforementioned „self-reliant, economic actor‟. 
3.4.4. Kayla and relational self-reliance 
While it may appear that Kayla is simply embodying the wider cultural disposition to 
be economically self-reliant, the reality is far more complex than this.  Kayla may 
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aspire to independence and autonomy, but her aspirations are not forged in social 
isolation.  Like any value or goal, her desires are embedded in a social context of 
interpersonal relations and connectedness.  Mason (2004) notes that theories of 
individualisation tend to build a picture of „individualised actors and selves‟ in which 
people‟s connectivity to others remains invisible or where understandings of identities 
and agency as relational are undermined.  Kayla‟s story highlights the way in which 
interpersonal relations impact the cultural goal of economic self-reliance in 
participants‟ everyday lives.  For example, the limits to independence Kayla describes 
are not only material ones.  One of the greatest perceived impediments to her self-
reliance is a relational one: her parents.  Reflecting on difficult financial times, Kayla 
reveals that it was: 
„… really depressing, completely depressing…feeling dependent is horrible.  
Because the times when I haven‟t had money, and I‟ve actually wanted 
something, my parents would supply the money for me.  And I hated that.  I 
know people would think „oh how selfish‟ and you know, „ungracious‟ and 
everything.  But for them to be giving me money now just is pointless 
because I feel that they didn‟t give me what I needed when I was younger, 
and that they‟re trying to make up for it now.  And like, if they‟d given me 
what I needed when I was younger, I wouldn‟t be in the position where I 
would need their help now.  And so it really makes me mad.‟   
Bellah et al. found that the family strengthens the significance of self –reliance as the 
„cardinal virtue‟ of modern individuals.  That is, one of the primary tasks of 
individuals is to be „finding oneself‟ through „autonomous self-reliance‟ that involves 
separating oneself from family and the traditions of the past (Bellah et al. 1996: 163).  
Kayla takes seriously this sense of responsibility and the need to take care of herself:  
„And also because they [parents] have always helped me out in a tight jam, 
I‟ve never taken responsibility.  And, it‟s a really important thing to have in 
this day and age.  You know, to be responsible and be able to take care of 
yourself if things happen, instead of always ringing up mum and dad. And so 
I don‟t like being in those positions.‟ 
  
 
 
76 
In addition, Wolfe (1989) notes that individualism and its relation to the economy is 
significantly associated with the functions of the modern family.   Moral and 
economic autonomy is evident in many aspects of family life, including relationships 
between parents, children and grandchildren.  He notes that far more than previously 
there is a greater melding of the moral code of the market with the intimate sphere of 
society (Wolfe 1989: 54-60).   Kayla expresses her moral autonomy and self-reliance 
in terms of her ability to earn her own money and in turn be financially and 
relationally independent of her parents:  
„I had to [go back to work].  I just had a few bills, I worked really hard at 
keeping my bills down.  Which meant that [son] missed out on a lot of things.  
And you know it would‟ve made me feel worse, so be so full of debt, because 
there‟s nothing I can do about it.  So it‟s worked out so much better.  
Financially, it‟s a domino effect.  Like financially I‟m much better, 
emotionally I was feeling on top of the world because I could get all these 
things, we could do these things, and I didn‟t have to be reliant on my 
parents. And so I could spend less time with them, which is really good! And 
every time dad and I would have a coffee, he‟d always shout [pay for the 
coffee].  And I‟d try and shout like, „no, I‟ll get it, I‟ll get it‟, and he‟d be 
like „no, no, no‟.  And that would make me feel like, poor?  So I didn‟t like 
that either.‟    
Ultimately for Kayla, life is her „own life‟ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 24).  
The „problem‟ of her family‟s financial assistance reflects her feelings of failure to 
make ends meet – her own ends meet.  Unlike Jessica, Kayla‟s family do not 
represent a welcomed support network or safety-net through which she and her son 
can live a better life.  Nor does money serve to strengthen her kinship ties to her 
family.  However, money does serve to manage ties of intimacy in Kayla‟s life 
(Zelizer 1994).  Money represents an attempt at intimacy by her parents that she 
refuses to accept: in her mind, a form of „guilt‟ money for a lost or damaged 
childhood.  Ironically, it is this money that makes her feel all the more „poor‟ for it‟s 
receiving; money that strips her of self-motivated decision-making and the goal of 
economic independence.   To reclaim these qualities and take control of the 
relationship she has with her parents, Kayla must earn money her own way. 
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To return to the wider argument about money, a traditional view of money meanings 
proposes there is „one‟ type of money, an „all-purpose money‟, always fungible or 
interchangeable (Zelizer 1989: 343).  Kayla‟s struggle to redefine money as her own 
is a clear example of Zelizer‟s claim that there is no single or unified money.  Rather, 
there are multiple kinds of money, each qualitatively distinct and earmarked in 
multiple ways for multiple uses and imbued with meanings arising from their social 
and cultural context.  In other words, argues Zelizer, „not all dollars are equal‟ 
(Zelizer 1989: 347).   
It is clear that in Kayla‟s case, „not all dollars are equal‟.  If so, money received from 
her parents would be as useful and valued as money self-earned.   The meanings 
Kayla ascribes to money are subjective: they are embedded in a cultural context 
where economic self-reliance is highly prized as well as a relational context where 
money handouts, from her parents in particular, are deeply resented.  In this context, 
financial support from her parents is an unacceptable replacement for financial self-
reliance, and invokes a defensive response: 
„…My dad‟s idea of getting me a computer would be… well he wanted to get 
me a second hand government computer which only had notepad on it.  And 
so I just went, no, I don‟t want to do that.  If I get one, I‟m gonna get it 
brand new, I‟m gonna get it with everything on there.  Because I don‟t want, 
your shit! [laughs].  I don‟t want your second-hand stuff!  I don‟t want you 
thinking of me as being someone who needs second hand stuff.   I don‟t like 
that!‟ 
Thus, money is not merely a tool of the market; and in subjective meanings nor are all 
dollars equal: this much is clear by Kayla‟s determination toward economic self-
reliance through earning her own money as a means to escape from her parents 
emotionally and historically weighted „guilt‟ money. 
3.4.5. Kayla and the cost of economic self-reliance: work, risk 
and future 
Here, I return to the above statement that Kayla must earn money her own way.  For 
Kayla, this reality has meant engaging in work that is, in her own estimation, risky 
and problematic.  As Kayla relaxes into the interview, she explains that years ago, to 
  
 
 
78 
improve her financial situation, she worked as an escort.  She recalls that experience 
as „one of the biggest mistakes‟ she had ever made, and describes the self-destructive 
and depressive lifestyle that ensued.  With support from her parents and 
encouragement from a mentor, Kayla left escort work and pursued university studies 
for a number of years.  As the interview progressed it became clear that Kayla had 
recently ceased studies and again resumed work as an escort: 
„I hate being reliant on my parents, so, I‟d you know, rather do…so many 
other things than rely on them.  It‟s ok, because I‟ve gone back to work 
again, like escorting.  And so, money‟s not an issue to me now, and it‟s good 
because I don‟t ask my parents for help - well they offer it to me, and I just 
go „no‟.‟ 
Kayla shares how her studies had lost meaning for her, how the bills built up, how 
depressing being poor was, how she felt she had no avenues for „normal‟ jobs like 
casual hospitality work, and of course how she hated being reliant on her parents.  In 
weighing up these circumstances with her limited perceived choices and strong desire 
for self-reliance, Kayla chooses to return to escort work.  Thus, the cost of economic 
self-reliance for Kayla is working in the sex industry, and the trade-off for working in 
the sex-trade is her financial independence.  In making her choice, she knows from 
previous experience that a (health) risk to herself is involved.  As noted earlier, Beck 
and Beck Gernsheim note that in a „self-culture‟ a person‟s life is essentially a „risk 
biography‟ where everything in life must be decided upon without certainty or 
support (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001:24, 42).  At this juncture, Kayla makes a 
choice where risk is the trade-off for economic self-reliance.   
There is a complex set of factors at work here in how Kayla defines what money 
means in her understanding of a „good life‟.  She doesn‟t engage in escort work 
because it is a good economic „market‟ decision - she admits that if she could, she 
would choose a „normal‟ job.  But nor does she choose to work in the sex industry 
because there are no other financial options available to her.  Her parents continually 
offer her their financial support to provide things she needs for herself and son.  In 
other words, simply having money is not what is important to Kayla – as if all money 
is the same.  Where the money comes from, and who controls it constitutes the heart 
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of what money means to her.  And in Kayla‟s case these issues are not only 
determined economically, they are also determined relationally.  She refuses to accept 
„guilt‟ money from her parents, and is satisfied only in generating income through her 
own efforts, to be controlled by herself, despite the cost to herself.    
Although perhaps an extreme, Kayla‟s story is not isolated.  Her story is echoed more 
systematically in Part II where I show how sources of income and a sense of control 
over income is an important aspect of money meanings amongst participants.   For 
example, monetary self-reliance is a central feature of the dominant money narrative 
discussed in chapter six. 
There is one more important dimension to Kayla‟s money meanings.   Like Jessica, 
her economic self-reliance also enables another quality she prizes: a sense of future.  
Through her reflections on financial struggles Kayla highlights that:  
„It‟s a horrible feeling to be struggling at you know, everything.  And 
financially it‟s really hard because there‟s no light at the end of the tunnel.‟      
Without her own money, Kayla is describing a future that is hard to see, with little to 
light the way ahead. As we have seen, money to Kayla gives freedom, choice, 
independence, „expansion‟ and is something that enables her to go beyond previous 
limits. Self-earned money metaphorically gives „light‟ to Kayla‟s future; both for 
herself and her son.   
3.4.6. Kayla: discussion 
It is clear that Kayla presents the picture of a morally autonomous, self-reliant 
economic actor.   As a cultural disposition the goal of self-reliance is expressed 
explicitly through Kayla‟s desire to earn her own money and take financial 
responsibility for herself and her son.  However for Kayla, money embodies 
meanings at a number of other important levels.  Money may mean self-reliance; but 
money is also a resource through which intimate relations such as family are 
negotiated and managed; and money is a source of many conflicting values and 
emotions. For example on the one hand money received from her parents makes her 
feel „poor‟, invokes resentment towards her parents, social embarrassment and brings 
on depression.  On the other hand, money self-earned gives her a sense of 
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independence, freedom, choice, a glimpse of a future and the ability to provide for 
herself and her son.   
Not only this, Kayla makes a huge effort to maintain the distinction between 
worthwhile money and „guilt‟ money: her return to the sex industry is an indication of 
this.  As Zelizer notes, people 
…care greatly about differentiating monies because payment systems are a 
powerful way in which they mark apart different social ties.  Each of these 
ties has a different quality and each one therefore calls for different form and 
rituals of payment.     (Zelizer 2007: 1063) 
Most importantly, money is centrally implicated in Kayla‟s sense of self-worth, and 
this sense of worth directly relates to where her money comes from.  As has been 
shown, money received from her parents shifts her perceptions about its meaning.  
Such money represents dependence, obligation, and shackles to her past.  These 
„guilt‟ dollars are not remotely equal in meaning with self-earned money that 
represents self-reliance, freedom and a sense of future.  For Kayla, money is not 
homogenous, objective, or a mere tool.  Not all money is equal, and nor is it value-
neutral (Zelizer 1989: 347).  Money, depending on where it comes from and why, 
makes her feel certain ways, it is valued in particular ways, and it reflects relational 
and historic experience within its meanings. 
Conclusion: Jessica, Hannah and Kayla 
So far, this thesis has established that within sociology is a tradition, originating in the 
work of Georg  Simmel, of thinking about money in market oriented terms:  that 
money is no more than a „neutral veil‟ that signifies exchange values in the „real 
economy‟ (Ingham 2001: 307).  Implicit to this assumption is that the „real‟ economy 
has little to do with other, separate spheres such as the social and relational, or those 
„non-economic‟ relations based on intimacy or sentiment (Zelizer 2007: 1059). 
I have joined Zelizer‟s (1989; 1994; 1998a; 1998b; 2000; 2007) critique of this 
traditional view through analysis of three participant case studies: Jessica, Hannah 
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and Kayla.   All three stories illustrate just how interrelated the social and economic 
are in young adults money meanings.  In fact, what money means to these women 
primarily requires understanding the relational dynamics negotiated with other family 
members, belief systems and friendship networks.  It is in these analyses that the 
depth and complexity of money meanings are given a three-dimensional view.  In this 
analysis I have also gone beyond addressing the domestic sphere (Baker and Jimerson 
1992: 11-12) and investigated as yet rarely explored aspects of social and cultural life 
such as religion and the culture of economic self-reliance in relation to money 
meanings. 
In Jessica‟s case it is shown that where intimate relationships take on specific 
meanings, such as the experience of gendered inequality in a marriage context, so 
also do money meanings.  For Jessica, money means far more than her structural 
status would infer: financial hardship and constraint associated with poverty.  It is 
within these pervasive economic constraints and against a history of relational abuse 
that Jessica‟s money meanings are shaped as source of agency, as a vehicle towards 
self-determination, and hope for a better future. 
Hannah‟s story highlights the ways in which Christian cultural and relational 
networks can play a pivotal role in shifting the meaning of money in ways neither 
market driven nor economically „rational‟.  Hannah‟s desire to connect more with 
women in her community and her conviction that money is to be used for God‟s 
purposes directs her decision to earn less money and give more away.  It is therefore 
in negotiation with important relationships - God and her church community - 
through which Hannah defines what money means to her.  Religious belief and 
practice in Hannah‟s life thus shapes money to become a means through which she 
demarcates deference to God and Christian community. 
Finally, Kayla exemplifies that where money comes from, the value invested in that 
money source and who controls it, play a fundamental role in how she understands 
money in her life.  For example, for Kayla not all money is the same.  Money from 
her parents is not „good‟, it is „guilt‟ money and she refuses to accept it.  As a result, 
economic self-reliance is prioritised, regardless of the cost to herself.   It is through 
her kinship relations that Kayla significantly defines the meaning of money. At the 
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same time, by differentiating between money sources, Kayla is also able to manage 
those same family ties. 
I return briefly here to the central thesis question: what meanings do young adults 
give to money in the context of their understanding of a „good life‟?  Jessica, Hannah 
and Kayla‟s stories highlight that „monetary phenomena consist of and depend on 
social practices‟ (Zelizer 2007: 1063).   They also establish that money meanings 
amongst young adults do not draw only on the money meanings derived from the 
formal market economy.  Rather, they show that young adults also negotiate money 
meanings within cultural, social and relational contexts that transform economic 
meanings into social and relational ones.  As Beamish notes, 
In the final analysis, the social and behavioural repertoires that underlie and 
animate the formal economy are no more or less social than are those that 
animate households and love affairs.  Assuming otherwise is to confuse the 
shadow with the shadow maker.   (Beamish 2007: 1007) 
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4. Chapter Four: Money and Morality 
4.1. Introduction 
I have argued so far that understanding the meanings young adults give to money in 
their perception of a „good life‟ requires identifying the social and relational 
dynamics that underscore those meanings.  This includes: how money meanings are 
shaped through family relations and the maintenance or management of intimacy; 
how money meanings embody religious dimensions of meaning through religious 
social and value systems; and also how money sources shape money meanings, in 
particular the importance of self-reliance to the subjective value given money. 
This chapter builds on the multi-dimensional view of money presented so far by 
identifying yet another, related money dimension.  Central to this is the claim that 
money meanings are morally oriented.   The moral dimensions of money meanings 
have been given little attention in sociological literatures.  However, the significance 
of moral dimensions of money meanings related to a „good life‟ is clearly identified 
in participant‟s stories. 
In order to clarify how money meanings might be considered „moral‟, it is necessary 
to engage with sociological literatures that explore the relationship between moral 
orientations and social and cultural forms.  The following discussion locates the 
sociology of morality with the analysis of money meanings in this study.  This 
includes outlining the current relationship between the sociology of morality and the 
sociology of money, a literature review of the sociology of morality and its relevance 
to the project, and what the sociology of morality can offer sociological literature in 
terms of new or alternative ways of engaging with the sociology of money. 
4.2. A sociology of morality 
Morality does feature as a topic of discussion in the sociology of money.  For 
example, Simmel was at pains to describe the value-neutral character of money by 
arguing that one of the areas of life that money had no place at all was in deeply 
moral cases such as serious crime (Simmel 1991: 19).  From a very different 
perspective, Zelizer (1998b: 1) suggests that people make moral distinctions between 
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different monies; for example the naming of particular money earned as an „honest 
dollar‟ as opposed to „dirty money‟.  Likewise, Curruthers and Espeland (1998: 1389) 
argue that the circulation of money flows and the social meanings that accompany 
them can result in the moral tainting or purification of money, such as the way money 
is „coloured‟ (or literally made dirty) when „laundered‟.  Comments such as Zelizer‟s 
and Carruthers and Espeland are relatively recent to the sociological of money.  But 
even these comments treat the moral value of money anecdotally; in cases tied to 
moral „labels‟ (e.g. „dirty money‟) applied to very specific types of money depending 
on the sources, uses and the social meanings applied to them. 
Of the classical sociologists, Weber comes the closest to commenting on moral 
dimensions of money by arguing that money contributes to rationalisation processes 
through the legal-moral conscience given to wealth accumulation (Deflem 2003: 76-
7).  However, these claims were located within a far broader sociological explanation 
for changes occurring within modern society, notably in reference to the social 
process of „rationalisation‟.  As such, Weber‟s work did not constitute a systematic 
analysis of the sociology of money with morality18. 
Consequently, there is little precedent in sociology for the analyses of the moral 
dimensions of money meanings.  In this thesis I will argue that money meanings are 
culturally value-laden with moral orientations.  However unlike Zelizer and 
Curruthers and Espeland above, I argue that these meanings are case-specific but 
rather deeply embedded in and central to the broad range of meanings participants 
carry in relation to money.   
The point of origin for thinking about the „moral‟ dimension of money goes back to 
the central thesis question: „what makes a „good life‟?  Implicit to this question is a 
concern with orientations and the evaluative – or moral – stances taken by 
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 However, it has been argued that Weber engaged in a systematic „quest‟ for a moral order to embed 
his sociology within (Swatos and Kivisto 1991). 
  
 
 
85 
participants in their understanding of money.  The remainder of this chapter outlines 
how evaluative orientations may be understood as „moral‟ ones.  As a sociological 
project, particular attention is paid to identifying the social sources of moral 
orientations.  Consequently, the following section charts a path through some 
„morality‟ literature – drawing in particular from the work of Emile Durkheim, 
Charles Taylor and Zygmunt Bauman – in order to identify how moral identity is 
constituted through social process. 
First, Durkheim, Taylor and Bauman‟s work will be located within a wider literature 
review of the sociology of morality  - and why morality is necessary to study at all - 
before outlining how the „self‟ may be conceptualised as „moral‟.  Following this is 
an outline of the historical and social sources of the moral self, as understood through 
the work of Taylor, and then Bauman.  Third, a definition of morality will be outlined 
for the purposes of this study before locating it within the analytical context of the 
remainder of the thesis. 
4.2.1. „Morality‟ in sociology 
For a field of sociological research with a great diversity and scope of ideas within it, 
there are two common assertions repeatedly made in the sociology of morality.  The 
first is that the field itself is one of wide neglect.   For example, Stivers (1994: 1) 
states that the disregard of the field is „one of the major weaknesses of academic 
sociology and a mysterious one at that‟.  Calhoun (1991: 231) similarly argues that 
the disciplinary avoidance of a moral discourse has „impoverished‟ our understanding 
of contemporary individuals.  Fein (1997: 7, 9) notes that the subject of morality has 
been treated as „unusual and off-putting‟, and quite often given to simplification.  
Luhmann (1991) opens his article with the statement that in speaking of „morality‟ he 
is entering a disciplinary realm usually undertaken by philosophers, not sociologists. 
The second assertion is the emphasis on the central importance of the study of 
morality to sociological investigation.  As Smith notes,  
It is orientation to moral order, I have suggested, and not innate 
acquisitiveness or functional practicality that most powerfully moves and 
guides human action.  And the substance of most of our most important 
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beliefs and moral orders come from the narrative in which our lives are 
embedded.         (Smith 2003: 151) 
The work of Emile Durkheim is the classical reference point of this link between 
moral order and human action.  Durkheim infused his theories with the study of 
morality.  For example, Lukes (1975: 419) notes that morality was the, „centre and 
end of his [Durkheims‟] work‟.  Durkheim (1972: 2) positioned his work as a 
response to what he saw as the extremes of moral philosophy on the one hand and 
holistic idealism on the other.  He rejected the tendency of moral philosophers to 
fixate on the promise of the emergent individual in society as wholly departed from 
the moral bonds of traditional society.  Durkheim also found the idealists to be 
extreme in their lament of the loss of traditional morality.   
As a consequence, Durkheim called for a „science of morality‟.  He argued that 
central to the modern collective is a moral continuity called the „collective 
conscience‟.  As such he identifies the pre-modern, „mechanical‟ mode of moral 
solidarity and the shift to its modern counterpart, an „organic‟ moral solidarity found 
through high individuation and given cohesion through a „morality of co-operation‟ 
(Durkheim 1972: 8).  Giddens (1978: 21) noted that moral code for Durkheim is, 
„grounded in the social conditions of existence‟.  In other words, morality is social 
fact - a claim that became the starting point and foundation for Durkheim‟s empirical 
(positivist and functionalist) sociology.  For example, Durkheim stated that a science 
of moral opinion, „…provides us with the means to evaluate moral opinion and, where 
necessary, rectify it‟ (Lukes 1975: 425).  In other words, that which deviates from the 
normative ideals of the modern (organic) form of moral solidarity constitutes a kind 
of pathology.  Durkheim saw his role as a „neutral‟ observer as identifying the 
normative moral individualism of modernity and pointing out deviations from it.  
As Stivers (1994) points out, the moral foundation central to Durkheim‟s theory 
subsequently came to be over-shadowed by his successors‟ focus on the functionalist 
elements of his work.  However, later in the 20th century a moderately renewed 
interest in morality as a social issue has resurfaced.  Many argue, like Durkheim, that 
morality is central to a sociological understanding of contemporary individuals and 
society.   For example, Giddens (1991) highlights that „life-politics‟ is a late-modern 
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re-emergence of repressed moral responses to human dilemmas.  Stivers (1994: viii) 
follows Kierkegaard‟s precedent and states that morality is the „…surest guide to the 
understanding of culture‟.  Alan Wolfe (1989) views moral agency as a socially 
constructed practice, in which moral „episodes‟ (such as a personal tragedy) underlie 
negotiations between the individual agent and their cultural context.  In a similar 
fashion, Fein (1997) claims morality to be central to social process, constantly 
shifting, complex, and requiring ongoing negotiation.   
The significance of morality to social process is also emphasised by two 
contemporary writers central to this thesis.  The first is Charles Taylor.  Taylor (1989) 
identifies morality as pivotal to a central sociological question: why do people think, 
reason, and act the way they do?  Taylor‟s interest is in historically mapping the 
(„tentative, hesitating and fuzzy‟) moral commitments that underlie modern self-
identities.  He argues that moral orientation is about process because humans are not 
static but constantly „becoming‟.   His work traces the history of this „becoming‟, 
providing a historical and philosophical context through which to understand the 
moral commitments of modern individuals (Taylor 1989: 46-52). 
The second writer is Zygmunt Bauman, who also implicates morality as central to the 
study of social process (Bauman 1993).  For Bauman, moral capacity is intimately 
tied to the subject and at the same time has everything to do with the social: 
We are not moral thanks to society (we are only ethical or law-abiding 
thanks to it); we live in society, we are society, thanks to being moral.     
       (Bauman 1993: 61)  
Bauman (1993; 2001a) traces the social processes of modernity and post-modernity 
(or „liquid modernity‟ as he later coined the term)19 as a means to critique the way 
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 The term „post-modern‟ is not my preferred term for the present-day context, and nor is it (at this time 
of writing), the preferred term for any of the major theorists discussed in this thesis, e.g. Taylor or 
Giddens.  However, at the time Bauman wrote the text I have drawn heavily from in this paper, he did 
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these processes have suppressed moral expression.  He claims that the importance of 
understanding social process has everything to do with its impact on moral capacity.  
Alternatively put, the axle around which Bauman‟s sociology turns concerns the 
moral implications of (western) social environments. 
Taylor and Bauman both deal with morality in terms of process, whether historical or 
social.  The following section will include an exploration of these processes at the 
point where the authors themselves begin: in their insistence that the „self‟ is moral.   
4.2.2. The moral „self‟ 
Taylor and Bauman both claim that moral capacity is an indivisible attribute of the 
human condition.  I begin by outlining the justification for their theories; first Taylor 
and then Bauman.  It will then be shown how theories of the moral self signal a 
differentiation from Durkheim‟s „moral fact.‟  
Taylor, Bauman and the moral self 
Taylor‟s goal in Sources of the Self is to make explicit a moral ontology by mapping 
the „moral world‟ as manifested in western views.  His central argument is that for 
human beings, the nature of „being‟ in the world is inextricably tied to moral 
subjectivity.  That is, the notion of self or identity isn‟t prior to morality, but arises 
through the processes and embodying of moral stances (Calhoun 1991: 233).  
Morality, suggests Taylor, is inextricably related to human identity: 
To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which 
questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, 
what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary. 
       (Taylor 1989: 28)  
                                                                                                                                           
 
use the term „post-modern‟ (although later Bauman coins the term „liquid modernity‟ (2000), thus 
perhaps not entirely satisfied with the term either)   Given the multiplicity of terms used to describe the 
contemporary context, I have settled on using the term „post-modern‟ for the sake of clarity and ease. 
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Taylor (Taylor 1989: 27) claims that all humans think and act within such a „moral 
space‟, or „horizons of significance‟.20  Moral spaces make possible definitions of 
what constitutes „goods‟  That is, individuals make qualitative distinctions about what 
they feel are better or worse, higher or lower, good or bad, ways to live and be in the 
world.   Qualitative distinctions also orient individuals toward that which is important 
or trivial, meaningful and significant, or secondary and inconsequential21..  The type 
of distinctions individuals make include „lifegoods‟ which refer to the modes and 
lifestyles viewed to be more worthy, valuable, or superior in some way (Taylor 1989: 
92).  For example, some of the „lifegoods‟ already identified in Part I include Kayla‟s 
determination for financial self-reliance, or Hannah‟s preference for the values of her 
religious community and beliefs over career advancement. 
Taylor (1989: 46-52) also claims that moral orientations involve process: because 
individuals are not static but „becoming‟ beings, the question of „who‟ we as 
individuals also involves the question of „where are we going?‟  For example, an 
individual can orient herself in physical space and know where she is going through 
her familiarity with landscapes and landmarks.  Similarly, individuals also orient their 
„self‟ story in moral space in relation to what they view as „good‟ and how they direct 
their lives towards it, to fulfil it.  For example, Kayla orients herself strongly towards 
goals of employment and self-generated income, and her inability to fulfil these goals 
at times deeply affects her sense of self-identity.  As Taylor notes (1989: 52), the 
temporality and process inherent in these kinds of orientations is also akin to 
understanding „self‟ in terms of story or narrative.  Chapters six, eight and ten of this 
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 Taylor‟s use of the term „horizon of significance‟ is drawn from Gadamer (1975)   
21
 Taylor is not alone in arguing this.  More recently, Smith (2003) has written about the centrality of 
moral orientations to human identity.  Similarly to Taylor, he writes: „Both preferences and values 
involve reference to discriminations between worthy and unworthy, good and bad, right and wrong, 
truth and falsehood, and so on.  They are socially normative and evaluative dispositions.‟  (Smith 2003: 
18).   
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thesis outline four such narratives, central to which are orientations towards what is 
„good‟ in life and how participants direct their lives towards it.  
At this point, the question might be posed that even if we are oriented in moral space, 
why should individuals bother articulating „goods‟?  In response, Taylor takes the 
basic stance that for ordinary people, in their practical consciousness, identity matters.   
Calhoun summarises Taylor‟s response:  
It is because we “ask why”, because we engage in self-interpretation, that we 
are forced to think about hypergoods…We cannot have an identity without 
having an orientation in moral space.     (Calhoun 1991: 236)  
Taylor is confident that the articulation of goods and their moral sources empowers 
individuals to act through the clarity borne of a sense of direction.  This doesn‟t mean 
goods don‟t exist in uneasy tensions, or outright conflict with each other.  However, 
Taylor argues that in their articulation, „the secret of their strength is their capacity to 
confer meaning and substance on people‟s lives‟, for example through enlivening 
culture, dignifying human life, spiritual enlightenment, or revolution (Taylor 1989: 
97). 
If morality for Taylor is inextricably linked to being human, for Zygmunt Bauman 
morality is innate to human nature: 
…being moral is perhaps the constitutive attribute of humanity, a feature 
that makes the human condition unique and sets it apart from any other 
modes of „being-in-the-world‟    (Bauman and Tester 2001b: 43) 
For Bauman (1993), moral capacity lies in the ability of the individual to make the 
moral choice to take responsibility for the Other22.  Moral responsibility necessitates 
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 Bauman draws the concept of the Other and the „face to face‟ encounter from Emmanuel Levinas, 
(e.g. Totality and Infinity, 1969, Duquesne University Press) 
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„proximity‟ through breaking down any distance between self and the Other created 
by social expectations such as reciprocity or contractual obligation.  „Proximity‟ 
occurs by loving the Other regardless.  It is within this „moral party of two‟ that 
morality begins, in the „face to face‟ encounter.  It is also at this point that the 
impulses to flee such responsibility are the most urgent.  Contained within the same 
impulse to serve is the impulse toward cruelty or immorality.  Therefore, claims 
Bauman (1993: 11), co-joined with responsibility for the Other is its aporetic 
hallmark of ambivalence and uncertainty.  This is because the only arbiter and 
interpreter of radical responsibility (from which there is no relief) is the self engaged 
in ongoing moral „anxiety‟ about the „rightness‟ of action.   
4.2.3. Moral „self‟ or social fact? 
Consequently for both Bauman and Taylor, morality is central to their description of 
being human.  By virtue of the fact that humans ask questions about and grapple with 
issues of what is right or wrong or good or bad, they are „moral‟.  This description of 
the moral individual does differ from Durkheim‟s „moral fact‟.  For Durkheim (1972), 
„society‟ is the overarching consciousness from which normatively understood moral 
authority is derived.  Accordingly, because morality is a social „fact‟, morality is 
understood as a product of the social.  In other words for Durkheim, moral cohesion – 
through individuation, or „organic‟ solidarity - is a „function‟ of the social.  The 
normative moral standard of individualism is thus considered ideal (for the best 
function of society) and any alternative moral beliefs are viewed as pathological.   
Consequently, Durkheim‟s perception of morality as a functional „product‟ of the 
social differs from Bauman and Taylor‟s conceptualisation of the intrinsically moral 
individual. 
Consequently, the first point to make about the sociology of morality for the purpose 
of this thesis is that moral orientations are theorised in a number of ways.  On the one 
hand, morality can be understood as both a function of needs arising from human 
sociality (or a „social morality‟), as in Durkheim‟s understanding.  On the other hand, 
morality is also theorised as central to the „self‟, and as Bauman has noted, even 
possible outside sociality.  Findings in the following chapters raise the central 
question about how these different understandings of morality apply to one another.  
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As such, the relationship between Durkheim‟s form of social morality and the moral 
self will be discussed more extensively in the thesis discussion (chapter eleven). 
Differences aside, Durkheim nevertheless insisted that if morality is social in any way, 
then sociology should be concerned with understanding process.  Taylor and Bauman 
also similarly contend that the moral subject is implicated in historical and social 
process.  The following section will outline their theories in contrast to alternative 
claims that suggest morality is predominantly an individual phenomenon.   
4.2.4. Historical and social processes of the moral self 
It is suggested by some theorists that morality in contemporary society can only be 
understood in the context of individual agency.   For example, Alasdair MacIntyre 
(1981: 35-66) claims that morality has been reduced to an individualised phenomenon.  
He argues that moral judgement has lost evaluative meaning, or meaning beyond 
itself.  This, he notes, is because the traditional values that morality was once 
embedded in no longer find a home in the rationalist principles that have come to 
dominate social life.  According to MacIntyre, the „moral self‟ is therefore a 
sovereign agent with no orienting frameworks or shared basis for rationale.  Any 
language surrounding moral judgement is but a „linguistic survival from the practices 
of classical theism‟ (MacIntyre 1981: 57).  The continued use of the language of 
moral judgement without the theistic context in which they originally made sense 
means that a great chasm exists between such uses of the term „morality‟ and their 
meanings.  For MacIntyre, the ideal society would be one in which the virtues (drawn 
from Homeric / Aristotelian philosophy) were oriented around practice, narrative 
order, and a moral tradition.23  Accordingly, MacIntyre explains moral meaning in 
modernity as reduced to the sphere of individual moral choice. 
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 While MacIntyre contends that when it comes to morality, modern society has left the individual as 
sovereign agent with few meaningful orienting anchors, his „ideal‟ society would be a return to a 
society tied to social principles and ends oriented around an Aristotelian notion similar to the polis.  
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Both Taylor and Bauman take a different perspective to morality than MacIntyre.  
Both argue that historical and social processes are a key to understanding the 
contemporary phenomenon of morality.  Taylor, for example, argues that 
understanding the social history of moral change is integral to conceptualising 
morality. Bauman argues that what makes humans into individuals is society, and 
consequently the notion of „individual‟ is not some natural, innate feature of being24.  
The following is an exploration of Taylor‟s ideas, and through them a return to 
critique MacIntyre‟s account of morality.  Subsequent to this I outline Bauman‟s 
theory, which offers a concrete link into sociological processes in shifting social 
formations through modernity and post-modernity.   
Taylor‟s historical sources 
The heart of Taylor‟s account lies in his historical exploration of the moral self, in 
which he signposts the continuity and adaptation of moral sources as they weave 
through shifting understandings of the self over time.  His historical account rests on 
a view of the nature of changing thought in the way transitions in moral sources and 
self-identities occur.  Taylor suggests that historically people do not reject one moral 
framework (such as theism) for another (like scientific rationality) simply because the 
former is proven incorrect.   Taylor‟s „best account‟ principle can help to explain this 
idea.  The „best account principle‟ is that the human world involves descriptions and 
explanations that best account for the meanings that thought and actions embody, 
including „hypergoods‟.  On this basis, Taylor suggests that shifts in moral sources 
                                                                                                                                           
 
That is, embedded in teleological notions of goals directed toward (collective) human ends, morality 
would flourish through virtues established in practice, through a narrative order, and a moral tradition 
(1981: 170-4.).  In other words, although MacIntyre conceptualises modernity as morally atomised (and 
even individual morality as having little meaning in relation to others), his „solution‟ is a far more 
Durkheimian model of morality embedded in social cohesion through a shared project. 
24
 In fact, Bauman (1993) states that the term „morality‟ itself is a specifically modern one, because the 
distinction between moralities has only in the modern era become a distinct sphere of thought, action 
and sentiment, alongside the notion of „individual‟ entities, capable of making evaluative self choice.  
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(or hypergoods) are grounded within the existing intuitions and moral experience 
available (by best account) to individuals at the time.  In other words, people are only 
convinced to shift from one moral source to another if what is already morally 
available to them is superseded by a higher moral awareness or consciousness.  
Taylor (1989: 72) names this shift an „epistemic gain‟. 
To clarify this idea, Taylor suggests that conflict exists within any moral experience 
or recognition of „goods‟.  By their very nature, „goods‟ frequently and inherently 
embody dilemmas, such as being in conflict with other „goods‟.  A „good‟ such as 
„universal human rights‟ for example, holds internal dilemmas not least because its 
ideal continually remains unrealized.  It may also conflict with other social „goods‟ 
such as those embodied in the individual pursuit of happiness.  Taylor reasons that 
these dilemmas form a motivation for moral transitions because only in seeking their 
resolution are new moral sources named.  In other words, the criteria for the 
invocation of new „goods‟ (or the elevation of existing ones to a higher status) is the 
perceived epistemological gain or superior experience thought to be achievable 
through them (Taylor 1989: 62-75). 
Historically, Taylor suggests that these moral re-articulations (or epistemic gains) 
have taken diverse paths.  His account highlights the major shifts as: the development 
of the Inward Turn, the Affirmation of the Ordinary, and The Voice of Nature.  
Following is a brief outline of crucial elements within each historical transition.  
Taylor (1989: 111) acknowledges that the notion of „individual‟ that is taken for 
granted today was by no means available to 16th and 17th century societies.  However, 
moral transitions toward „inwardness‟ at the time now underlie the modern self as 
commonly understood today.  In the context of a largely theistic order/cosmos, Taylor 
traces transitions in thinking through major philosophies of the time: Plato‟s self 
mastery, Augustine‟s radical reflexivity, Descartes‟ disengaged reason, Locke‟s 
punctual self, and others.  From them, some fundamental shifts in self-understanding 
took place.  First is an incremental disconnection from the wider, cosmic and 
meaningful order, with individual paradigm direction set subjectively, from within.  
Coupled with growing notions of disengaged reason, self reflexivity, self exploration 
and self-control were increasingly endorsed through a growing value placed upon 
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self-responsible independence and human dignity.  Another inward turn took place 
through a recognition and privileging of the particular.   Subjective identities, often 
in uneasy tension with disengaged reason, thus formed another facet of the modern 
„self‟.  Yet another inward turn involves the ethic of personal commitment driven by 
Reformational Puritanism, shifting the basis of consensus from communal to 
contractual relations.  This ethic radicalised the first two aspects and extended their 
reach further into shifting spiritual thinking and forming secularisms (Taylor 1989: 
111-198). 
Taylor (1989: 211-33) describes the other two major shifts similarly:  as incremental 
moral transitions in thinking through the increasing valuing and privileging of some 
ideas and behaviours over others.  In the second shift (the „affirmation of the 
ordinary‟), the destabilisation of „higher‟ activities as constituted through traditional 
hierarchies resulted in a turn to the „ordinary‟.  The restoration of the „everyday‟ was 
incrementally given higher moral ground, as it was seen as part of God‟s redeeming 
plan for creation.  Taylor‟s work is here is reminiscent of Max Weber‟s Protestant 
Ethic (Weber 1930)25.  For example, Taylor highlights the Protestant sense of calling 
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 As an important aside, further to an outline of the protestant reformation as a process important to 
historical modernity, Taylor and Weber‟s work share another likeness.  As another of sociology‟s 
classical trilogy, Weber did not omit morality in his social theory.  Unlike Durkheim, who located 
morality in social fact, Weber located the sources of social change in moral ideas.  In this respect, 
Taylor similarly is drawing primarily on shifting philosophical ideas as underlying the sources of 
morality throughout modernity.  Weber shows that the moral sources drawn upon today (e.g. capitalism 
and economic rationalism) are not necessarily born of the rejection of moral belief (e.g. religion), rather 
in some cases because of their shifting manifestations.  Social processes (or Durkheim‟s „facts‟) can tell 
us what social forms have shifted, however Weber‟s ideas can embody the „why‟, or the motive for that 
shift.  In this sense, Weber‟s preceding theory strengthens Taylor‟s claim that moral sources shift 
because they represent an „epistemic gain‟ or „error-reducing move‟.  The primary difference between 
Weber and Taylor at this juncture is that while Taylor‟s focus is on historic shifts in moral thinking, 
Weber‟s account of shifting moral ideas is accounted for through reference to social outcomes rather 
than philosophical ones, for example, rationalist conduct and capitalism. 
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and refusal to demarcate sacred from secular because all of life came to be understood 
as belonging to God.  The Protestant ethic was encapsulated in commitment to 
rationalised, disciplined work and devoted family life.   
The third major theme draws directly on the previous two.  The „inward turn‟ and the 
„affirmation of the ordinary‟ life had shifted notions of the „good‟ and opened up 
traditional theistic moral sources to increasing critique.  Taylor asserts of this 
transition, 
 The crucial change is that people no longer felt that the spiritual dimension 
of their lives was incomprehensible if one supposed there was no God.   
       (Taylor 1989: 310)   
According to Taylor, redefining moral sources minus the inclusion of God took two 
broad directions, defined in terms of the „radical enlightenment‟ and „romanticism‟ 
(Taylor 1989: 315-9).  The primary form taken by „radical enlightenment‟ thinkers 
was the utilitarian step of elevating the pursuit of pleasure over pain as the central 
goal of humanity.  Rejecting the theistic or providential constitutive moral source, 
utilitarians nevertheless remained committed to the „lifegoods‟ they espoused such as 
individual freedom, affirmation of the ordinary and universal (and objective) 
benevolence.  To utilitarians, human nature represented a neutral domain – neither 
inherently good nor bad – to be moulded and shaped toward (or against) human 
happiness through unshackled reason (Taylor 1989: 321-3).   
Taylor notes that reason was also understood through alternative moral sources, the 
main form being „romanticism‟(Taylor 1989: 355-367).  Romanticism was founded in 
Rousseau‟s concept of the natural inner voice as the source of good and representing 
harmony, virtue and freedom.  This notion of „inner nature‟ as the ultimate source of 
„good‟ flowered in Romanticism and increasingly without overarching ideas of 
cosmic or interlocking natural order.  Rather than disengaging from self, romanticists 
longed for connection with the impulse of nature through recovering sentiment, 
sensuality, articulation, and means to express that nature.  Access to a moral stance in 
Romanticism is therefore understood to be gained through the inner voice of the 
individual and the wholeness and originality springing from it - a predominant 
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example of this was found through art.   Taylor (1989: 36-7) also notes that in many 
cases, nature is also closely linked with reason. 
Taylor emphasises that historical watershed transformations identified in these three 
major transitions have bought about changes that still underlie our western sense of 
moral orientation.  These include the notion that humans deserve dignity, justice and 
universal benevolence, as well as the continuing affirmation of the „ordinary‟ life. 
These transformations broadly have their source in any one of these roots: in Judeo-
Christian charity; various enlightenment notions of the equal, rational and civilized 
individual as free to benefit mankind; or the Romanticist notion of sympathy flowing 
from an undistorted natural desire to assist humankind and provide justice.  Some of 
these „goods‟ will be later identified in the accounts of participants central to this 
study. 
Taylor‟s outline so far gives adequate context to support further consideration of 
MacIntyre‟s thesis of the virtues.  Through Taylor‟s historical outline it is possible to 
argue that MacIntyre‟s account is limited because morality is defined in static terms.  
Morality has no meaning, argues MacIntyre, because the „context‟ (read theistic, 
Aristotelian, or in any case teleological context) is absent.  That is, there is no moral 
„context‟ in contemporary society, or „ends‟ around which to practice virtue 
(MacIntyre 1981: 35-66).  Contrastingly, Taylor claims that the content of morality 
shifts over time and is therefore historically situated.  Morality is not static, but 
ephemeral and in constant shuffle.  Taylor‟s notion of „epistemic gain‟ demonstrates 
that moral sources not only shift, but that the justifications for their transition are 
themselves morally motivated. 
This motivation includes reducing conflicts experienced within particular moral 
stances by moving towards a so-called „better‟ (or error-reducing) morality.  
Therefore to insist that the „best‟ version of moral virtues is located in one particular 
historic time or place, as MacIntyre does, is to dismiss these shifting sources of 
morality.  Moreover dismissing them precludes insight into the moral forms that do 
manifest (albeit in vastly different ways than centuries ago) in contemporary society. 
MacIntyre is therefore unable to account for the meaning that is given particular 
moral stances by individuals today, or the possible social processes that underlie 
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those choices.  For example, In Part II of this thesis, I identify the specifically moral 
dimensions of money meanings amongst participants in this study.  They may not be 
identified in terms of moral virtues MacIntyre idealises, nevertheless they constitute 
moral orientations – or a disposition towards what is „good‟ – that is shared in this 
contemporary culture. 
I have outlined a sketch of Taylor‟s morally oriented, historically situated, and 
specifically modern, self.  However, while Taylor‟s outline of a historical articulation 
is significant to this project, his moral sources of the self are outlined primarily 
through philosophical ideas.26  What a sociological project emphasises is the central 
fact that the „self‟ is of course also social.   The „self‟ is constructed in social space, 
and constitutive of social relations.  I return to the work of Zygmunt Bauman to assist 
in developing a clearer understanding of these social relations. 
Bauman‟s social ethics 
Bauman contends that central to individual moral choices are social processes.  It is 
social process that lends some choice alternatives greater legitimacy over others.  
Bauman names these social processes as „ethical‟ ones.  In other words, social order 
and culture are ethical in that they situate moral choices in relation to them.   For  
Bauman therefore, sociology is the study of the ways in which (social) ethical rules 
are made, endured, and maintained, and the ways in which humans interact with 
choices guided by such ethics (Bauman 1993: 44-5).27 
                                                   
 
26
 In general terms, philosophy (including moral philosophy, for example see Vajda (1999) and Baier 
(1997)) conceptualises morality in terms of internal, rather than social, mechanisms.  A similar 
argument is mounted of „moral psychology‟.  Work such as Kohlberg (1975), Hoffman (1980) and 
Shelton and McAdams (1990) have concerned themselves with developmental measures for 
ascertaining moral awareness.  The latter, for example, locates „mora lity‟ as an empathetic response to 
other‟s needs, and gives little indication of the historical, social or contextual phenomenon of morality.  
27
 Bauman‟s work builds on the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (1991). 
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In Post-Modern Ethics Bauman (1993) describes the ethic of post-modernity as 
primarily articulated through the social processes contained within the modern project 
and the reasons why they failed.  For that reason, the following is an outline of the 
modern „project‟ according to Bauman, followed up with the concluding comments 
Bauman makes in relation to the „experiential context‟ of post-modernity. 
Modernity, states Bauman, has been built upon the premise of „mistrust‟ (Bauman 
1993: 67).  Modern emancipation of „self‟ from natural (or divine) order did not 
translate to a freedom from all external constraints.  The new-found freedom from an 
overarching „natural‟ order was interpreted into widespread mistrust of natural 
impulse (previously Bauman‟s argument noted that such „impulse‟ is primarily the 
individual‟s moral impulse).   For example: emotions had no place in principled 
reasoning (e.g. Kant); all criteria for morality shifted strongly toward proceduralism 
and the displacement of morality to the rational decision-maker; „doing good‟ was 
replaced with „discipline‟; and „freedom‟ came to be equated with choice to abide by 
the rules.  For these reasons, claims Bauman, what begins in scepticism of 
autonomous moral capacity results in a modern social ethic that denies the self any 
agency in moral judgement (Bauman 1993: 65-9). 
Further to being mistrusted in modernity, moral capacity is also undermined by 
modern social processes.  Society, argues Bauman, may be defined as the addition of 
the „third‟ (the „judge‟ or „umpire‟) to the „moral party of two‟.  The moral party of 
two is the sphere in which responsibility for the Other can take place, through face to 
face relations.  „Society‟ is the realm of social order - those individuals, categories, 
contractual obligations and accountabilities that enter as the third party to arbitrate 
between the moral party of two (Bauman 1993: 110).  Central to Bauman‟s 
description of modern forms of society are the elements that constitute the social, for 
example „socialisation‟ and „sociality‟ (Bauman 1993: 116-37) or „cognitive‟ or 
„aesthetic‟ spaces (Bauman 1993: 145-8).  Bauman explains the ways in which each 
of these forms of the social diminish moral space, for example: through structured 
(e.g. bureaucratic) social controls; through the „facelessness‟ of the Other in the 
crowd where moral capacity (or taking responsibility for the Other) is diminished;  
through the anonymity of strangers and the indifference (or „mismeeting‟) afforded 
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them; or conversely, the stranger as an object of amusement or a „spectacle‟ 
remaining faceless and morally distant.  
Bauman argues that morality can only be enacted in proximity.  However, in 
modernity the sheer distances and scale of human action rendered proximity (and thus 
moral responsibility) largely absent from the equation.  Bauman (1993: 217-22) 
speculates how moral responsibility can be pursued in such a bleak moral climate, 
declaring that the forecast doesn‟t look promising.   On the one hand, he argues, a 
post-modern ethic can present an opportunity to rethink our responsibility to the 
Other through proclaiming the morbidity of the modern project.  On the other hand, 
post-modernity brings its own morbid message.  That is, alleges Bauman, human 
beings now know that freedom cannot come through ethical code and that moral 
dilemmas will continue to be faced, probably without any clear solutions (Bauman 
1993: 31). 
Bauman continues by sketching some characteristics of post-modern social processes.  
He argues that like any social ethics post-modernity can highlight with clarity the 
mistakes and the wrongdoings of its predecessors.  However, he continues, post-
modernity will simultaneously usher in the new wrongs of tomorrow and plant the 
seeds of its own downfall.  In post-modernity, globalisation has diminished the 
sovereignty of the nation-state, mass mobilisation is no longer required or pursued, 
people are content with their „private futures‟ (no more „salvation by society‟ please), 
and any „management‟ is strictly confined to state administration.  Bauman (1993: 
138-40) calls this the post-modern „divorce‟ between state-politics and the moral 
substance of the people.  In other words, the concrete „structure‟ (or socialisation) of 
modernity is broken down in the face of a world economy and forced from 
nationalistic strategies into parochial, locally-based politics.  Dominant social forms 
shift to become directly implicated in identity-building, now an individual task rather 
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than state role and primarily characterised in the „neo-tribe‟ (Bauman 1993: 233-
35).28 
Further to the shifting emphasis on „social‟ spaces, Bauman sketches metaphors of 
the post-modern „type‟ of person as the „vagabond‟ and „tourist‟ (Bauman 1993: 240-
45).  The „vagabond‟ is always moving, disillusioned with the present, given to the 
temporary, and happy to dismantle.  The tourist is constantly moving through space, 
and not affected by the orders, meanings or faces within these spaces.  Experience for 
the „tourist‟ is paid for and owned as a matter of „right‟.   All satisfaction is found 
within the aesthetic space of experiential pleasure.  Again, the moral proximity of 
„face-to-face‟ and the responsibility for the Other are pushed out of post-modern 
spacings.  The „tourist‟, states Bauman „is bad news for morality‟ (Bauman 1993: 
242).  
Bauman argues that the „vagabond‟ and „tourist‟ are not just peripheral figures in 
post-modernity.  Rather, they are setting the normative standard by which life, 
happiness and pleasure are measured.  Transient lifestyles go hand in hand with the 
minimization of politics around single issues such as „human rights‟ (to be left alone), 
the dismantling of the welfare state replaced by merit-based systems, and the 
consequent freeing of politics and particularly economy from moral responsibility.  In 
post-modernity, people require money before they can act as the „good Samaritan‟.  
Moral capacity is increasingly pushed towards an economic balancing of the books.  
The fulfilled customer is the social ideal and social space is consumer space, the new 
„aesthetic‟ space for playing.  Again, insists Bauman, there doesn‟t seem to be any 
room left for moral responsibility in post-modernity (Bauman 1993: 244-5). 
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 A term borrowed from Maffesoli, M. (1996). The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in 
Mass Society. London: Sage Publishers. 
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Summary of themes 
The work of Durkheim, Taylor and Bauman assist in the formation of a sociology of 
morality for the purposes of this thesis.  To clarify the central points about morality 
made from their work, the following is a simple re-statement of important elements 
identified in the literature so far. 
Durkheim‟s model of morality is a „morality of co-operation‟ (Durkheim 1972: 8), 
where morality is understood as a product of the „social‟.  Social solidarity is formed 
through shared moral orientations, and are described as a „function‟ of bringing about 
social cohesion.  From a Durkheimian view, social morality is a normative moral 
standard and ideal for the best function of society. 
According to both Taylor and Bauman, humans are intrinsically moral beings.  For 
Taylor, the moral „self‟ is also historically situated.  It is therefore impossible to 
understand moral orientations in modernity without sketching the history of their 
shifting sources.  Shifts in moral sources occur because the transition represents an 
„epistemic gain‟, or the attempted resolution of a conflict inherent to the previous 
moral source.   
While Taylor‟s work provides a necessary framework for thinking about the enduring 
nature of morality through historical transitions, Bauman‟s work is important because 
he also locates how these moral processes must be conceived as social ones.  Bauman 
argues that the social processes of modernity and post-modernity shape and constrain 
individual capacity to engage in moral responsibility for the Other.  Through modern 
forms of the „social‟ (e.g. socialisation, sociality, or cognitive or aesthetic spaces) and 
technology, individual moral capacity is diminished and distorted.  As a social 
process, post-modernity is an acknowledgment of the destruction of moral capacity 
embodied in modernity.  Nevertheless, Bauman emphasises that the consequent shifts 
in social forms specific to post-modernity (e.g. the „tourist‟ or „vagabond‟) carry both 
the potential to disregard any moral responsibility for the Other, and their own seeds 
of self-destruction.  Consequently, contradiction, conflict, and ambiguity are 
inextricable from individual moral capacity.   
4.3. Mapping morality 
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It is these ideas about what constitutes „morality‟ that I explore further in this thesis.  
Drawing from Durkheim, Taylor and Bauman‟s work, there are two important 
dimensions I take as a benchmark for thinking about morality.  The first is the „form‟ 
of morality, and the second is its „content‟.   
The form of morality - its‟ shape or character - is understood from the perspective of 
social and historical process as shifting, ephemeral and constantly open to negotiation.  
Alternatively put, morality is not static, or defined within a particular historical period 
to be applied as a fixed meaning henceforth.  In this sense, understanding the form of 
morality as „process‟ can lend clarity to its descriptive definition.  If constantly 
shifting, morality cannot be defined as a fixed value, such as „charity‟ or „generosity‟ 
but rather must accommodate its ephemeral nature.29   
The content of morality is also important, and it follows on from a version of 
Durkheim‟s view of social morality and Taylor and Bauman‟s claim that to be human 
is to be moral.  That is, morality is socially constituted, but also arises because human 
beings continually grapple with questions and behaviour oriented towards what is 
right, good, evil, inconsequential, and of serious importance.  Accordingly „morality‟ 
is understood as the capacity of humans to evaluate and judge between distinctions; 
including what is „good‟ as opposed to „bad‟, „right‟ as opposed to „wrong‟ or even 
„appropriate‟ in relation to „inappropriate‟.  As such, the „content‟ of morality thus 
flags both the social nature of morality and the capacity of individuals to make moral 
judgements in the context of social structures. 
On the one hand, therefore, from the literature it appears that „morality‟ is in form a 
process that is constantly shifting in time and space, and in content inextricably tied 
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 Bauman has an alternative starting point here: he understands morality as coming „before‟ the social; 
and his definition of morality (drawn from Levinas) is „responsibility for the Other‟ - thus unchanging 
over time.  It is not the case that I disagree with Bauman, however this argument requires more 
exploration that I attend to in the thesis discussion (chapter eleven).   
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to human beings who are by their very nature engaged in ongoing moral orientation.  
Changing orientations of the moral „self‟ are also social and historical because moral 
self-understandings are inextricable from the specific social-structural and temporal 
contexts within which they appear.   On the other hand, as will be shown later through 
the data findings in this thesis, the relationship between the social nature of morality, 
individual moral capacity and the way they are studied sociologically highlights a 
complexity about morality that is not so easily defined in practice.   
4.3.1. Morality and „habitus‟ 
Identifying moral dimensions of money meanings also provides the foundation for an 
analytical shift.  Moving beyond the case studies of the previous chapter, I analyse, in 
Part II, the shared money meanings and everyday practices across three participant 
categories: middle-income, low-income and downshifters.  The concept of „habitus‟ 
in the work of Pierre Bourdieu clarifies the analytical shift between Part I and II, and 
I will briefly outline why.  According to Bourdieu, „habitus‟ is:  
…embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as 
history… the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product.  
       (Bourdieu 1990: 53) 
In other words, a person‟s everyday practices are constituted through „habitus‟, which 
is the totality of their history of learning and experience embodied as a „system of 
dispositions‟.  These dispositions are not consciously understood as rational 
principles for action, but rather are legitimated in terms of „common sense‟ practices, 
self-evident and appearing reasonable.  Bourdieu notes that habitus is lived 
predominately in reference to earlier (childhood, domestic, familial) experiences, 
forming „schemes of perception, thought and action‟ which legitimates the 
appropriateness of practices through time.  He argues these schemes are more reliable 
than any formal social rules or norms (Bourdieu 1990: 53). 
„Habitus‟ may be embodied by individuals, but according to Bourdieu also refers to 
common dispositions amongst groups of people.  Bourdieu refers to habitus as 
providing, 
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…consensus on the meaning of practices and the world, in other words the 
harmonization of the agents‟ experiences and the constant reinforcement 
each of them receives from expression – individual or collective (in festivals, 
for example), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings) – of 
similar or identical experiences.     (Bourdieu 1990: 58) 
Individual habitus is thus defined in the uniqueness of individuals‟ social trajectories, 
contained in time-ordered influences and conditions, none of which can be reduced to 
any other.   At the same time, individuals „choices‟ systematically (and un-
consciously) favour other individuals, places or events that will protect the habitus 
from challenge and crisis, and provide constant or static dispositions. As such, the 
group habitus is defined as the individual habitus united in relationship with other 
members of the same group, a relationship of diversity within homogeneity.  The 
group habitus reflects common dispositions amongst all its members, found in the 
likelihood of all being exposed to conditions or convergent experiences most 
persistent or common for members of the group.  Thus, while no two individuals have 
exactly the same experiences, members of the same group habitus experience 
common histories and thus share preconditions for convergent dispositions through 
which their meanings and practices are co-ordinated and shared (Bourdieu 1990: 59-
61).  
Bourdieu conceptualises the way culture is embodied individually and collectively.  
Part I of this thesis identifies some examples of individual habitus, specifically in 
reference to the diversity of understandings about the place of money in a „good life‟.  
That is, it exposes the uniqueness of individual participant‟s social trajectories: those 
singular, time-ordered cultural influences such as family relations, religious beliefs, 
work experiences and expectations of self-reliance, none of which can be reduced to 
any other. 
However, what Bourdieu makes clear is that individual choices never merely signify 
subjective dispositions alone.  Individual habitus is always in part reflective of group 
habitus: and this will be the analytic focus of Part II.  Part II will address questions 
such as: what are the common money dispositions and convergent money experiences 
found amongst participants in this study?  In what ways are their money meanings 
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and practices co-ordinated and shared?  In other words, Part II will focus on money 
meanings that draw on the „harmonisation of agent‟s experiences‟ (Bourdieu 1990: 
58).  In particular, the three participant categories (middle- income, low-income and 
downshifters) provide frameworks for analysing similar and dissimilar dispositions 
and themes occurring in money meanings.  Some of these themes are new, and some 
have already been outlined in Part I but will be analysed in greater depth in the 
following analysis.  Themes include: analysis of participants‟ predominant 
orientations towards money; participant understandings of private vs. public monies; 
the relationship of money meanings to self-reliance; and temporal themes related to 
money meanings, such as the future.   
To this end, „habitus‟ also describes, in part, the process of moral orientations as 
described above (although Bourdieu does not use this phrase).  The processes 
described by Durkheim, Taylor and Bauman as „moral‟, and Bourdieu‟s „habitus‟ 
have key similarities: they are understood as historically and temporally located; as 
ephemeral and open to shifting meanings; as socially/culturally sourced although 
individually embodied; and that central to being human is the embodiment of 
„dispositions‟ (Bourdieu) or „orientations‟ (Taylor) towards particular meanings or 
legitimation of practices. 
Of course, Bourdieu‟s concept of „habitus‟ is far broader than the „moral orientations‟ 
focussed on in this thesis.  Bourdieu defines the social arena of „habitus‟ in terms of 
„fields‟, and, as Jenkins (1992) clarifies, these can relate to a broad reach of social 
structures or „logics‟, including:  
…cultural goods (life-style), housing, intellectual distinction (education), 
employment, land, power (politics), social class, prestige or whatever.  
       (Jenkins 1992: 84) 
This relates directly to the remainder of this thesis.  While not a sociological study of 
money in terms of the „economy‟ or „money‟ as a „field‟ in Bourdieu‟s sense; the 
study of money here relates to the „durable dispositions‟ of participants towards the 
meanings they ascribe to money (in their conception of a „good life‟).  More 
specifically, it is the purpose of the following analysis to identify the „moral 
orientations‟ present in participants „dispositions‟ towards money meanings.  For 
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example, the ways in which people describe money in relation to a „good life‟ 
highlights how people‟s orientation towards money (in terms of goals, desires, 
responsibilities etc.) bring to light the moral categories and boundaries that in turn 
define their identities and help negotiate their place in social life.  Shared orientations 
to money highlight moral meanings and moral boundaries around what are „good‟ and 
„appropriate‟ ways to think about or live with money, or what are „inappropriate‟ or 
less-than-ideal modes of existence in relation to money.  These moral boundaries 
identify what perceived ways we „should‟ or „shouldn‟t‟ live, and why this ought to 
be the case or not.  They form part of (in Bourdieu‟s sense) „dispositions‟ or 
consensus around „meanings of practice‟ (Bourdieu 1990: 53).   
These moral orientations are also culturally, socially and relationally generated.  That 
is, moral orientations are invested with social and cultural meanings.  Ostrow (2000: 
305), following from Bourdieu‟s work, suggests that culture is more than just the 
„standards, norms, or rules‟ behaviourally enacted and „internalised‟ through values.  
Rather, they constitute experiences that are habitually given meaning through 
„historically developed interactions between people and their physical environment‟ 
(Ostrow 2000: 305).  And these interactions, notes Smith, are deeply moral: 
Human persons nearly universally live in social worlds that are thickly 
webbed with moral assumptions, beliefs, commitments, and obligations.  
The relational ties that hold human lives together, the conversations that 
occupy people‟s mental lives, the routines and intentions that shape their 
actions, the institutions within which they live and work, the emotions they 
feel every day – all of these and more are drenched in, pattered by, glued 
together with moral premises, convictions and obligations.  These morally 
constituted and permeated worlds exist outside of people, in structured 
social practices and relationships within which people‟s lives are embedded.  
They also exist „inside‟ of people, in their assumptions, expectations, beliefs, 
aspirations, thoughts, judgements and feelings. There is nowhere a human 
can go to escape moral order.  There is no way to be human except through 
moral order.        (Smith 2003: 8) 
Conclusion 
  
 
 
108 
Culture, and the moral orientations embodied in it, is deeply embedded in everyday 
money meanings and practice.  Bourdieu‟s „habitus‟, for example, helps to identify 
the (biographical and social/cultural) process through which money meanings can be 
understood as moral orientations, and more broadly still, cultural dispositions.  This 
added dimension found in the concept of morality is therefore a significant way to 
engage with - and expand - the sociology of money from a cultural perspective.  
Building on these ideas, the following chapters will shift to an in-depth analysis of the 
ways in which income and choices surrounding income status influence shared 
money meanings and form cultural dispositions and moral orientations in reference to 
a „good life‟. 
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Part II 
Part II draws on the theoretical ideas of Part I, but is largely empirically driven. 
Themes in Part II focus on identifying specific dispositions found in moral 
orientations towards money meanings.  In particular, each participant category – 
middle-income, low-income and downshifters - is given two chapters each to 
highlight the ways in which consensus with regard to these moral orientations shift 
with each participant category.   
A number of themes are also followed within each of the chapters.  First is an 
analysis of the shifting moral orientations towards money across each participant 
category.  For example, money is central to a „good‟ life amongst the middle-income 
participants but found to be downplayed by low-income participants and sidelined 
amongst the downshifters.  Second, these moral orientations are implicated in a theme 
already given analytical attention in Part I: the cultural disposition towards financial 
self-reliance.  Third, the relation of money orientations to issues of private and public 
uses of money is analysed within each participant category, including participants‟ 
orientations towards money sources.  Fourth, already intermittently analysed in Part I, 
the relationship of moral orientations and money toward participant futures is 
examined in greater depth within each chapter.  And finally, the findings of each 
category are abstracted into narrative types that more clearly highlight how moral 
orientations are central to collective identities and temporal storylines.  
The results of the three following analysis chapters are then taken into the final thesis 
chapter in which their significance is discussed for both the sociology of money and 
the sociology of morality.  For example, the findings provide a significant shift 
through which both classical and contemporary theories in the sociology of money 
can be re-examined.  In light of the findings, I also return to discussions about what 
constitutes „morality‟, and am able to explore the relationship between social and 
individual moralities more deeply. 
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5. Chapter Five: “Everyone wants to be a 
Millionaire”30 - The Money Meanings and 
Moral Orientations of Middle-Income 
Participants 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter outlines themes arising from money meanings and moral orientations 
towards money by the category of middle-income participants.  The middle-income 
category is the most numerically significant group in this study (18 of 41 participants), 
and is the most demographically significant income group in Australia31.   
As a significant demographic income group in Australia, studies focusing on middle-
income values and attitudes relating to quality of life, happiness or well-being are 
increasingly well documented (Pusey 2003; Eckersley 2004; Kasser 2002).  In his 
study, Pusey notes that, „middle Australia is as much an outlook as a demographic 
category‟, and that „middle Australia‟ attitudes cannot be confined strictly to middle-
income Australians (Pusey 2003: 3, 17).   This point is acknowledged here, although 
within the constraints of this study broad themes are identified that are shown to 
differ across participant categories whose only changed criteria relates to income 
levels.  As such, the economic criteria of „income level‟ forms the basic organisation 
around which money meanings and orientations are analysed across the three 
categories. 
                                                   
 
30
 Mark, middle-income participant 
31
 ABS (2001) „Weekly Household Incomes by Family and non-Family households‟ report indicates 
that 42% of Australian households fall within a weekly income of $499 – $1499 (or $26,000 to $78,000 
per annum gross); whereas 28% of Australian households fall below this figure, and 18% fall above (the 
remaining 12% were incomplete indications). 
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Of the eighteen participants in the „middle-income‟ category, nine are female and 
nine are male.  The youngest participant is twenty-five years old, and the oldest is 
thirty-six, while the average age of the group is just over thirty years old.  All the 
middle-income participants receive their earnings from their employment or work.  
Occupations include accountants, architect, graphic designer, lawyer, call centre 
workers, public servants in various government employment capacities, builder, 
businessmen, upholsterer and a nurse.  Their incomes range from $32,000 per annum 
to $130,000, with an average income across the group of approximately $51,000.32  
Thirteen of the group are tertiary educated, another three are TAFE33 educated, while 
two participants received a grade twelve certificate as their highest educational level.  
Ten of the group are buying their own homes, seven are renting, and one participant 
lives with family.  Seven participants are single, seven are partnered or in de facto 
relationships and four participants are married.  Four participants also have 
dependents.  With the exception of one participant, all have travelled overseas, some 
extensively.  For a full outline of middle income participant characteristics, see 
appendix one, table one. 
The analysis of the middle-income participants of this study begins with identifying 
the primary ways that these individuals talked about money in their lives.  That is, 
how is money oriented in relation to what they view as a „good life‟?  The issue of 
how this forms a specifically moral orientation will then be addressed, and explained 
in the context of cultural dispositions.  Following this, specific money orientations of 
middle-income participants are identified.  These include a discussion about the 
disconnection between personal money meanings and public money meanings, the 
relation of money meanings to self-reliance, and finally how money meanings shape 
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 Excluding the $130,000 income, all other incomes ranged between $32,000 and $61,000.   Although 
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the interpretation of temporality, for example, participants‟ understandings of the 
future.   
5.2. Personal middle-income money meanings and moral 
orientations 
5.2.1. Money as „good‟ 
 „A good life? I think that financial success and security gives you the 
springboard from there to get a good life.‟     
      (Douglas, 34, Building Contractor)  
Douglas is a relatively new small business owner and tradesman on a $40,000 per 
annum income who prides himself on hard work, strong personal values, and doing 
„right‟ by his clients.   He also values money.  Money is a means to a good, 
financially secure life full of opportunities, options and control.   His trade and 
business are directed towards these ends.  The logic of money for Douglas is about a 
better future: it is financial independence that will give him control over options such 
as travelling, good health, and retreat-style retirement.  For Douglas, money itself is 
„good‟ and central to a „good life‟. 
As a middle-income earner, Douglas‟s perception about the place of money in a good 
life is similar to the vast majority of middle-income participants.  To them, money is 
„good‟ and plays a central role in living a „good life‟.  In this group, money gained for 
private use by a person or household has a number of straightforward, unanimous 
themes: the primary orientation for thinking about private money is in terms of its 
benefits, its enabling qualities, and as a carrier of improved quality of life.  
Conversely, personal money is rarely problematised or viewed as negative by 
participants. 
„Good‟ is described by participants in various ways, from achieving money success or 
goals, to financial control and independence, or even money being just a good in its 
own right.  One of the strongest frameworks is a shared orientation towards personal 
money as a means to an end or goal.  Some of these goals are quantitative goals, like 
travel, ownership of material goods or investing for the future: 
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„The other thing would be achieving goals n‟ things that you set for yourself, 
whether it is to go visit somewhere, or buy a thing or to buy a house, like 
saving to have a house, or get a degree.  If  you‟ve got that then, you know 
you‟ve achieved something, you‟ve reached a bit of a goal and you‟ve 
worked hard at something and you‟ve achieved something.‟    
       (George, 27, Engineer) 
„I mean, money… the financial independence that I‟m after will give me the 
opportunity to travel, and to go and buy that yacht and head around and sail 
up the Mediterranean.  So, money provides these sorts of opportunities, I 
suppose.  It‟s a vehicle, it‟s not a destination.‟    
      (Edgar, 34, Building Contractor) 
Goals are also qualitative.  The happiness attained through the „quality of life‟ money 
provides is also a unanimous theme: either through lack of financial constraint; 
financial stability, comfort, a particular „quality‟ of life, or the lifestyle choices 
money enables.  Mark says, 
„A comfortable life at that age.  Yeah, well, you would aspire to be 
comfortable by fifty-five.  …    I also like to think that financially, I was 
definitely set up by that age.  I‟d like to think that money wasn‟t a problem 
at that age.  I‟d like to think that I had everything that I considered to give 
me a comfortable life.„     (Mark, 28, Administrator) 
One of the strongest recurring themes is that money is an „enabler‟.  That is, money 
enables choice of lifestyle or a sense of freedom.  For example, money enables many 
participants „to do what I want to do‟.  Money provides opportunities and experiences 
like travel or socialising.  Money is also a financial enabler - of financial control, 
independence, security, success or stability. Sally notes, 
„…I think because I get bored, I‟d like  to maybe have enough money that I 
could live in one place for six months and then maybe go to another place 
for six months or, …  You know, spend maybe six months in Denver and go 
skiing, and then spend you know your summers in, Barbados...‟  
      (Sally, 35, Administrator) 
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Like most participants, Sally is oriented towards the pursuit of money without 
indicating that such a pursuit might disable, or marginalise other valued goals.  Rather, 
it is clear that for all middle-income participants, the central assertion is that in multi-
dimensional ways, personal money itself is unambiguously „good‟: Money is 
unanimously a primary means through which middle-income participants are living - 
and investing in - a „good life‟.34 
5.2.2. Money as a (cultural) moral orientation 
Money meanings can also be conceptualised as moral orientations.  To restate some 
elements of morality (drawing from Taylor), morality involves the capacity of 
humans to evaluate and judge between distinctions, including what is „good‟ as 
opposed to „bad‟, „right‟ as opposed to „wrong‟ or even „appropriate‟ in relation to 
„inappropriate‟ or what is „worth doing‟ and what is not.  Morality is, as Taylor noted, 
identified with evaluative orientation: knowing where „I‟ stand in relation to what is 
or is not important or consequential (Taylor 1989:  28). 
Money meanings as described by middle-income participants can be clearly identified 
in terms of the evaluative distinctions Taylor refers to.  For any one participant to 
describe money as „good‟ for the many reasons given above is to make an evaluative 
claim or judgement about how they orient themselves in relation to money, or what 
money means to them.  To all middle-income participants, money is „good‟ (not bad),  
an „appropriate‟ (not inappropriate) goal to strive for,  and something „worth‟ 
pursuing (as opposed to not worth pursuing).  With respect to money, middle-income 
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 While five quotes may appear as minimal data to locate a major thesis finding on at this stage, the 
centrality of this theme will become clearer as subsidiary themes are outlined in the following sections.  
While highlighting the subsidiary themes, data throughout this chapter will also continue in various 
ways to point back to the major middle-income theme that personal money is „good‟ money.  
Nevertheless, I have supplemented this section with an appendix item (see table in appendix five) 
highlighting interview quotes that illustrate in more depth the ways middle-income participants have 
referred to money as „good‟. 
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participants in this study clearly engage in an evaluative orientation towards its 
acquisition. Their orientations are „evaluative‟ in the sense that the reasons 
participants orient themselves towards money are „weighed‟ or „judged‟ in some way: 
for example money is good because it provides specific benefits, it embodies enabling 
qualities, and it is a carrier of improved quality of life. 
This ability to evaluate and judge the meanings of money in relation to what is 
important or not locates participants‟ understanding of money as „good‟ as a moral 
orientation.  Another way of saying this is that moral orientations make possible 
qualitative distinctions about what constitutes „goods‟ or „lifegoods‟ (Taylor 1989: 
28).  „Lifegoods‟ are lifestyles viewed to be more worthy, valuable or superior in 
some way.  For example, philanthropy, or a leisure-lifestyle may constitute a 
„lifegood‟ in Taylor‟s view.  In this sense, acquiring money is a „lifegood‟ because it 
constitutes a qualitative distinction (and thus moral orientation) about what is a 
valued way to live and be in the world.     
The themes arising from middle-income participants in relation to money are also 
more than just anecdotal.  Orientations towards money in this middle-income study 
are also shared unanimously amongst participants.   Both Taylor and Bauman contend 
that the „self‟ is constituted through the social, in a „process‟ where they are not 
independent of one another but intertwined within the same, indivisible process.  A 
return to Bourdieu‟s „habitus‟ is a way of mapping how money as a moral orientation 
constitutes a cultural process.  Bourdieu clarifies that through „habitus‟, the 
„individual‟ and „society‟ are integrated into an indivisible „process‟: individual 
habitus is a person‟s unique embodied history of experiences and „dispositions‟ in 
relationship with the common histories and convergent dispositions of a wider group 
through which their meanings and practices are co-ordinated and shared (Bourdieu 
1990: 59-61).  
The shared moral orientation towards personal money as „good‟ (and described in so 
many similar ways by participants) is also embodied through cultural process.  Each 
participant has a unique history of experiences and dispositions (or orientations) 
through which money meanings and practices are embodied.  This is clearly seen 
through Part I of this thesis.   The individual stories of Jessica, Hannah, and Kayla 
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each portray a subjective history through which various experiences (familial, 
religious or work-related) shape particular dispositions or orientations to money and 
through which money meanings are expressed and practiced.   In other words, 
through these processes, money comes to „mean‟ something in particular to 
individuals.  
However their money meanings are not limited to individualised meanings.  
Participants‟ stories are also woven through the common histories and convergent 
dispositions of the wider culture to which they belong (Bourdieu 1990).  Amongst the 
middle-income participants, common experiences and dispositions are identified 
clearly though shared moral orientations towards personal money as „good‟: that 
money, for all participants, is something to be personally attained, achieved or 
pursued.  In other words, as a moral orientation, personal money meanings are 
culturally generated, or invested with cultural meanings and dispositions.  For 
example, middle-income participants orient themselves towards their money as 
„good‟ because, for example, of the quality of life money enables, more specifically 
in terms of lack of financial constraint, financial stability, the lifestyle choices money 
makes possible and the comfort it endows.  These constitute shared moral orientations 
that point (by virtue of them being shared) to wider common histories or convergent 
cultural dispositions and in particular, consensus around the „meanings of practice‟ 
(Bourdieu 1990: 53) in relation to money orientations.   
Consumer literature highlights consensus around consumer practices in different 
ways.  For example, the adaptive and creative elements of consumer practice (de 
Certeau 2000; Fiske 2000) are held in tension with the identification of consuming as 
a new cultural mode (Lyon 2000) which is normalised as a language (Baudrillard 
2000) or mode of communication through which it is possible to delineate social 
values, categories, meanings and traditions (Douglas and Isherwood 2000: 79).  For 
example, Eckersley argues that in our culture, individuals tend to focus on maximised 
happiness in the form of maximised wealth as the „supreme good‟ (Eckersley 2004: 
98).   
In this study, data suggests that young middle-income earners in Tasmania orient 
themselves strongly towards the benefits, pleasures, and lifestyle choices money 
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personally enables.  These are shared „meanings of practice‟ and convey the moral 
orientation towards money as „good‟ as central to participants‟ money meanings, and 
- as shown in the following chapter – as culturally privileged money meanings that 
can tend to leave other „goods‟ without claim. 
5.2.3. Additional personal money orientations 
Money is also talked about in other (less central) ways by middle-income participants.  
For example, most participants are also ambivalent or express tensions about personal 
money in some manner.   This occurs in two ways.  First, more than half of the 
participants talk about money in terms of the „tensions‟ that personal money may 
create.  In each case, participants reflect on times in which they have personally 
experienced some kind of financial stress or worry, or in particular, have had to do 
with very little or even no money.  The experiences are without exception described 
in negative terms.  Some of the descriptive terms include the following: „awful‟, 
socially „cut-off‟, „stressful‟, „a loose canon‟, the „rug pulled from under my feet‟, 
„rough‟ and „tough‟, „ashamed‟, „scroungy kind of existence‟, „anxiety‟, „a sad, sad 
tale‟, „really depressing‟, „panic‟, „difficult‟, and a „source of unhappiness‟.  For 
middle-income participants, there are no silver linings around these kinds of money 
experiences. 
Accordingly, as well as orienting themselves towards money as „central‟ to a good 
life, many in the middle-income group are also clear that financial difficulty is a state 
to be actively avoided.  That is, they not only indicate an orientation towards personal 
money as „good‟ and worthwhile pursing, but also that the converse – having little 
money or difficulties related to money acquisition – is a circumstance they are 
oriented away from.  For middle-income participants, choosing financial difficulty is 
not legitimated in the context of a „good life‟, and not at all conceivable as a possible 
alternative money meaning. 
Second, almost half of participants feel uneasy about the relation of personal money 
to wellbeing or, in particular, „happiness‟.  For example, they commonly reflect, 
albeit briefly, on variations of the old adage that „money won‟t bring you happiness‟.  
At the same time however, it is a theme often continued by participants with a 
footnote about not wanting to have to experience doing without money: 
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„I think it was Zsa Zsa Gabor who said “money can‟t buy you happiness, but 
at least you can dress well while you‟re sad”.  I thought yeah, that‟s exactly 
right.  It won‟t solve all your problems, but it‟ll buy you some nice 
distractions‟.     (Damien, 27, Administrator) 
„So, when you think of the good life, being able to go out and have a few 
drinks with friends, go out for a meal or go out to the theatre.  You can‟t 
really do that unless you‟ve got a bit of cash.  And then there are a lot of 
things that you can do that make you very happy that don‟t involve money.  
But it‟s always nicer to have the choice!‟  (Ruth, 25, Government Employee) 
These participants show constraint in their orientation towards money as central to a 
„good life‟.  However, there are also common themes within this restraint.  First, 
participants are not ambivalent towards the relation of personal money to a range of 
outcomes (such as too much wealth or consumption) but rather specifically to one 
outcome: happiness.  Second, they do not articulate why this is the case.  The idea is 
described as if it is a „self-evident‟ statement amongst these participants, without any 
rationale necessary.  Third, the comment is invariably followed by the qualification 
that doing without money is also not an option.  Sally provides another example of 
these points: 
„I‟ve lived in situations where our family was really wealthy, like we had 
yachts and everything, and then - totally bankrupt.  And the best times we 
had were when we had no money… I mean it‟s good to have money.  Like I 
would say to [partner] that I don‟t want to be like my parents where, if 
something breaks down you never have the money to fix it.  I want to have 
enough [money] away so that, if I need a vacuum cleaner I can just go out 
and buy one.‟        (Sally, 35, Administrator) 
It is clear in these instances that the ambivalences expressed are not only found in the 
felt disjuncture between money and happiness, but more particularly in the difficulty 
participants have in reconciling what this ambivalence means in relation to their 
orientations towards money.  In other words, these participants are articulating the 
„ideal‟ that there is a moral inconsistency between wealth accumulation and personal 
happiness.  However, they find it difficult to articulate the possibility that 
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understanding money as „good‟ could be a moral dilemma.  This is because by all 
other accounts their idea of „happiness‟ also sits within an orientation that treats 
personal money not as a dilemma but as a dominant, ongoing life-goal and „good‟.  
As such, participants struggle to resolve the disjuncture, resulting in ambivalence 
towards what actually constitutes „happiness‟.  The effect of this is that it becomes a 
comment that participants have nowhere to „go‟ with, for example in no case amongst 
the middle-income group is there any sustained discussion about this theme.  In 
comparison, downshifters (see chapter nine) also use the term „happiness‟ in relation 
to money but tend to clearly articulate strong justifications for what they mean in 
relation to these two „goods‟. 
A similar dilemma is noted in at least five instances where middle-income 
participants contradict themselves about their views on money.   For example, George, 
in reflection about the relation of money to needs and desires, states that he doesn‟t 
need to have luxuries, such as expensive cars.  However later in the interview he 
highlights the possibility of owning a Porsche „at 40‟.  Thus, while George admits on 
the one hand he has no need of a luxury car, it is nevertheless built into his 
perceptions and hopes of who he will be in the future.  Another example is Mark, who 
begins his interview with an explanation of a shift in his thinking over time about 
money, from in his youth desiring to be very wealthy to more recently placing far 
greater value on relationships without which money „won‟t mean anything‟.  Towards 
the end of the interview, Mark comes to the conclusion that in a good life, „everyone 
wants to be a millionaire‟, and that his goals are directed towards being debt free, 
owning property and working hard for a „happy life‟.  It seems no matter how much 
other values – like relational ones - exist in the „good life‟, money continually 
resurfaces in importance alongside them and even (as in Mark‟s case) given ultimate 
importance. 
On the one hand, these contradictions flag a genuine desire for some kind of self-
restraint against the simple pursuit of personal money.  However, the self-restraint 
itself is ambivalent, and playful concessions result in the almost-burying of these self-
restraints under the inevitability of the pursuit of money as a central moral orientation 
in the „good life‟.  In other words, these middle-income participants have difficulty 
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acknowledging the „good‟ of self-restraint because that privilege is given to personal 
money understood as „good‟ money. 
5.3. Public money orientations 
So far analysis has concentrated on orientations towards personal money.   Middle-
income participants are positively oriented towards personal money and its dominant 
place in a „good life‟, and there is very little problematising of the role of personal 
money in a „good life‟.  In the following section, analysis will shift to the ways 
participants talk about money in the public (or social or civic) sphere.  There are two 
parts to this discussion.  The first relates to how participants talk about the place of 
money in the political arena (e.g. government distribution of money) and the second 
refers to how participants relate money with public moral dilemmas.  Of the eighteen 
middle-income participants, only two are not represented in any of these discussions.  
Both participants, one male and one female,  feel they have no opinion about politics 
or social/moral issues and that they cannot make judgements about things they know 
little about.  
5.3.1. Politics 
The majority of participants talk about their understanding of the relationship 
between the political sphere and money.  Without exception, their understanding of 
the role of the government in relation to money is articulated in terms of public 
dilemmas.  The themes arising are varied, and they include: scepticism about 
excessive military spending and Australian border protection; the belief that big 
business controls governments; that public money allocations are politically-driven, 
profit-driven and inefficient; that governments are disconnected from the real needs 
of people; the view that governments giving welfare handouts devalues individual 
responsibilities; that the government is implicated in the growing chasm between 
wealthy and poor in Australia and this relates to problems such as poor education and 
health services to low-income citizens; and also issues related to the government‟s 
neglect of environmental sustainability concerns. 
Relatedly, while middle-income participants are vocal about the dilemmas 
surrounding the government‟s role in public money distribution, most participants 
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believe that it should be the government‟s role to act as the fair distributor of social 
resources.   This distribution of resources extends to education, health, infrastructure, 
a „static society‟, management of the economy, adequate living standards and fairer 
money distribution according to needs, looking after the most disadvantaged, 
encouraging community growth, making life easier for everyone, the defence budget, 
worker pay-rises, the justice and criminal system (and cracking down on those 
cheating the system), and providing aid to other countries with Australia‟s surplus 
resources.  Thus, while most political issues involving the public use of money are 
expressed as problematic, the strong belief amongst middle-income participants 
remains that regardless of the nature of these problems, their solution lies in the role 
of the government to fairly redistribute public monies. 
Most participants also talk about their own role as political citizens.  Only one 
participant is actively involved in a political party and takes part in group discussions 
about local developments.  Conversely, at least half of the participants express their 
distaste or reluctance for personal political involvement: 
„So I tend to sit on the fence on a lot of things.  Ah, but I know I‟m very lazy 
in a lot of things in my life.  But, with issues like that [politics], I just hope 
people don‟t think I‟m lazy where I‟m on the fence, it‟s just that…I don‟t 
know enough about them to, to sort of commit either way, or I haven‟t 
thought about it enough to commit either way.‟    
      (Damien, 27, Administrator) 
„Oh, do you know what? Politics is something I really don‟t tend to go near.  
I probably should be interested with my job like, I keep my eye on certain 
things like the economy but, generally I tend to not have an opinion‟  
       (Lucy, 26, Accountant) 
Most of the remaining participants express opinions about political involvement, 
however none of them are actively involved: 
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I:  „Do you think individuals can make a difference?‟ 35                                                     
P:  „Absolutely!  Perhaps not me. [laughs]  I can‟t even get out bed, on my 
day off.  But, I think definitely.‟    (Winona, 32, Accountant) 
„I suppose the whole hypocrisy of things is starting to get on my nerves.  I 
used to be more of an activist in this and activist in that, and then I realised 
that was just as damaging… I don‟t join any parties or anything now; I just 
think it‟s better to sit in judgement on the way you live, rather than on 
everybody else.‟      (Carin, 31, Nurse) 
In summary, there is a contrast between participants‟ orientations towards money in 
the political sphere and their orientations towards personal money.  In relation to 
politics, participants focus on the government‟s role as distributor of social welfare 
and resources, and this is most often considered in problematic terms.  This is in 
contrast with their low-level problematising of personal money.  In addition, most 
participants distance themselves from any direct role in political participation or 
personal responsibility for the distribution of welfare or social resources.  Again, this 
is in contrast to the high levels of responsibility and ownership participants are 
prepared to take for their own money generation and management.  A clear 
distinction thus begins to emerge between orientations towards personal money as 
„good‟ and money related to political issues expressed in terms of „dilemma‟, where 
solutions lie in structural, not personal, interventions.  
 
5.3.2. Social morality 
The second part of this discussion briefly draws on dialogue with participants about 
the relation of money to perceived moral dilemmas in society.  More than half of 
participants talk about money in relation to moral dilemmas.  In all cases, moral 
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dilemmas are located in the public sphere, and in most cases from a global or at least 
national perspective.  In particular, themes included the growing affluence of the 
wealthy and increasing poverty of the poor, concerns around environmental 
sustainability, or corporate wealth and workplace ethics.  For example:  
„And it seems to me that the fundamental problem is that our western 
societies are based on capitalist beliefs, which are highly immoral.  You 
know, they are motivations which are immoral.  Because it‟s greed based.  It 
has to be.  Its how these societies work.  So that‟s probably the biggest 
problem I can see.  The biggest moral problem.‟  (Hank, 34, Architect)                                               
„Oh, I think it probably comes down to an economic distribution of wealth, 
[an] unequal distribution of wealth.  That relates I think to environmental 
concerns.  And that is obviously an enormous concern.  But I think that 
really stems from economics.  We‟re abusing the planet. All those in power 
are abusing it for economic gain.‟   (Stephanie, 31, Lawyer) 
Where participants do express moral dilemmas related to money, their language tends 
to be quite „strong‟, as evidenced in the above quotes.  That is, implicit in their 
opinions is a sense of moral „wrongness‟ attached to the dilemma.  Words such as 
„greed‟, „immoral‟, „evil‟, „not right‟, „dysfunctional‟, „hypocrisy‟, „blood money‟, 
„selfish society‟ and „wasteful‟ describe the moral dilemmas participants relate to the 
way other citizens, governments, or businesses/corporations use (or abuse) money 
and the perceived consequences of these misuses.  
The same participants offer their thoughts on what solutions might be to these 
dilemmas.  Responses include social solutions, such as: the progress of „science and 
technology‟; creating a „civilised society‟ of peace or better communities; more 
equitable government distribution of resources; or more individuals taking 
responsibility for their actions such as the wealthy using their resources to make a 
difference.  A number of participants also point to the difficulty of finding a solution.  
For example: 
„I don‟t know what the solution is.‟   (Ruth, 25, Government Employee) 
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„I don‟t think its right to try to change things.  Things are the way they are 
because that‟s what works.‟    (Douglas, 34, Building Contractor) 
„What‟s the solution? Well, I think this is the big problem.‟        
       (Hank, 34, Architect) 
One explanation of this is the „third-person effect‟ found in media.  Davison (1983) 
demonstrates that people generally feel, for example, that morally reprehensible 
material or media violence requires censoring not because it will affect themselves – 
or even their close friends for that matter – but because the „general public must be 
protected‟, or youth with „impressionable minds‟ (Davison 1983: 14).  In other words, 
people tend to underestimate or even overlook the moral effect of something on 
themselves while easily applying it to others. 
Similarly, in the cases where middle-income participants express money in terms of a 
„moral dilemma‟, the dilemma is expressed as a social dilemma (a dilemma related to 
others and not themselves) and in language with clear overtones of „right‟ and 
„wrong‟ implicit in them.  Responsibility for solutions to the dilemma also lies 
outside themselves, expressed in terms of „social‟ solutions.  Where participants do 
estimate their own role, it is with a feeling of helplessness about changing such vast 
and deeply rooted social problems at the individual level.  
5.4. Discussion: private vs. public money orientations 
It is possible to now draw together differences in the way middle-income participants 
in this study orient themselves towards personal and public money.  The findings 
have suggested that all participants orient themselves towards personal money as a 
life „good‟ for multiple reasons and that these stances towards money are „moral 
orientations‟ because they constitute a valued way to live and be in the world.  These 
moral orientations are also part of wider cultural processes because they reflect 
common histories or convergent dispositions and in particular, consensus around 
„meanings of practice‟ (Bourdieu 1990: 53).   
Conversely, middle-income participants are also oriented away from financial 
difficulty - it is rarely considered as part of the „good life‟.  This focus on money as a 
dominant „good‟ also makes it difficult for participants to engage in meaningful 
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discussion about the ambivalent relationship between money and happiness.  On the 
other hand, a shift in orientation to money as „good‟ occurs when money is related to 
the public (political/social) sphere.  For example, participants engage in low-level (if 
any) problematising of their own money, but highly problematise public (government, 
social, civic) uses and outcomes related to money.  They indicate high levels of 
ownership and responsibility over their own money generation (further analysed 
below in „self-reliance‟ section) but negligible levels of ownership and responsibility 
for the public use and distribution of money.  And, while personal money is central to 
a „good life‟, public money remains largely external to what is „good‟ about money in 
personal terms.   
Middle-income participants thus have a different moral orientation towards social 
money than towards personal money.  For example, social money is not described as 
central to participants own „goods‟ or „good life‟.  Nor are improved social outcomes 
considered worthwhile attaining, achieving or pursuing with personal money.  Rather, 
there is a clear disconnection between participants‟ orientation toward highly valuing 
private money on the one hand and deeply problematising the use (or abuse) of civic 
money - and their own roles in relation to it - on the other. 
Reasons for this disconnection between meanings of private money and public money 
are diverse and complex, historically and socially.  Michael Pusey (2003) notes that 
Australian civil society is „in trouble‟, not least because economic reform has eroded 
any institutional (or other) constraints on the freedom of the economic market.  He 
claims that increasingly in contemporary society, „most of the ready-made certainties 
about how to live the good life have melted into the air‟ (Pusey 2003: 135).   Pusey 
adds that the participants of his study reveal mixed feelings about the changes of 
modernity, such as: the loss of traditional forms of communities and associations; 
increasing personal liberties; more possibilities for social change; or new social and 
individual burdens (e.g. isolation, depression, or fundamentalisms to name a few).  
Yet he notes that: 
…everyone agrees that economic and social change has depleted the 
resources that were once provided by these older, denser, forms of 
association.  As they have dissipated, people have felt forced to retreat more 
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deeply into a private sphere that is itself over-stretched for the same reasons. 
        (Pusey 2003: 135)  
Pusey (2003: 127) continues that middle Australians feel increasingly compelled to 
turn inward to the private sphere for relaxation and rejuvenation, taking time and 
energies away from civic involvements.  Eckersley‟s (2004) research also 
substantiates these findings.  He draws on various studies (Clemenger 2002; Flowers 
2002; Mackay 2003a; Mackay 2003b) that indicate a growing disconnection between 
the personal and social.  For example, in one study individuals view their personal 
aspirations as having nothing to do with achieving wider social goals. Also, 
Australians have shown to be turning inward towards personal and familial concerns 
and away from broader national issues that they feel they have no control over 
(Eckersley 2004: 121).  Studies such as Pusey‟s and Eckersley‟s point to a complex 
array of sources for this public/private dislocation, not least historically related to the 
social, economic and cultural changes occurring throughout modernity. 
Despite the documented complexity of reasons for the disconnection between public 
and private orientations of money, the findings of this study can provide another 
dimension to this disconnection.  For example, the strength of participants‟ 
orientations towards personal money and conversely the dilemmas and hesitancies 
they associate with public and civic monies give an insight into the „middle 
Australian‟ retreat into the private sphere (Pusey 2003: 135).  For example, while 
Pusey (among others) notes how „ready-made certainties‟ have largely dissipated 
from view of the good life, participants in this study suggest that some perceived 
„certainties‟ may still exist.  Amongst middle-income participants, there is a greater 
sense of shared confidence about the centrality of personal money to a „good life‟ 
than almost every other aspect of life discussed in the interviews.36  For example, 
while participants are uncertain about how to talk about self-restraint in relation to 
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money, or whether or not (and how) money relates to happiness; and while they are at 
best highly ambiguous about their own role in the political or civic arena, they are 
clear about the central role that personal money plays in their lifestyle aspirations and 
goals. 
The certainty with which middle-income participants talk about the „good‟ personal 
money offers in life bespeaks the identity-defining nature of money in their lives.  
Taylor notes (1989: 27-51) that identities are defined through moral orientations, or 
the value distinctions made about what is good, how things „should‟ be, or what we 
endorse or oppose.  Moreover, he adds, these moral orientations give a sense of 
purpose and meaningful life direction.  As a following section will further clarify, the 
centrality of money as a life-orientation also provides future purpose, direction and 
hope to the lives of many of these middle-income participants.  In other words, 
personal money orientations are also shared, moral-cultural orientations across the 
middle-income group: orientations that are commonly legitimated, identity-defining, 
and future-giving.  In offering a sense of certainty, orienting oneself towards personal 
money generation as constitutive (at least in part) of a „good life‟ provides some 
clarity not only to who participants see themselves to be, but also to where in life they 
understanding themselves going. 
Contrast this certainty to the deep problems and ambiguity with which most 
participants address public monies.  They point to multiple social problems, but 
cannot identify themselves with those problems or in relation to the solution of them.   
Although they can articulate the dilemmas related to social distributions of money, 
participants struggle to orient themselves in any way as implicated in, or responsible 
for them.  Consequently, they have little personal identity or future in the public/civic 
process as far as money is concerned: these issues fall outside of who they identify 
themselves as and the direction they see themselves going.  Using similar language to 
Taylor‟s „to know who you are is a species of knowing where I stand‟ (Taylor 1989: 
27), Pusey notes this about the „middle Australians‟ in his own study:  
The restless concerns of our respondents with troubled communication have 
something more to tell us about the condition of civil society.  They are 
saying, in effect, that „it‟s hard to know where you stand‟, how to orient 
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your actions to others, and how to find, and to read, reliable feedback in a 
depleted civil society in which informal communication channels seem 
scrambled with noise and contradiction.  (Pusey 2003: 136) 
Therefore, money orientations provide an alternative means to understand the 
disconnection between how participants relate to the personal and public sphere, or 
Pusey‟s „middle Australian‟ retreat into the private sphere.  Middle-income 
participants in this study are morally oriented in varying degrees towards the pursuit 
of personal money, which gives some clarity to self-identity and narrative-direction. 
On the other hand, middle-income participants distance themselves from the deeply 
ambivalent place that money has in achieving wider social goals: they can only 
confront the issue as a dilemma.  Consequently, middle-income participants orient 
themselves most strongly towards that which makes most „sense‟ - personal money 
aspirations - and away from the deeply embedded social and political dilemmas 
around which they feel they have little or no control over.  
Why personal money aspirations seem to command the attention of middle-income 
Australians far more than civic engagement is also a question Pusey and others (e.g. 
Eckersley 2004) have attempted to answer in various ways, including through a 
critique of the restructuring of the Australian economy through economic reform 
(Pusey 2003).  While some of these broader issues will be discussed later in the 
chapter and thesis discussion, I will remain focussed on participant orientations 
towards money at this point.37   
The following section expands on some initial analysis begun in chapter three on the 
centrality of „self-reliance‟ or independence to money meanings.  I will show that 
moral orientations towards money also involve shared dispositions towards „self-
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 In the context of these other relevant studies, it is worthwhile noting that this study differs from them 
because it is framed in the context of a question („what makes a good life‟) that draws attention to the 
moral dispositions central to participant responses, not just respondent attitudes and values associated 
with what is „good‟ or specifically (in this case) middle-class. 
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reliance‟.  For example, economic self-reliance is shown to be a primary justification 
for entering into employment, it represents goals or achievements enabling multiple 
benefits (such as quality of life or investments), and is also a source of personal 
security. 
5.5. Orientations towards economic self-reliance 
The point has already been laboured in chapter three that the „self‟ is a central subject 
of contemporary sociologies and that the prominence of „individualism‟ in modern 
societies is widely theorised.  To reiterate, some of the theorists and terms referred to 
previously include Taylor‟s „authentic‟ self (1989); Gidden‟s „reflexive self‟ (1991); 
the „choosing, deciding, shaping human being‟ of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2001); 
the „morally autonomous individual‟ referred to by Bellah et al. (1996); or the „lonely, 
self-concerned and self-centred economic actor‟ as described by Bauman (2003).  It 
was also argued that economic self-reliance and self-determination are cultural 
markers that help people to define their common identities.  The case studies of both 
Jessica and Kayla in chapter three show anecdotally just how significant the pursuit 
of „economic self-reliance‟ is to both their understandings of a „good life‟, despite 
their disparate life histories and experiences.  In the following analysis, common 
themes arising from all participants in the middle-income category will be discussed 
in relation to this theme. 
First, amongst middle-income participants, „self-reliance‟ is not always related to 
money in their understanding of a „good life‟.  For two thirds of participants, meaning 
and happiness or self-worth is at times described as originating through the „self‟ 
without reference to economic motivations.  For some, this relates to the way they 
view themselves and their own self-fulfilment, or in achieving things that make them 
happy: 
„…for me, a huge thing about what makes my life good, what for me gives 
me purpose, gives me meaning, is self-love.  Is self-confidence, self-respect.  
I think it comes down to you, in the end.‟   (Saskya, 26, Administrator) 
For others, deference to „self‟ means taking primary responsibility for themselves 
rather than being dependent in any way upon other people or social structures: 
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„A good life is, when you‟re happy and when you have good people around 
you.  And you are … not really dependent on anything in particular, you‟re 
able cope and survive through your own ways of living, I think.‟        
       (Osser, 31, Graphic Designer) 
„I realise now how important it is to be able to steer your own ship.‟         
     (Douglas, 34, Building Contractor) 
Another way of talking about the centrality of the „self‟ includes the notion of moral 
autonomy: 
„We should have morality, but it should be our own morality.  I think it‟s got 
nothing to do with anybody else.‟    (Sally, 35, Administrator) 
„…a lot of my principles are based on me and my close knit of friends, rather 
than society as a whole.‟       (Candy, 27, Upholsterer) 
Thus, while it is specifically money orientations that constitute the focus of this thesis, 
participants‟ understandings of self-reliance are not limited to financial ones.  Self-
reliance, or self-fulfilment itself is, as d‟Epinay stated, „at the heart of our civilisation‟ 
(d'Epinay 1991: 56-65).  In this study, many middle-income participants clearly 
articulate an ethic of reliance primarily upon the „self‟ for life fulfilment, direction, 
achievement, and also moral decision-making in their expressions of a „good life‟. 
However, it is in relation to money that the theme of self-reliance is most consistently 
significant in this study.  Without exception, all participants also convey in varying 
degrees the importance of economic self-reliance to the realisation of a „good life‟.  
There are a number of different themes arising here.  First, all participants refer to the 
relationship between working to earn money and the contribution of an income 
  
 
 
131 
towards self-sufficiency.38  For some, maximising self-reliance through income drives 
their idea of a „good life‟: 
„Starting your own business I see as a vehicle for independence.  And so you 
don‟t have to…rely on other people, rely on a job or rely on anything to give 
you an income.  I see it as a vehicle to be self-sufficient and financially 
independent I suppose.‟   (Edgar, 34, Building Contractor) 
„[Money is] a means to an end.  I guess I work to live rather than live to 
work.  Albeit I am fairly driven about… you know, doing well and being 
successful, getting as much out of it as I can.  I‟ll always have my hand out 
for the pay-rises and all that sort of thing.‟   (Mike, 35, Accountant) 
For others, working to earn an income and gain financial self-reliance is one criterion 
for contentedness in a „good life‟: 
„I think everyone works for a reason [and] that‟s to earn money.  And I‟m 
reasonably lucky I guess in that I earn a decent amount compared to most.  
Having some level of financial security, in you know, owning a house or 
something like that ...  Where you can work for play money, and work for 
your retirement sort of thing.  Where there‟s no pressure in where you want 
to go.‟       (George, 27, Professional) 
Second, all participants also talk about financial self-reliance in terms of what their 
own money generation allows them to do, or achieve.  For some, this is spoken of in 
terms of a general quality of life: 
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 I did not interview non-working mothers/carers who rely on their partner‟s incomes in this category, 
and acknowledge this could perhaps raise interesting variations in responses to perceptions of self-
reliance and the place/value of family in participant monetary meanings. 
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„I like it [money] because it enables you to do things.  … I don‟t think that it 
can make you happy, but I think it can stop you from being sad.  If that 
makes sense!  Like the saying that „money doesn‟t make you happy‟.  Yes, 
but if you don‟t have it, you can be very sad!  So, more of a tool to give me 
what I want I think.‟   (Winona, 32, Accountant) 
„But I just basically want to be self-sufficient.  And comfortable.  But I don‟t 
necessarily have to be rich.  If we had just a little tiny house, but then 
travelled, that would be great.  I don‟t want a mansion or anything.  Just the 
freedom.‟       (Sally, 35, Administrator) 
Other participants are quite specific about the ways money contributes to a „good life‟: 
„I‟m just getting towards the age where starting to think about nesting a bit, 
you know, should I be saving towards a house?  Well yes, I am trying to save 
towards a house.  I‟ll need a new car.‟    (Peter, 28, Manager) 
„No mortgage.  That‟s what I would like.  To wipe the debt.  The thought of 
being in debt is just terrible really.‟    (Carin, 31, Nurse) 
Third, more than two-thirds of middle-income participants also communicate that 
being economically self-reliant embodies some sense of security.  For some, like 
Charlie, financial security is a basic life equation: 
„…that you have your house, you have your skills and or source of income 
from them.  It doesn‟t really have to go much further than that.‟        
       (Charlie, 36, Teacher) 
For Stephanie, financial security is an obligation that looms closer the older she 
becomes: 
„In that sense of money, I think being a bit cautious and trying to put away is 
important.  … But I‟ve also got that sense that I‟ve got an obligation to 
support my dad fairly soon, my brothers and I.  …  So for me that 
responsibility stuff is starting to kick in.‟     (Stephanie, 31, Lawyer) 
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These three themes – income and self-reliance, the goals or achievements enabled by 
self-reliance, and the security provided by economic self-reliance – represent the 
positive ways that middle-income participants address the meanings of financial self-
reliance in reference to a „good life‟.  However, participants also give reasons for 
being oriented towards the pursuit of economic self-reliance because of contexts 
avoided through self-sufficiency.  These „scenarios‟ include stress, anxiety, reducing 
quality of life, worry, difficulty, or „missing out on things‟.  For example: 
„I want our children not to have the kind of poverty that we had as kids.  I‟m 
saying that I don‟t intend to be really wealthy, but I‟d like to not be at that 
level of scroungy kind of existence.‟  (Hank, 34, Architect) 
In addition, fourteen of the eighteen participants speak directly about the lack of 
economic self-reliance in negative terms.  Some participants reflect on times they 
themselves had little money: 
„[It was] kind of a big issue.  Little things like having to ask your mum to 
lend you some money here and there.  Or not having enough to do the things 
your friends are doing, who are all working.  …  Yeah, some horrible times - 
just no money!‟      (Candy, 27, Upholsterer) 
„And I hate not being able to pay my way.‟  (Lucy, 26, Accountant) 
Other participants voice their unfavourable opinions about a lack of economic self-
reliance by referring to „undeserving‟ welfare recipients:  
„Whether its mental illness or something - not even severe - you can have 
some people that just aren‟t, you know, they just aren‟t well and can‟t hold a 
job for whatever reason.  They should be looked after.  Not the guy that 
whether he‟s sixteen, eighteen, or thirty-five, doesn‟t want to work.‟  
     (Edgar, 34, Building Contractor)  
In summary, it is clear that for all middle-income participants, their orientation 
towards money as „good‟ also embodies a strong orientation towards their own (or 
self-generated) money as „good‟ money.  Economic self-reliance is a primary 
rationale for entering into employment: it represents goals or achievements enabling 
  
 
 
134 
multiple benefits (such as quality of life or investments), and is also a source of 
personal security.  While participants repeatedly legitimate economic self-reliance in 
these ways, the converse – a lack of economic self-reliance and consequential 
problems – is conveyed as a non-legitimate identity and as a lived experience to be 
avoided.   
The following discussion first identifies these findings in reference to moral 
orientations and cultural dispositions.   Second, the findings draw back into a wider 
discussion about the moral orientations of money and in particular, wider findings 
related to the disconnection between public and private orientations towards money.   
5.5.1. Economic self-reliance as a moral orientation and 
cultural disposition 
In this study, middle-income participants add weight to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim‟s 
claim that „money means your own money‟ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 23).  
Economic self-reliance is a state of being to be pursued, gained or achieved; and like 
orientations towards money as „good‟, it represents a common theme amongst all 
middle-income participants.  Moreover, participants‟ positive orientations towards 
economic self-reliance are closely related to their general money orientations, often 
embodied within them.  These (economic self-reliance) findings add analytical depth 
to an already existing theme.  Not only do participant money orientations show that 
money is a central means through which they are living and investing in a „good life‟, 
they also show that the kind of money they value is their own money.  That is, they 
value money sourced through their own employment or work, and not from external 
(e.g. government or familial) sources. 
Similarly to money orientations then, economic self-reliance can also be described as 
both a moral orientation and cultural disposition.  Following the same principles as 
applied to money orientations, the economic self-reliance findings point to shared 
moral orientations that reference wider common histories or convergent cultural 
dispositions and again in particular, consensus around „meanings of practice‟ 
(Bourdieu 1990: 53).  Drawing on the broader theme of individual freedom, Smith 
puts it this way: 
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Few people value individual freedom…simply because they personally and 
idiosyncratically so happen to value it.  People value freedom because they 
are embedded in a larger moral order that specifies what is good, right, true, 
just, and worthy in the context of which freedom is prized.  (Smith 2003: 18)      
As a moral orientation and cultural disposition, two points are to be made about 
„economic self-reliance‟.  The first relates to the argument that literature focussing on 
the nature of what it means to be a subject in contemporary society tends to construct 
a picture of the individual in society as a „reflexive strategic actor‟ without engaging, 
for example, questions of how they are located in the cultural landscape (McDonald 
1999: 208).  While in chapter three Jessica and Kayla show that the meaning of 
economic self-reliance is subjectively and in many cases strategically negotiated in 
their worlds, this chapter locates „economic self-reliance‟ much more broadly as a 
culturally shared – not primarily subjective - disposition that is embodied by all 
middle-income participants.  This doesn‟t mean culture „imposes‟ itself on people.   
Rather, cultural dispositions are lived and embodied „goods‟ that are legitimated in 
terms of „common sense‟ practices across a common group of people.  For example, 
when Damien states that „I think it was Zsa Zsa Gabor who said „money can‟t buy 
you happiness, but at least you can dress well while you‟re sad‟, he is drawing on 
social sources of money meanings, or money meanings he perceives to be widely 
(culturally) held to be true.   
The second point to be made here addresses the „self‟ aspect of economic self-
reliance.  Bellah et al. argue that in many ways the meaning of life has been defined 
as the need to become „one‟s own person‟ or an „autonomous, self-responsible self‟.  
Furthermore, one of the only few guidelines for how to achieve this is through 
employment, becoming a self-supporting individual able to „stand on their own two 
feet‟ (Bellah et al. 1996: 83).  In other words, as a cultural disposition and moral 
orientation, the quest for personal, economic self-reliance is one of the primary 
languages of self- articulation that people learn.   
The inner tension of this cultural disposition is captured best in the inarticulateness of 
participant responses to questions posed about individual responsibility within the 
public sphere.  Participants are concerned about inequalities, about excessive wealth, 
  
 
 
136 
greed, or environmental destruction for example.  However, most participants aspire 
to active social involvement but feel unable to do so, and similarly most struggle to 
define answers to the problems they identify or describe practical solutions that 
involve themselves.  Consequently they are left inarticulate and limited to a language 
that defines money in the „good life‟ in terms of personal money orientations and 
economic self-reliance.   Perhaps it is a tension similar to that noted by Bellah et al. of 
their respondents, that: 
…we are hesitant to articulate our sense that we need one another as much 
as we need to stand alone, for fear that if we did we would lose our 
independence altogether.  The tensions of our lives would be even greater if 
we did not, in fact, engage in practices that constantly limit the effects of an 
isolating individualism, even though we cannot articulate those practices 
nearly as well as we can the quest for autonomy. (Bellah et al. 1996: 151)  
It is important to note that middle-income participants are not merely economically 
self-reliant actors who are morally orientated towards money acquisition in their 
understandings of a „good life‟.  Implicit in their stories are also multiple other 
dimensions of practice showing that at the very least they are committed to personal 
social relations among other things.  Even the most cursory glimpse at other „goods‟ 
middle-income participants talk about in their interviews points to the desire for 
connectedness with others and their need to be in close relationship with their 
partners, family and/or friends.  Douglas, for example, knows only the language of 
self-reliance and the pursuit of economic success when he talks about money 
meanings.  But it is through the pursuit of these goals that he feels able to reconnect 
with family - by employing them, providing for them, and feeling that he is able to 
contribute to their wellbeing.   
However, what the findings do show is that the languages and resources middle-
income participants possess to describe how money relates to the „good life‟ may be 
limited to, or at least most clearly articulated through, cultural dispositions toward 
personal economic self-reliance.  Similarly to Bellah et al.‟s findings, the middle-
income participants of this study define their desire and quest for economic autonomy 
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far more articulately and deeply than they indicate their need for other people and 
social connectedness in their understanding of a „good life‟. 
The following section includes the final analysis related to middle-income 
participants‟ orientations towards money.  Here, the focus will be on how money 
meanings shape participants‟ perceptions of their own futures. 
5.6. Middle-income money orientations towards the 
future 
Bell (1997: 64) notes that images of the future are central to moulding people‟s 
everyday present activities, as well as integral to all human behaviour in all 
circumstances.   The „future‟ is also identified in sociological literature as central to 
„meaning‟ itself:  
Through the life plan, individuals plan what they will do and who they will 
be; it links one‟s past, present and (projected) future together into an 
overarching meaning.      (Orrange 2003: 8) 
In this study, findings identify that participants relate money meanings to their 
perceptions of the future, pointing to both the centrality of the „future‟ in their money 
orientations and the meaning this provides them.   Here, analysis is in two parts.  First, 
participants demonstrate variations in the way they orient themselves towards the 
future, and this is linked to existing research.  Second, further analysis shows that 
some orientations are common to all participants and can be linked to wider 
discussions related to moral orientations.  
 
5.6.1. Three „types‟ of future-thinking 
Analysis from this study shows that participant‟s responses to questions about their 
future vary in a way consistent with other studies of middle-income young adults.  In 
a recent European study of the ways in which young adults think about their future, 
Brannen and Nilsen (2002) identify three ideal types, or models suggesting different 
ways that young people think about time.  The first is a model of „deferment‟ where 
young adults live primarily in the present and focus on the opportunities and 
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enjoyments available to them as young people.  This group also tend to assume their 
longer term future as something that will successfully work itself out at time passes, 
in much the same way as their own parents‟ has over time.  The second model, of 
„adaptability‟ includes young adults who consider the future a challenge - to be 
actively calculated, with short-term and open-ended steps taken (such as work choices) 
to ensure they can cope with the challenges. They carry a sense of confidence and 
expectation about the future in what they see as a shifting environment.  The third is a 
model of „predictability‟, in which young adults (often males) take a longer term view 
of the future, training for high-paying professions and a chosen vocation.  These 
young people view themselves in terms of a „scheduled, standardized life-course‟ 
(Brannen and Nilsen 2002: 529-31). 
The middle-income young adults in this study are represented in all of these three 
models.  A very small number of participants described their understanding of future 
in terms of „deferment‟, where present experiences (like travel) dominate goals and 
money-earning objectives:  
„A big thing for me in my confidence is…doing things on my own and I think 
a lot of that equates to travelling.  Travelling by myself, experiencing new 
places and people, on my own terms.  And that‟s really what I want.  …  [It] 
doesn‟t equate to a house, I‟m sure there‟s a lot of security and satisfaction 
in having that…but it‟s never been something I think about.   In monetary 
terms, I think it would be great to have somewhere to make money so I could 
travel more…you know I mean it always comes to that; it always comes back 
to…seeing new things.‟   (Saskya, 26, Administrator) 
A majority of middle-income participants in this study fit the „adaptability‟ model 
proposed by Brannen and Nilsen (2002).  That is, these participants feel they must 
plan for their financial future and that they themselves can shape their own futures 
despite changing circumstances.  The meanings they give money fit into shorter-term 
and open-ended goals that may (or may not) change: 
„But experiences are still very important to me and eventually I‟d like to 
save up to go on another overseas holiday; I haven‟t done one in while now. 
But I guess I‟m just getting towards the age where I‟m starting to think 
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about nesting a bit, you know, should I be saving towards a house?  Well, 
yes I am trying to save towards a house.‟  (Peter, 28, Manager) 
About a quarter of the participants fit into the third model, of „predictability‟.  
Similarly to the Brannen and Nilsen study (2002: 527), gender is central to this model 
and all those identified in it are male.  These young males are „planners‟: they desire a 
sense of long-term predictability found in a well-paid and static occupation through 
which long-term financial security may be attained:  
I:  Where would you like to be, say in fifteen or twenty years time, with your 
work?   
P: „I would like not to be there.‟  
I: So in what way to you envisage being able to be in a position to be able to 
not work?   
P: „Oh, set the company up in a way that it can run effectively…and in the 
long term, without me being there, basically.‟  
I: What would you like to be doing with the time that you‟ll have?  
P: […] „Sailing.  Would that be good?  Sail a yacht. Yeah, just sailing‟   
     (Edgar, 34, Building Contractor) 
 
I: Do you think about the future?  
P:  „Yeah, I guess it‟s part of my background, or my training almost, you 
know.  For a lot of people they just haven‟t got a clue about money, or how 
to make money.  And they‟ll go to work, and earn their money, spend it, and 
move on.  Whereas for me, I work with money essentially.  And so I‟m 
actually quite good with it.  I know how it works and I know how to make a 
dollar.  And so therefore I can‟t help myself but plan for these sorts of 
things.‟        (Mike, 35, Accountant) 
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Within the middle-income category therefore, participants have varying ways of 
perceiving time and the importance of „future‟ in respect to the meanings they give 
money in the „good life‟.  As Brannen and Nilson acknowledge (2002: 532), time 
orientations are shaped through multiple dimensions of experience, including 
opportunity structures, the influence of gender, lifestyle and consumption 
opportunities, cultural construction of the meaning of „youth‟, and the influence of 
social class, race and ethnicity. 
5.6.2. General future orientations 
Despite these variations however, data in this study also points to general orientations 
toward the future relating to all middle-income participants alike.  To give context, in 
Brannen and Nilson‟s study, there is an implicit (and unwritten) assumption within 
the study that regardless which „ideal type‟ is used to describe the time orientations of 
young adults, all participants are in their varying ways describing some future, and in 
all cases the descriptions are positive in orientation.  For example, even young adults 
characterised by the model of „deferment‟ optimistically expect that their future adult 
lives will involve the work and income choices that are available to their own parents 
– even when their own life focus is currently concentrated on the „present‟.    
Correspondingly, the same finding is clearly evident in the future perceptions of 
middle-income participants in this study.  That is, all participants are able in some 
way to talk about their futures: all have expectations for the future and in all cases 
these expectations are oriented as hopeful and/or positive.  However, unlike the 
Brannen and Nilsen (2002) study, these findings are identified as significant to this 
research.  This is because a positive future orientation cannot be assumed as self-
evident in all young adults‟ time orientations.  For example (as it will become clearer 
in chapter seven through a focus on low-income participants), middle-income money 
orientations towards the future are in many cases starkly different to the orientations 
of low-income participants. 
Consequently, it is necessary to outline more fully the ways in which middle-income 
participants money meanings do enable them to positively orient themselves 
financially towards their futures.  For some participants, having money is as simple 
and necessary as outlining a future in which they enough income so that they can pay 
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the bills, and live comfortably or enjoy a particular quality of life.  Others talk about 
having money enough to fulfil more specific hopes, such as owning a home, a car, a 
boat or (as most participants identify) to be able to travel or holiday overseas.   Some 
participants are even more particular, pointing to a time when they will have „no 
debts‟.  Many middle-income participants look forward to future financial security, 
and saving money is part of the plan for achieving this.  Being in a good financial 
position is the goal of some participants, for a number of reasons including self-
funded early retirements, retreat-style lifestyles, property ownership, travel 
experiences or just having the „freedom‟ to „do what I want to do‟. 
These positive, forward-looking middle-income orientations point to a broader 
connection between participants‟ future orientations and their moral orientations 
towards a „good life‟.   Similarly, Taylor strongly emphasises the relation between 
moral orientations and temporality:  
As I project my life forward and endorse the existing direction or give it a 
new one, I project a future story, not just a state of the momentary future but 
a bent for my whole life to come.   (Taylor 1989: 48) 
Taylor is arguing that orientations towards what is considered a „good‟ in life – like 
money - is not just related to present behaviour and values, but centrally to life 
direction and the „projection‟ of a future story through which individuals make sense 
of who they are and where they are going.   In other words, in the context of this 
study, middle-income participants‟ moral orientations towards money as something to 
be gained or achieved is reflected in how they make sense of their projected futures, 
and the direction they understand themselves to be heading in life. 
Participants also make sense of their futures this way because the existence of a 
common cultural disposition towards money means that such planning „makes sense‟: 
Ultimately, one‟s life plan must articulate with the overarching cultural 
norms and values of the broader society.  As individuals plot the trajectory 
of their life on the societal map, each point in their projected biography 
relates them to the overall web of meanings in the society. (Orrange 2003: 8) 
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In other words, participants‟ money-related future orientations (or meanings) are not 
merely singular or individualised ones, they also draw upon the social „web of 
meanings‟ or cultural dispositions that give those money orientations broader 
legitimacy.  Hence, even while middle-income participants vary from one to another 
in the way they orient themselves towards the future (e.g. by „deferment‟ or 
„adaptability‟ or „predictability‟), their common positive orientation towards money 
as „good‟ is also commonly projected into the way in which they see their futures: 
with the expectation that money will continue to positively furnish their hopes and 
dreams. 
Conclusion  
The key focus of this chapter has been the meanings and moral orientations middle-
income participants in this study give to money.  In the context of talking about a 
„good life‟, middle-income participants clearly draw upon cultural themes about 
money that they morally orient themselves towards as „lifegoods‟.  For middle-
income participants money is a primary means through which they are living and 
investing in a „good life‟.  These orientations also involve a number of further themes: 
a disconnection between private money as „good‟ and the dilemmas associated with 
public/civic money; the strong relationship between personal money and self-reliance; 
and the temporal aspects of these orientations found in future expectations in which 
money is central to their hopes and dreams. 
The next chapter, still focussing on middle-income participants, will trace the first of 
four narrative types central to this thesis.  This narrative, the „dominant‟ money 
narrative, draws on the above analysis and provides a means to „story‟ money 
meanings.   The discussion will also locate those meanings into the context of wider 
sociological analysis.   
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6. Chapter Six: Money in the Middle - the 
Dominant Money Narrative 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The following discussion identifies the first of four money narrative types drawn from 
participant categories.  In this case, middle-income participants broadly testify to a 
money narrative that describes „good‟ in generalised terms, to the exclusion of 
competing moral claims.  This narrative also relates more broadly to existing 
sociological literature, addressing for example the disconnection between private and 
public spheres, and constraints to the nature of the „reflexive self‟ in contemporary 
society. 
6.2. Utilising narrative 
Narratives are a primary linguistic vehicle though which people grasp the 
meaning of lived experience by configuring and reconfiguring past 
experience in ongoing stories that have certain plots or directions and which 
guide the interpretation of those experiences.  (Yamane 2000: 183)  
In order to explore the meaning of money in participants‟ experiences, it is helpful to 
analyse how participants „story‟ or configure their experiences of money in narratives.  
To paraphrase Taylor, to be human is to take a stance towards a particular concept/s 
of „good‟.  To orient oneself as such is to place oneself in relation to the „good‟ and 
seek to direct one‟s life actions and being towards it.  The temporality and process 
inherent in this quest aids towards an understanding of self in terms of story, or 
narrative (Taylor 1989: 52).  Smith also describes the relationship between moral 
orientations and narrative: 
…the larger cultural frameworks within which the morally oriented 
beleivings of the human animal make sense are most deeply narrative in 
form.  We are the makers, tellers, and believers of narrative construals of 
existence and history, every bit as much as our forebears at any other time in 
human history.  Furthermore, we are not only animals who make stories but 
  
 
 
144 
also animals who are made by our stories.  We tell and retell narratives that 
themselves come fundamentally to constitute and direct our lives.  We thus 
cannot live without stories, big stories finally, to tell us what is real and 
significant and to know who we are, where we are, what we are doing, and 
why.  Narrative is our most elemental human genre of communication and 
meaning-making, an essential way of framing the order and purpose of 
reality.      (Smith 2003: 151-2) 
While the risk in creating narrative types is to adopt yet another generalising view of 
someone‟s „story‟, the beauty of narrative telling, writes Arthur W. Frank (1995) in 
his account of illness stories, is about listening.  Narrative encourages a close 
attention to participants‟ stories, because stories always „mix and weave different 
narrative threads‟.  Offering narratives is a means to „sort out those threads‟ (Frank 
1995: 76). 
The inclusion of a narrative type for middle-income participants does not devalue the 
particularity or originality of their stories (Frank 1995: 76); rather it suggests that the 
way a participant reflects upon and stories the meaning of money shares important 
and dominant aspects of meaning with other participants in the category.  Participant 
stories are not limited to one narrative type either.  Other narratives, whether outlined 
later in the thesis or too idiosyncratic to outline at all, constantly weave their way 
through the dominant narrative, and this will become clearer in later discussions.  
However, drawn from the data analysis above this discussion suggests a narrative 
type that all middle-income participants‟ stories in varying degrees can be aligned 
with - the „dominant‟ money narrative. 
6.3. The dominant money narrative 
6.3.1. Narrative indicators 
The dominant money narrative is recognisable through a number of important 
indicators.  First, it is a narrative that is shared by all middle-income participants 
through a clear set of markers flagging the importance of money in life.  Second, it is 
a transparent storyline about money that pulses with a sense of movement towards the 
future: „this is where I am now; this is where I am going‟.  Third, the storyline is 
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explained in subjective terms and also referenced socially.  Fourth, the narrative also 
includes particular languages of inclusion and exclusion, and there are recognizable 
limits to the shared languages of money.  Fifth, the dominant narrative is inextricably 
linked to the „self‟.  Finally, the dominant money narrative reflects a privileged 
cultural narrative against which all narratives measure, middle-income or otherwise. 
First, the dominant narrative highlights a shared story flagging a clear orientation 
towards the centrality of money to a „good‟ life.  As evidenced in the middle-income 
data, descriptions of money include multiple aspects of life across a broad spectrum 
of experiences.  Clear markers help delineate how these aspects of life involve the 
centrality of money to work, rest and play.  For example, work provides a primary 
means through which money is made available and is central to a dominant money 
narrative.  Whether work is self-fulfilling or merely a means to earn an income, the 
centrality of work as a stepping-stone to financial independence is central to the 
dominant narrative.  The way „rest‟ is described is another marker: in terms of 
comfort, enabled by money.  The qualitative and quantitative goals of a comfortable 
home and sufficient provisions for family life and the needs of everyday living 
feature strongly in what money means in this narrative.  Leisure, or „play‟ is a third 
marker.  Leisure is strongly oriented towards lifestyle goals, including travel and 
holidays, social events and activities, and ownership of leisure-related goods such as 
shacks or boats.   Consequently, three of the most central and broadly defined 
elements of lived experience in western culture (work, rest and play) are marked as 
available primarily through money in the dominant narrative. 
Second, the dominant money narrative follows a storyline built around a sense of 
continuity and forward movement.   The data shows that in multiple ways, having 
money lends availability toward conceiving of future possibilities.  Whichever of 
Brannen and Nilsens‟ (2002) model participants follow in thinking about the future 
(deferment, adaptability or predictability), their futures are positive ones, envisaged in 
reference to financial self-reliance.  Some participants have clear future goals (e.g. an 
early retirement or owning a home), other‟s futures are „fuzzy‟ or not clearly defined 
(having financial security or living comfortably), but all feel they are travelling in one 
direction - towards the future.  There are few interruptions to this storyline, just a 
continuous sense of movement, and central to that movement is the availability of 
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money.  In other words, in part, the meaning of money is centrally implicated in their 
orientation towards the future. 
Third, the dominant money narrative draws upon a number of sources.  While there is 
an overwhelmingly „instinctive‟ nature to the narrative (Frank 1995: 78) – for 
example, participants primarily talk about their desires for money as if those desires 
are quite natural – they also reference some social sources.  In particular, participants‟ 
refer to perceived familial expectations of earning capacity or career path, or the felt 
pressure to buy a home, invest money, or travel overseas because their peers or 
colleagues have already done so.  As well as carrying their „own‟ monetary 
expectations, many also sense a social expectation to become more orientated towards 
financial acquisition. 
The dominant money narrative also draws on particular „languages‟ to articulate 
money meanings.  Some of these have already been flagged.  For example, there is a 
future-oriented language denoting a forward direction and sense of continuous 
movement, within which the language of „hope‟ and „expectation‟ is found.  In 
addition, a „self‟ language draws on references to financial autonomy, control, 
independence, security and self-reliance.  Finally, the language of money as „good‟ is 
described in multiple ways: as goal achievement, success, comfort, opportunity, 
happiness, leisure and pleasure, quality of life and because of the choice that money 
provides. 
Moreover, language found in the dominant money narrative also draws on narratives 
outside itself, which act as reminders that the dominant narrative is more attractive 
than others.  For example, participants refer to alternative money orientations such as 
financial stress and the worry related to not having money as a state to be actively 
avoided.  The language is highly negative in tone (e.g. „awful‟, „stressful‟, „rough‟, 
„anxiety‟, „depressing‟, „a source of unhappiness‟ to name a few), and is described as 
a circumstance to be actively orientated away from, in the same way that an illness 
might be spoken about in a society that privileges being healthy.  Consequently, in 
this money narrative, personal financial difficulty or debt is not a legitimate part of 
the dominant story. 
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Furthermore, if the dominant money narrative includes particular sets of languages to 
describe which money orientations are legitimate or not, it also excludes other 
languages.  The narrative metaphors already described relate primarily to personal 
money, where an orientation towards personal money is a legitimate personal and 
perceived social expectation.  On the other hand, a dominant money narrative 
articulates public monies in terms of social (political or moral) dilemmas warranting 
social solutions.  In this narrative, there is a general and marked inarticulateness and 
feeling of being „lost for words‟ when personal responses are required for social 
outcomes.  While a dominant money narrative has strong orientations toward personal 
money, it is limited in the language of articulating how money relates to the „self‟ 
outside the personal sphere. 
Fifth, the dominant money narrative is specifically related to the „self‟.  It is best 
articulated through „self‟ language: the importance of financial self-reliance; the 
necessities and lifestyle goals enabled through financial self-reliance, as well as the 
goal of economic security requiring financial autonomy.  In other words, the 
dominant money narrative stresses the importance of „my own‟ money: for Edgar, it 
is financial independence that he seeks at this point in life.  It also highlights the 
centrality of money to self-identity in this narrative.  For example, having „my own‟ 
money bespeaks a sense of ownership and claim over money, and because money 
offers some future security and certainty in this narrative, it has also been shown to 
provide a sense of clarity in self-definition and future-direction. 
In summary, the dominant money narrative is thus the storying of how money has a 
central place in what it means to live a „good‟ life.  In this narrative, money is itself a 
primary „good‟.  Personal storying winds its way around the place of money through 
the everyday requirements and desires of a good life, the daily activities found in a 
good life, and through the continuous thread of money‟s existence in the history, 
present and future of a „good life‟.  The dominant money narrative flows.  There is a 
sense of forward movement giving meaning and purpose to the present: Saskya lives 
to travel and envisages her future as a series of overseas experiences facilitated by her 
skills and ability to earn.  Money meanings even flow beyond personal futures:  Mike 
is working towards an early retirement and the future opportunities his earnings will 
provide for his children are part of his present financial reasoning.   
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6.3.2. The dominant money narrative as a culturally 
preferred narrative 
The dominant money narrative is also the „culturally preferred‟ narrative.  This term 
is borrowed from one of Frank‟s (1995) illness narratives which he describes as 
culturally preferred because it is the one story given powerful legitimation by media, 
health and academic institutions.   
There are a number of ways that the dominant money narrative can be understood as 
culturally preferred.  First, participants themselves privilege this narrative in different 
ways.  As already shown, middle-income participants share moral orientations that 
point to wider common histories or convergent cultural dispositions and in particular, 
consensus around the „meanings of practice‟ (Bourdieu 1990: 53) in relation to 
money orientations.  Like many aspects of middle-income storying, their cultural 
disposition towards the centrality of money to a „good‟ life indeed supports the 
dominant money narrative as a culturally preferred storyline.  However, even 
participants with alternative narrative threads support the dominant money narrative 
as culturally preferred.  As will be shown in chapter seven, many low-income 
participants acknowledge a desire to story their lives according to the dominant 
money narrative, even if they feel it is not available to them.  And downshifters, 
despite having actively chosen an alternative money narrative, also reference the 
dominant money narrative as one preferred by others around them; and as a narrative 
they are expected or feel pressured to follow by family members, for example.  Thus, 
even when alternative narrative threads run more strongly in participants‟ stories, the 
dominant money narrative remains the culturally privileged one.  As Smith notes,  
People thus most fundamentally understand what reality is, who they are, 
and how they ought to live by locating themselves within the larger 
narratives that they hear and tell, which constitute what is real and 
significant for them.      (Smith 2003: 152) 
Another strong indication that the dominant money narrative is culturally preferred is 
that its consistent message is found in popular culture and social institutions.  At 
every turn - whether by the government tax office, a local superannuation fund, Santa 
Claus at Christmas or the local travel agent – the message is conveyed that having, 
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saving, investing and spending money is a „good‟ activity and of primary importance 
to a good life.  For example, Connectfinancial is a local Tasmanian finance firm 
whose communication about money is a culturally taken-for-granted one: 
Investing is the magic of wealth creation. You start with a small sum of 
money and send it out to work. You keep adding to it, little by little over 
time, and presto - before you know it has turned into a sizeable nest egg for 
your future.  As a valued member, we're here to help you experience this 
magic through all of life's changes. And building personal wealth is an 
important part of your future.    (Connectfinancial 2005) 
This orientation towards money has all the hallmarks of the dominant money 
narrative: having money is „good‟, building monetary wealth is important; money is 
integral to shaping the future; money is a „constant‟ through all of life‟s challenges 
and changes; and, quite clearly, it is personal wealth that is significant in the equation.  
From government websites with personal finance advice (CoA 2005), to private 
health insurance funds promoting health as something individuals can „control‟ 
(PHIA 2007), to credit unions promoting children memberships into money saving 
clubs (ADCU 2007), the orientation towards money found in the dominant money 
narrative is the culturally preferred, and culturally privileged, narrative, crowding out 
any alternatives. 
Economic and sociological literature too, corroborates this fact.  For example, major 
economic theories and institutions still draw heavily upon the free market 
philosophies of 18th century moral philosopher Adam Smith, who in 1776 in his 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, wrote:  
As every individual endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital 
in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its 
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to 
render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, 
indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much 
he is promoting it. He intends only his own gain; and he is in this, as in 
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no 
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part of it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the 
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have 
never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public 
good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and 
very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.   
       (Smith 1776: IV.ii.9) 
Thus, lingering behind dominant money narratives is the economic market, driven to 
increase profits through personal wealth creation.  Beyond the attention of economists, 
this is something sociologists also acknowledge, although often more critically.  
Pusey for example, laments the economic reform privileging a free market economy, 
arguing that it comes with: 
…a thinning of democracy and an induced retreat of the people into a purely 
private sphere of caring only for one‟s own, of mood states, of consumption, 
of recuperation, therapy, and incommunicable anger at what is being done to 
them.       (Pusey 2003: 183) 
Additionally, it has already been demonstrated in chapter three and five that other 
sociologists (Bauman 1998a; Bauman 2003; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001; Bellah 
et al. 1996; d'Epinay 1991) note how deeply economic motivations are embedded in 
the becoming and defining of the „self‟ as autonomous and self-responsible.  Thus, 
whether through participants themselves, popular culture or social institutions, the 
academic study of the financial market or the social observation or critique of the 
sociologist - major themes within them all resonate with the dominant money 
narrative of this study as a culturally preferred story about the meaning of money in 
life. 
 
 
6.4. Comments on the dominant money narrative 
6.4.1. The elimination of value conflicts 
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As a narrative given cultural preference, then, a number of comments remain to be 
said of the dominant money narrative characterising middle-income participants in 
this study.  A primary observation about the dominant money narrative is that it has a 
relatively linear storyline.  And as a narrative whose moral orientation towards money 
focuses on the „good‟ of personal money it embraces a relatively straightforward 
moral stance.  This by no means infers that a dominant money narrative excludes all 
ambivalences, or conflict related to money matters.  On the contrary, it has been made 
clear that money dilemmas and conflicts do exist in this narrative.  Rather, what is 
significant is the way that in the dominant money narrative, language privileges the 
„good‟ of personal money despite, and in spite of money dilemmas presented. 
Nussbaum‟s (1987) analysis of Greek tragedies in „The Fragility of Goodness‟ 
provides a metaphor of this dominant money narrative view.  Nussbaum argues Greek 
tragedies have long been misread, superimposed with rationalistic interpretations that 
reflect the culturally embedded views of a Kantian approach and similarly Plato 
before him.  The conflict of values central to the tragedy of the Greek poets was 
„found painfully intolerable‟ (Nussbaum 1986: 50) by the pragmatic philosophers, for 
whom a moral rule or principle can never be in conflict with another.  According to 
the pragmatism of the latter, the stronger good prevails because there must be 
„consistency amongst the principles of practical reason‟ (Nussbaum 1986: 48).  
Consequently, a Platonic reading of Greek tragedies privileges the elimination of 
value conflicts.  It does so by emphasising linear and future-directed solutions to 
moral dilemmas through decision-making that elevates stability, control, self-
sufficiency and rationally-driven reasoning as its grounding principle. 
Similarly, the dominant money narrative tells a story about money in ways 
reminiscent to a Kantian approach of the Greek tragedy.  Analogously to Greek 
tragedies, the stories of middle-income young adults are peppered with the value 
conflicts, moral dilemmas and complexities that inevitably arise from earning, having, 
investing and dispensing money on a daily basis.  However, like the Kantian 
pragmatist approach to tragedy, the dominant money narrative overlays such value 
conflicts with a consistent principle overriding all others.  And this principle is the 
dominant moral reasoning that personal money is „good‟ money, regardless of the 
dilemmas left in its wake.  Resembling the Kantian approach, the dominant money 
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narrative privileges future-directed money solutions, financial self-reliance, and 
decision-making that elevates monetary stability and control. 
Thus, like the Kantian approach to a Greek tragedy, the dominant money narrative is 
an interpretation about money that reflects the culturally embedded views of our time.  
It is important to note that as a money narrative it is not merely reflecting a „simple‟ 
interpretation of the meaning of money: neither was the Kantian approach to Greek 
tragedy.  Both approaches are born in the context of value conflicts and moral 
dilemmas central to their existence.  Rather, it is the interpretation of what is of 
greater moral importance in the midst of these money dilemmas that defines the 
Kantian approach to tragedy, or in this case, the dominant money narrative.  The 
dominant money narrative privileges stories about the „good‟ of personal money: to 
the point where these stories become increasingly invulnerable to the ethical conflicts 
arising from them because the dominant money orientation crowds out alternative 
interpretations, or languages to confront them with.   
Elsewhere, Nussbaum uses a modern day example of economic development 
indicators to highlight this cultural „refusal to recognize plural ends‟:  
Until rather recently, “the quality of life” in a nation was assessed simply by 
enumerating GNP per capita.  This crude norm did not even make salient the 
distribution of wealth and income, and thus routinely gave high marks to 
nations such as South Africa, with its tremendous inequalities.  Still less did 
it ask about the connection of GNP to other areas of human functioning that 
are important indicators of quality of life: areas such as life expectancy, 
infant mortality, educational attainment, and the presence or absence of 
political liberties.     (Nussbaum 1997: 1202) 
Coser gives another example of this in his work that identifies „greedy institutions‟.  
These institutions, be they political, religious, or even familial, demand total 
commitment and eliminate all possibilities for questioning dominant values or 
creating value conflicts with the dominant mode (Coser 1974).  Perhaps extreme 
examples, Nussbaum and Coser nevertheless demonstrates how one strong principle 
or „good‟ (in this case the market value of goods and services, or the „greedy 
institution‟) prevails in the interpretation of what quality of life is, leaving all other 
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(equally or more important) indicators without claim.  The dominant money narrative 
mirrors this tendency: money dilemmas and conflicts are present but are given no 
personal privilege or solution because only one stronger money principle or „good‟ 
prevails, leaving others without claim - or at least insufficiently binding on the 
dominant money narrative. 
Having outlined the interpretative nature of the dominant money narrative, it is also 
important to explore the social consequences of a narrative thus privileged.  First, 
what does having a limited language of moral alternatives in money meanings imply 
for an individual‟s social responsibilities? Second, analysis of the dominant money 
narrative presented here may necessitate a re-thinking of the extent to which „self-
reflexivity‟ (to use Giddens term) accurately describes modern individuals.  
6.4.2. The ambivalence toward social responsibility 
Concern over the disconnection between the public and private sphere has already 
been voiced in the previous chapter.  There it was noted that Eckersley‟s (2004) 
research joins a growing list of studies39 indicating a growing disconnection between 
the personal and social.  For example, individuals viewed their personal aspirations as 
having nothing to do with achieving wider social goals. Also, Australians have shown 
to be turning inward towards personal and familial concerns and away from broader 
national issues that they feel they have no control over (Eckersley 2004: 120-1).  
Michael Pusey (2003) raises this concern in yet another way, through voicing the 
dangers of economic reform.  He quotes H.C Coombs (former Reserve Bank official) 
who rang warning bells in 1992 by saying that „the intellectual and moral basis of 
Australian society is being corrupted‟.  His reasoning for this was because of the 
widespread view of „the economy as a machine independent of social purposes‟  
(Pusey 2003: 14).  
                                                   
 
39
 E.g. Clemenger (2002); Flowers (2002), Mackay (2003a; 2003b). 
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Two tendencies are inferred by these research findings.  The first is the inward retreat, 
or the inclination for people to narrow their scope of influence to a small sphere of 
people (family or close friends) directly linked with themselves.  The second is the 
tendency to view economic matters (including private money matters) as distinct 
from social outcomes, as if the economic market is driven by objectives that have 
little to do with social ones.  As two generalised considerations presently voiced by 
social scientists about Australian culture, they also capture my concerns about the 
dominant money narrative.  Again, it is not the case that middle-income participants 
ignore or are blind to social problems of which money is the cause.  One participant 
after another alludes to social problems, problematises government spending, feels 
badly for the poor, or questions their own role in wider concerns.  But ultimately, 
their sphere of monetary influence remains personal and strongly reaffirmed over and 
over as part of their own good life: for the present, for their lifestyle, for their futures 
and for their security.  The „good‟ of personal money, thus repressing other moral 
alternatives by the strength of its orientation, leaves little room for the recognition of 
multiple (e.g. personal and social) monetary goals and responsibilities.   
It is evident that the dominant money narrative has attractive, confident qualities: it is 
a positively oriented, future-looking, pleasure-seeking and self-fulfilling narrative.  At 
the same time however, the dominant narrative edits out answers to conflicts that may 
call its very narrative privilege into question.  Social responsibility, or the orienting of 
personal actions towards better social outcomes, is one of these answers, most often 
edited out and leaving participants unable or unwilling to articulate a place for it in 
their lives. 
6.4.3. Rethinking reflexivity 
Building on the first, the second concern relates to the ease in which social theorists 
of all kinds express modern people as individualised, unattached and autonomous 
beings free to live according to their own choice.  To reiterate, some of these 
descriptions include Gidden‟s „reflexive self‟ (Giddens 1991), the „choosing, deciding, 
shaping human being‟ of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2001), the „morally autonomous 
individual‟ referred to by Bellah et al. (1996), or the „lonely, self-concerned and self-
centred economic actor‟ as described by Bauman (2003).  For the purposes of this 
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critique, Gidden‟s „reflexive self‟ is briefly outlined in order to locate it contextually 
alongside the dominant money narrative. 
Giddens (1990; 1991) argues that moral questioning has been bracketed out (or 
sequestered) throughout modernity – due to the loss of traditional-religious 
frameworks and increased trust placed in abstract systems.  However in late-
modernity, he argues, there has been a re-emergence of repressed moral responses to 
human dilemmas in the form of „life politics‟.  „Life politics‟ is an emergent sphere of 
questioning politicising the self and body in relation to lifestyle choices and abstract 
systems.  The ambivalences inherent in such moral questioning are also enabled 
because individuals in late-modernity live reflexive biographies: that is, central to the 
reflexive self is control, awareness and the constant monitoring and often re-shaping 
of body and mind in relation to the systems and knowledges played out socially 
around them (Giddens 1991: 75-80). 
My critique relates to the extent to which individuals can be morally reflexive – about 
money related issues at least - if living within the scope of a dominant money 
narrative.  While I have shown that many middle-income individuals demonstrate an 
awareness and reflection about their work sphere or wider social problems related to 
money - like poverty - no one individual either questions or problematises the 
meaning of private money, its distribution or intended use.  A sociological analysis of 
a culture that privileges personal money as „good‟ infers that money is not value-
neutral, nor to use Zelizer‟s words, „morally invulnerable‟; but rather integral to 
shaping cultural frameworks which become shared stories about what is or isn‟t 
„good‟ and worth attaining. The almost total lack of problematising the individual 
sphere in relation to money raises real questions about the actual extent to which late-
modern individuals are able to be reflexively aware of their role in reproducing some 
major cultural themes or dispositions.  
My concern is that Giddens (among others) reflects on self-reflexivity as a modern 
„enabling‟ attribute without any sense of how self-reflexivity is constrained by 
existing cultural frameworks, such as money narratives.  If a money orientation such 
as the dominant money narrative crowds out other moral alternatives related to the 
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use of money, then unless the narrative is actively chosen against, self-reflexivity is 
left deeply constrained. 
If there are no question marks placed over the monetary fruits of the economy in our 
private lives, or little sense of reflection about the social responsibilities and 
obligations private money might or could lend itself to, then it may be the case that 
abstract systems provide only one culturally preferred knowledge when it comes to 
the economy.  That is, that the stronger the economy the better, the more private 
money, the better.  In other words, if self-reflexivity is the biographical response of 
contemporary individuals to the waves of new knowledges that are birthed 
continually by abstract systems, then self-reflexivity is questionable where there is 
static, constrained or unchanged knowledge (in this case, our understanding of the 
functions and purpose of the economy).  In this research, evidence suggests that 
middle-income young adults tend to edit what they will admit about money in their 
personal lives to a shared, taken-for-granted orientation: that money is unequivocally 
„good‟.  If this is the case, then some participants are showing that for at least one 
pervasive cultural theme (privatised money), Gidden‟s sense of self- awareness and 
constant reflexive re-shaping of the self is not necessarily a practiced reality. 
Conclusion 
The dominant money narrative is central and prominent in the findings of this thesis, 
but it is not the only narrative uncovered.  In the next section are two more narrative 
types.  They are not as culturally prominent but no less important.  The first, the 
deferred money narrative, is a story that is similar in many ways to the dominant 
money narrative because it strives to achieve it.  The second, the flawed money 
narrative, is a narrative that exists in strong relationship to the dominant narrative 
because it is inextricably linked but deeply antagonistic at the same time.  These 
narratives address an unsettling question: what does money mean for those who are 
unable to currently live the culturally preferred dominant money narrative? 
Before outlining alternative narratives however, the next chapter is first dedicated to 
outlining analytical themes arising from money meanings and moral orientations 
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towards money by the second participant category defined in this thesis: low-income 
participants. 
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7. Chapter Seven: “It‟s a long walk back when 
you run out of money”40  - The Money 
Meanings and Moral Orientations of Low-
Income Participants 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on low-income earners.  In particular, I will outline the money 
meanings and moral orientations that low-income participants share in their 
understanding of a „good life‟.   
In 2001, those on low-incomes (less than $26,000 per annum) represented 
approximately 28% of the Australian population.41  The data in this chapter is drawn 
from thirteen low-income participants.  Of these, 8 are male and 5 are female.  The 
youngest is 23 years old, and the oldest is 38 years, while the average age of the 
group is just over 29 years old.  Reflecting 2003-04 income figures for low-income 
households (ABS 2005), government pensions and allowances are the main source of 
income for all low-income participants in this study.  While some participants are 
unemployed, some are engaged as primary carers for children, and a number are 
occupied with full-time tertiary study.  Some students and carers are also engaged in 
part-time work to supplement their incomes.  The highest income is just over $26,000 
per annum, while the lowest is approximately $8,000 per annum, and the group 
average income is below $15,000 per annum.  Five of the group are tertiary educated, 
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Static low-income participant, Trevor. 
41
 ABS (2001) „Weekly Household Incomes by Family and non-Family households‟ report indicates 
that 42% of Australian households fall within a weekly income of $499 – $1499 (or $26,000 to $78,000 
per annum gross); whereas 28% of Australian households fall below this figure, and 18% fall above (the 
remaining 12% were incomplete indications). 
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four are currently undergoing tertiary education,42 and the remaining four have 
completed grades ten, eleven, twelve, or a TAFE43 certificate as their highest 
educational level.  Three of the group are buying their own homes, seven are 
currently renting and the remaining three live with their families.  Eight participants 
are single, while three are partnered or married, and two participants are divorced.  
Three participants are single mothers with dependents.  Six participants have travelled 
overseas, whilst the remaining seven participants have either travelled only within 
Tasmania or within Australia.  For a detailed list of low-income participant 
characteristics, see appendix one, table two. 
Analysis of the low-income participants begins with identifying the primary ways that 
these individuals talked about money in their lives.  That is, how is money oriented in 
relation to what they view as a „good life‟?  Following this, the complex and 
sometimes contradictory ways that low-income earners describe the meaning of 
money are analysed, including divergent meanings between low-income students and 
the low-income unemployed. 
7.2. General money orientations of low-income earners 
Leon earns approximately $10,000 per annum and views himself as less materialistic 
than his friends.  He used to work but now studies at university full-time in order to 
kick-start a higher earning and more satisfying career.  He plays down the place of 
money in his life.  For example he seems fairly unconcerned that he doesn‟t earn too 
much - he‟ll get by and make do: „I just need enough to see me through my degree‟.  
                                                   
 
42
 As noted in chapter one, the bias towards tertiary educated participants is most likely a reflection of 
my social location as a tertiary student and the social networks most available to me through snowball 
sampling.  However, it also becomes clearer throughout this chapter that low-income tertiary students 
have shared money orientations that are juxtaposed with other low-income earners (e.g. unemployed).  
As such, the distinction has proved analytically interesting and insightful to the wider study. 
43
 TAFE is a Training And Further Education Institute in Hobart Tasmania 
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He indicates that a good career and comfortable retirement are part of his future plans, 
but there are more important things than money anyway - like job satisfaction and 
personal happiness.  He justifies this by telling a story about his lottery-winning 
friend who is very wealthy and yet unsatisfied at the same time.  For Leon, money is 
desirable, or „good‟ but downplayed in his understanding of a „good life‟. 
7.2.1. Money as „good‟ 
Leon‟s view of money highlights some of the themes found more broadly amongst 
low-income participants in his category, although critical divergences will be outlined 
later.  Similarly to the middle-income earners, the way low-income earners generally 
view money is also as „good‟ in their personal lives.  Their orientation towards money 
as „good‟ is not as direct as the middle-income group: the overall instances of money 
being talked about as „good‟ by low-income participants was statistically a third less 
than that of the middle-income group.  Nevertheless, personal money is still „good‟, 
in particular for three reasons.  First, it provides a sense of control over participants‟ 
lives including: a sense of independence from the system (e.g. government) or other 
people such as family; independence from financial constraint or worry; or 
independence that provides opportunities, to buy or experience things, or to „do what 
I want to do‟: 
„Well, obviously, you‟ve got to have it [money].  You‟ve really got to have it.  
I feel incredibly blessed that I‟m not living in my mum‟s time, when there 
wasn‟t a pension to fall back on when there wasn‟t any work.  Really, really 
blessed by that.  Because I don‟t have to go and have some bullshit husband, 
you know, I don‟t have to do any of that because there aren‟t any more 
options. So I‟m really lucky to have the freedom that I have.‟   
     (Gabrielle, 36, Part-time Musician) 
Second, most low-income earners view personal money as good because it is a means 
to an end or goal.  Goals may be qualitative – related to comfort, choice, health, 
happiness or success – or quantitative and more clearly defined, for example related 
to  travel, ownership, saving money, paying bills or being debt free: 
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„Um, I guess my wish list though, you know…  Um, I‟d like to own my own 
home.‟       (Virgil, 30, Full-Time Student) 
Third, money provides a quality of life defined through lack of financial constraint or 
money worries, financial stability, lifestyle choices such as engaging in recreation, 
investing for the future or having open options, or comfort such as a particular 
standard of living.  For example, Stuart notes that, 
„…when my parents retire I want to move, and I want to actually purchase 
the property that I‟m sort of living on at the moment.  And that gives 
me…the quality of life as in like [you can] walk in the trees, and not hear a 
car.  And only hear my dog barking basically, that‟s the only thing.  So it‟s a 
relief from the outside world type of thing?‟  (Stuart, 27, Full-Time Student) 
7.2.2. „Downplaying‟ money 
Like middle-income participants, low-income participants also view personal money 
as „good‟ - something to be oriented towards, or desired - because it provides 
financial independence, goal achievement, and a better quality of life.  However, the 
low-income data is also conspicuous for how it differs from middle-income 
participants‟ money meanings because low-income participants also describe money 
in „neutral‟ ways.  While money is certainly desired, there is also a strong sense that 
low-income participants are unconcerned or almost blasé about money.  That is, while 
money might be desirable to them, low-income earners express with some 
nonchalance that there is no need to make a big deal about it.  In other words, money 
is „downplayed‟.  This is an attitude that commonly winds its way around statements 
related to the realities of living with minimal incomes: 
„Being on the pension you don‟t get a lot of money, but I do get enough 
money.  And after paying my friends back their money, I‟ve just got that to 
do what I like with, you know.  I‟ve got all my meals supplied here.  And got 
my own room.  But if I had a lot of money I‟d make a mess of myself, plus 
everyone would borrow off me...‟  (Trevor, 38, Unemployed) 
In this way, money is not always described as „good‟, but nor is it described 
negatively.  Rather, participants reflect on money as a necessity: something they 
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require to survive or get by, but not something to make a big deal about.  Another 
way this „downplaying‟ of money is communicated is through the reflection that 
participants will „make do‟ or be „creative‟ with what little they have:  
„…you can‟t order in Indian every night, or Chinese or that sort of 
thing…So I guess I‟ve had to organise myself a little bit better.  Which has 
been fine because I‟ve actually found I quite like cooking.  So I watch Jamie 
Oliver and all that sort of stuff, and pick up a few little tips.  And try and 
replicate it.  And if someone rings up and says, you know we‟re going to do 
this, I just have to say I can‟t do it.  Which is fine.  I feel like it‟s mainly 
things like going out and having a beer that you have to cut down.  I feel like 
I‟ve done enough of that, anyway… I also have to be a little bit more, 
responsible about driving.  „Cause I used to just … go and take a drive.  
Whereas I can‟t do that now. … Petrol‟s expensive, and clothes shopping.  
You‟ve got to be a lot smarter about that.  A lot smarter.  But I was at the 
stage I had too many clothes anyway.‟   (Leon, 29, Full-Time Student) 
As Leon shows, part of the downplaying of money in this way is an attitude of being 
unconcerned about money, as if having little money is non-problematic: 
„I mean it‟s under the poverty level n‟ stuff, but I mean I get by – easily - on 
it.‟       (Anders, 24, Unemployed) 
Therefore, while on the one hand low-income participants talk about the „good‟ of 
money in similar ways to middle-income participants, they are also careful to 
downplay the realities of their low-income by framing the experiences in language 
that doesn‟t necessarily draw on an orientation towards money as simply „good‟.  
Interestingly, Singh and Lindsay (1996) note a similar finding in their study of money: 
One of the strategies used to avoid seeing money and power as linked, is to 
present money as not being meaningful. … Money is seen as a „pain in the 
neck‟; a „nuisance‟; without „any significant place in our lives‟; a means of 
paying the bills. Another strategy is to minimise its quantum, by saying, 
„there‟s never that great big amount to worry about.‟     
      (Singh and Lindsay 1996: 65) 
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In this case, most low-income participants describe their practical experiences with 
money similarly - as something they are unconcerned about, as a reality they will 
make do with and even become creative with.   
7.2.3. Money ambivalences and tensions 
In addition, and again like middle-income participants, everyone in the low-income 
category of this study also express ambivalences towards, and tensions about money 
in their lives.  However, they differ from middle-income participants in the extent to 
which these instances occur: low-income participants express money 
ambivalences/tensions about personal money over four times more frequently than 
middle-income participants.  The subject of the ambivalence and conflict is also 
substantially more varied than middle-income participants who tend to confine money 
conflicts to the stress and worry related to past experiences of having little money, or 
to the philosophical relation of money to happiness.  Rather, low-income participants 
show that their ambivalences about money are related to a wide variety of everyday 
issues. 
For example, the source of income was a cause for ambivalence amongst many 
participants, and for many reasons.  Some participants felt undeserving of money, 
while others had experienced financial abuse through money-power relations.  Some 
felt ambivalent about receiving „handouts‟ or not being able to hold down a „normal 
job‟, and others felt conflicting emotions over the social pressure they feel to earn 
their own money.  Jessica describes her feelings about „grovelling‟ for money: 
„Well, I‟ve felt that I‟ve had to grovel, for everything.  Like, to get into this 
place [I had] help from absolutely everyone, because I had no savings.  It 
was really bad when I was considered badly in debt, I couldn‟t pay my debts.  
So I was forever behind, and forever getting final notices and disconnection 
notices.  So that was really hard.‟    (Jessica, 38, Part-time Student) 
Similarly to middle-income participants, the relation of happiness to money is also a 
source of ambivalence for low-income earners, but not always for the same reason as 
middle-income earners.  Many references to money here are related to happiness 
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being found to a degree in the absence of financial struggle or constraint, for example 
in being financially independent.  Virgil expresses this idea:  
I: „What about happiness?  What is being „happy‟ to you?‟                                             
P: „Being free from worry‟.                                                                                                 
I:  „What makes you worry?‟                                                                                             
P: „Things that make me worry, unfortunately, are money.  Because you 
can‟t really survive in our society without it.‟    
      (Virgil, 30, Full-Time Student) 
Many low-income earners also express multiple tensions related to financial worry. 
Each reflection of financial worry (related to their current financial context) is 
expressed negatively: for example as a „stressor‟, „horrible feeling‟, „de-humanising‟, 
as „trouble‟, „really hard‟ or involving „constant worry‟.  The difficulties experienced 
through financial worry also extend to other tensions, such as tensions within 
relationships (such as family or spouse), and also conflicting feelings surrounding the 
need to be dependent on others, such as government welfare services, parents, or loan 
services: 
„I went to get a loan that would help me… so I didn‟t have to go back to 
work.  And, I had a thousand dollars in my bank.  I had a thousand dollars 
to pay on my credit card.  So I wanted to pay that off, and I had a [loan] to 
pay which was one and a half, and so I wanted two and a half grand to pay 
them off, even though I had a grand in the bank.  And the computer said no! 
And I was so angry.‟               (Kayla, 27, Escort Worker) 
The complex array of ambivalences and tensions expressed by low-income earners 
also included some smaller themes.  Participants raised issues associated with 
desiring money but not being able to have it, the felt or perceived inequality and 
power-relations relating to their social position, negativity about consumerism, and 
perhaps most poignant (and elaborated further later) some participants convey a 
disquiet about their very futures because of a lack of money.   
In summary, money is squarely located in reference to a „good‟ life and is desired by 
low-income earners.  Like middle-income participants, the „good‟ of personal money 
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is most often not problematised.  However, personal money is largely downplayed 
through stories that highlight the realities of getting by with little money and having 
to „make do‟.  While on the one hand the downplaying of these realities are inflected 
with an air of being „unconcerned‟ about, or „creative‟ with personal money, they also 
reflect the ambivalences and tensions participants feel about their lack of control and 
power over where their money comes from, how they are limited by it, and the 
dilemma of not having enough.    
7.3. A category divided: static and transient low-incomes 
In varying degrees, all low-income participants share the general money orientations 
outlined above.  However, beyond this point it is no longer feasible to talk about low-
income participants as unified by common money themes.  Rather, personal money 
meanings and orientations diverge along two clear trajectories.  These trajectories are 
based upon whether the participant‟s low-income is either transient or static.  A 
„transient‟ low-income refers to a low-income that is understood to be temporary in 
nature.  A „static‟ low-income refers to a participant who has a low-income with no 
immediate prospects of an altered circumstance.  The following section begins with 
the transient low-income earners, followed by the static low-income earners, tracking 
some of the themes specifically arising from their data.   
7.4. Transient low-income earners 
Transient low-income earners view their current low-income as short-term and to be 
later replaced by an increased income, for example full-time paid work upon 
completion of studies.  Seven of the thirteen low-income participants are transient in 
their low-income, four males and three females. The majority (five) of the group are 
students who have chosen to return to tertiary education as mature-aged students after 
some time working or travelling.  In this sense, their low-income status is a means to 
a goal: education, and/or future work.  Two participants in this category are on 
government welfare payments due to lack of work, but nevertheless live with the 
promise of employment in the not too distant future.    
As described above, all transient low-income participants fit into the general money 
orientations for low-income earners as described above: they view money as „good‟ 
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while downplaying its importance, and they also highlight ambivalences and tensions 
they express about money living in a low-income context.  The following section 
analyses some of the peculiarities of the transient low-income group, in terms of how 
they „downplay‟ money meanings, how this relates to their understandings and 
expectations of the future, as well as the ambivalences and conflicts about money 
they identify both at the personal and social level. 
7.4.1. Downplaying money 
The transient low-income participants „downplaying‟ of money is encased within a 
strong sense of pragmatism about living with less money.  It is they who describe 
their current income context as necessary – even worthwhile – in terms of waiting for 
the rewards that education, or waiting for the „right‟ job, will bring.  For example, 
asked how she coped with a low-income, Bethany replies: 
„It‟s been alright. I‟m being a bit pickier this time, because I could easily go 
back to hospitality - I was offered my old job back.  But I don‟t want to get 
back into that.  That‟s why I‟m going to wait a bit longer and see what I can 
come up with.‟     (Bethany, 23, Unemployed) 
For Stuart, study is a means to a further goal: 
„Austudy will get you the bare minimum. And that‟s good though, because it 
makes you more determined to succeed.  It‟s like bugger this, I‟m not 
sticking with three hundred and eighteen dollars a fortnight, just to go back 
and be what I was.  So it makes you more, well it makes me more 
determined.‟      (Stuart, 27, Full-Time Student) 
To these participants, a low-income may be unavoidable, but it is only a necessity for 
now, for a short time.  Re-skilling through education, or waiting for the better job to 
arise, seems to them a pragmatic course of action worth the trouble of making do – 
even being creative – with money while there isn‟t a lot to go around.   
7.4.2. Projected futures 
However, such pragmatism is indicative of a deeper reality for these transient 
participants.  Bethany will wait for that better job, Leon will put up with three 
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hundred and eighteen dollars a fortnight, Leon will cook his own meals, and 
Gabrielle‟s family will pull together to make ends meet – because they believe their 
money circumstances will change for the better.  In other words, like the middle-
income participants, all transient low-income participants are able in some way to 
talk about their futures, all have expectations for the future and in all cases these 
expectations are oriented positively in relation to money meanings.  Stuart talks 
openly about his future expectations: 
„I‟ve made a choice and one of the reasons I‟m in university [is that] I didn‟t 
like earning forty-two and half thousand dollars a year.  I want to earn 
eighty thousand dollars a year.  And for that you‟ve got to put some time and 
investment in.  And university is that time and investment.  I mean I worked 
it out that after six or seven years - say take university and then working - I 
would‟ve made as much as I would‟ve earned if I just kept on working for 
six years, or six or seven years.  And then from then on you‟re going to earn 
more.‟     (Stuart, 27, Full-time student) 
Reynolds and Ross (1998) note that education plays a central role to human well-
being because being well-educated mitigates against unemployment and provides 
greater access to „full-time, high status, rewarding, well paid work‟.  As a rule, the 
well educated also face fewer economic difficulties (Reynolds and Ross 1998: 222).  
As Stuart demonstrates, when transient low-income participants talk about their hopes 
beyond low-incomes, the desires and expectations they place in education result in 
language much the same as found amongst middle-income money orientations: 
„I‟d like for [partner] and I to have a really nice home.  I certainly do not 
mean like a massively salubrious mansion.  … I‟d really like us to have a 
home that we actually know is our base; that we always come back to.  But 
we really are both big on travelling.  We‟d love to live in other countries for 
periods of time - like, we‟re talking fantasy now.  It‟d be lovely to be like in 
a position where someone says, you know, we‟ve got six months in Kuala 
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Lumpur, or we need you to go to Kenya for a year or whatever.  …  You 
know we could literally just be thinking, „lets go to Cuba for four weeks‟ or 
whatever it would be.  That would be really nice, to be financially 
comfortable to be able to do that.‟    (Mondi, 26, Full-Time Student) 44 
„But the first thirty years of my life are gonna end up being just purely for 
me.  The next thirty will be my career.  And I‟m hoping the thirty after that 
will be a nice retirement, or semi-retirement.‟    
      (Leon, 29, Full-Time Student) 
In part, the transient low-income participants of this study follow middle-income 
participants‟ orientations towards money as something to be sought or pursued.  This 
is also reflected in how they make sense of their projected futures, and the direction 
they believe themselves to be headed in their lives.  For example, all transient low-
income participants in this study describe themselves in terms of the „adaptability‟ 
model proposed by Brannen and Nilsen (2002).  On the whole, these participants 
consider the future a challenge and are taking active, short term and open ended steps 
(such as university study) to make sure they have opportunities in the face of 
changing circumstances.  That is, the meanings they give money fit into shorter-term 
and open goals that may or may not change (Brannen and Nilsen 2002: 529-30).  
In other words, whilst experiencing a low-income, these participants live in deference 
to the dominant money narrative.  In terms of thinking about life and future they are 
oriented towards money as „good‟.  Unlike middle-income participants, their 
immediate experience is framed by the reality of a low-income.  However, in their 
understanding, the low-income is only for now.  What they expect and plan for is the 
dominant money narrative.  Recall Charles Taylor‟s assertion that the question of 
who we are as human beings can only be answered in reference to where we are 
going and the direction we orient our lives (Taylor 1989: 46).  The pragmatic 
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response to the question, „what makes a good life‟ by the transient low-income 
participants in this study shows broad orientations to the expectations found within a 
dominant money narrative, and it is according to this they project their futures.  
7.4.3. Money ambivalences 
Nonetheless, transient low-income participants in this study living with the 
complexities of reduced incomes do face challenges that middle-income participants 
only talk about avoiding.  This is evidenced, as shown above, through the higher 
levels of ambivalence and conflicts these participants describe in relation to money, 
and the broad range of their descriptions.  For the transient low-income participants, 
these ambivalences take a specific form: they question the extent to which values 
other than money – such as happiness, time, job satisfaction or security – should have 
to compete with the „good‟ of money: 
„I guess you do need to know that you‟ve got money coming in.  But I 
honestly think I can have plenty of money coming in and still not feel secure.  
You know what I mean?  That‟s not what does it.  But you‟ve got to know 
that you‟re happy.‟    (Leon, 29, Full-Time Student) 
„I just don‟t know why other people [are] sort of locked into stuff that just 
doesn‟t inspire them, and excite them.  If you can‟t go „yes! I‟m going to 
work‟ then you‟re killing yourself, you know.  What are you doing it for?  
But then, I think that‟s one of the good things about being kind of poor all 
your life, is that you don‟t need a lot of money to have a good time.‟  
     (Gabrielle, 36, Part-time Musician) 
Thus in Gabrielle‟s case, who also aspires to be financially upwardly mobile45, she 
also engages with her experience of being poor to challenge the idea that earning 
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 Gabrielle notes that „I don‟t have small dreams, I have big ones‟, and this includes business 
propositions that will hopefully make her family far more financially well-off.  For example, she states 
her desire to have bought property in the mountains by next year, „with a studio‟.  
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money is more important than being happy.  For these participants, the experience of 
living on low-incomes is itself a challenge to the culturally preferred dominant money 
narrative.  Consequently, as much as they may aspire to this narrative in the future, 
their present frugal earnings and the strong level of pragmatism that accompanies the 
downplaying of their money meanings in the present opens space for ambivalence 
about the single-mindedness of the dominant money narrative as a singular aspiration 
for their lives. 
7.4.4. Public money orientations 
Thus personal money orientations of the transient low-income participant group are 
characterised by both similarities and differences to the middle-income group.   The 
same is true of their public money orientations.  The differences are subtle, but 
important to outline.  First, transient low-income participants express a much 
narrower range of political and moral dilemmas in comparison to middle-income 
participants.  Participants did make some specific political comments, such as 
identifying problems associated with the government as distributor of wealth, the 
refugee crisis, or the misuse of the welfare system.  Some comments were also 
expressed positively, such as being satisfied with the government‟s role as an 
economic manager of Australia, or even just in relation to the „necessity‟ of the 
government‟s role:       
„I guess it is just so you haven‟t got starvation and all that kind of stuff at a 
mass level - just keeping it ticking along.  I think we‟ve got a pretty good 
welfare system.  The health system‟s probably struggling a little bit, but you 
can‟t work miracles; you can‟t just make money appear.  So I guess it‟s just 
getting the distribution of money…not necessarily even, but just where it 
needs to be distributed.‟    (Leon, 29, Full-Time Student) 
Furthermore, the only clear social problem identified by the majority of participants 
(expressed both in political and moral terms) is a scathing attack on those with too 
much wealth.  Whether it is politicians, CEO‟s, „greedy‟ people, tatslotto winners, or 
those who simply earn a lot, the transient low-income group had little patience for 
their financial excesses:  
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„I started to stop and realise just the wealth of the Catholic Church.  The 
hypocrisy of their plea to the rest of the world to help the poor and to feed 
the hungry, and yet they‟re sitting there like they‟re rich fat cats, and they‟ve 
got gold plates in Vatican City, and the Pope wears a ring on his finger 
that‟s worth more than most houses.‟ (Virgil, 30, Full-Time Student) 
A significant difference between middle-income and transient low-income 
participants is the extent to which they talk about possible solutions to social 
problems related to money.  While the middle-income group tended to find social 
solutions to social problems (e.g. re-distribution of government funding), the majority 
of the low-income group approached answers with idealistic stories.  In most cases 
they also place themselves in the picture:   
„Another little pet dream that I‟ve had is to actually be able to get enough 
money behind myself so that I can go into some third world country … and 
build a town from the ground level.  And put in water sources and 
everything, and then just invite people to come and live in it and leave.  And 
give them a town set up in the same development situation that we have in 
the rest of the developed world.  Because I think something like that could 
directly influence ten thousand, twenty thousand, hundred thousand people.  
You know you could make a real difference in the world with something like 
that.  And I hope that if one person started something like that, that others 
might follow suit.  You might start to see corporations picking up on the idea 
and thinking, well, we could get good PR out of this, so we‟ll go in and set 
up a city to help.  You know, things might steamroll.‟    
       (Virgil, 30, Full-Time Student) 
On this issue, the transient low-income participants provide an interesting contrast to 
the middle-income participants.  It is clear that the middle-income group are far more 
constrained in their „solutions‟ to money-related social (political/moral) problems.  
First, they rarely suggest their own involvement, and second they draw on existing 
social structural possibilities as reference points for change (e.g. governments, 
welfare agencies, or corporations).  On the other hand, the transient low-income 
participants are given to large-scale dreaming involving both themselves (as 
instigators) and/or significant changes to the status quo.  Gabrielle, for example, notes 
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her plans to market a product/idea that in the future will be a necessity for all human 
beings in much the same way as air.  Stuart feels strongly about wealthy people 
opening a fund to re-direct their money to the poor.  Mondi calls herself a „greenie-
left-wing-socialist‟ who wants to work for the charity arm of her local bank and 
„bring the bank down from the inside‟. 
Stier argues that „the task of universities is, among other things, to „foster‟ citizens 
that adhere to an emancipatory outlook on the world‟ (Stier 2004: 88).  It appears that 
for participants in this study, the ability to „dream‟ about social change in a manner 
involving large sums of money and themselves is the prerogative of transient low-
income participants undergoing education.  In contrast, it will be shown in the next 
section that those on a static low-income have no such idealism.  And as already 
shown, middle-income participants are far more constrained in their ideas, limiting 
them to the realm of social structural activity and social monies.  As shown in the 
previous chapter, middle-income participants are limited in the language of 
articulating how money relates to the „self‟ outside the personal sphere.  Interestingly, 
although the transient low-income group aspire to the „good‟ of personal money in 
the same way as middle-income participants, the transient nature of their current 
personal income constraints allow for a different view of the future possibilities that 
earning/acquiring money may enable.  In this case, their ideal money situation for the 
future relates both to improved personal and social outcomes.   
However, transient low-income participants are similar to middle-income participants 
when asked about involvement beyond personal interests - they are socially and 
politically uninvolved.  Some participants (Fred, Leon and Bethany) feel no need to 
explain their lack of involvement, while others do.  For example, Virgil, who wants to 
build cities in developing countries, will not contribute to funds such as World Vision 
because their administrative costs (e.g. CEO‟s salaries) are too great.  Stuart simply 
remains uninspired to do so: 
 I:  „Are you involved in any other non-political, community organizations, 
or associations, or anything like that?‟       
P: „No.  Not at the moment.  No.  Not even – I  don‟t do Red Cross, I don‟t 
do…community things.  My mum does enough for all our family!'  
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I:  „She‟s a bit of an activist is she?‟       
P:  „Oh, labor, local government, Aboriginals. She‟s huge in that, god help 
me.  You know, that‟s her, and good on her for having a go, because she‟s 
doing a good thing.  But you don‟t have to be your mother so I‟m not going 
to.‟     (Stuart, 27, Full-Time Student) 
In this sense, the monetary aspirations of transient low-income participants towards 
better social outcomes are just that: aspirations.  This tension is not lost on Stier 
(2004), who argues that instrumentalist ideologies contrary to „emancipation‟ are also 
at work in national education systems.  That is, higher education is also a means 
through which students are taught economic ideologies, to „maximise profit‟ and 
„ensure economic growth‟ (Stier 2004: 91).  These are ideals strongly at odds with 
aspirations towards better social outcomes, and as we have seen with the middle-
income participants, given toward a focus on personal outcomes rather than social 
ones. 
Whether or not the expected transition of entering into paid employment and middle-
incomes for these participants will also facilitate the shift from idealistic social 
solutions to actual ones remains to be seen.  However, if the middle-income group 
serve as an example of typical orientations found following this transition, then it is 
doubtful that the transient low-income participants will continue to develop a specific 
language in which their increased personal money is utilised for social change. 
7.4.5. Summary 
In summary, transient low-income participants of this study also share the middle-
income orientation in which personal money is „good‟.  While their low-incomes 
encourage a pragmatic attitude to money as something to be „downplayed‟ in its 
everyday description, their future expectations for work and higher earnings imbue 
their present circumstance with a sense of transience - as a necessary and (particularly 
for students) socially validated low-income period of time that will pass.  However, 
the reality of their low-income does challenge the culturally preferred ideal of 
aspirations towards higher incomes.  In this space they are able question many of its 
assumptions, such as whether other values like time are of equal worth to money, or 
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whether too much money is a moral problem.  One of the assumptions they do reject 
is that personal money does not extend to the good of social outcomes: their 
philanthropic ideals are evidence of this.  However, with no real social involvement 
themselves, their ideals remain in the realm of dreaming about wealthier days. 
7.5. Static low-income earners 
The remaining participants in the low-income category are the „static‟ low-income 
participants.  A static low-income refers to a participant whose income has been 
„static‟, with little or no movement, for some time and with no immediate prospects 
of an altered circumstance.  Six of the thirteen participants – four male and two 
female - are static low-income earners.  All participant incomes from this group fall 
below the poverty line.  A widely accepted benchmark for the poverty line in 
Australia falls at 50% of the average or medium income, which in 2003 was around 
$500 per week per household (adjusted according to household numbers) and 
according to a recent ACOSS (2003) report included about 13% of the Australian 
population.  The same document also reported the following: 
People whose main source of income in Government benefits are 
consistently found to be at greater risk of poverty than other groups.  This is 
particularly so for people who remain in this situation for many years, such 
as long term unemployment beneficiaries, many sole parents, people with 
disabilities and carers.     (ACOSS 2003) 
This is true of all participants in the static low-income group of this study.  Most of 
these participants have received government benefits for a number of years (if not 
consistently at least sporadically), including long term unemployment benefits, sole 
parent and carers benefits or the disability pension.   
7.5.1. The paradox of money as „good‟ 
As shown earlier, all low-income participants understand money as „good‟.  While 
not to the same degree as middle-income earners, they are oriented in some way 
towards money as a means towards independence, lifestyle goals and financial 
security.  However, the first thing to note about static low-income earners is that their 
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relationship to the „good‟ of money is also complicated and not without paradox.  
Take Trevor, for example: 
I: „What kind of things make you happy in life?...‟      
P: „Chocolate thick shakes… I don‟t know, I‟d like to have money.  But I 
don‟t have any money.  That‟s what I would like.  [And later…]   That‟s the 
thing, see.  If I had a lot of money, I wouldn‟t be that safe.  Do you know 
what I mean?  Because if I had a lot of money, I‟d end up making a mess of 
myself - going to the pubs and making a mess of myself, buying heaps of 
marijuana, or drinking a lot and gambling a lot.‟    
      (Trevor, 38, Unemployed) 
Here, Trevor acknowledges the „good‟ of money.  He is well aware that money is a 
legitimated means to happiness, something that being oriented towards is „normal‟ 
and even expected, and something that should improve his circumstance if he had 
more.  However, the reality of money and its personalised meanings are far more 
complex to Trevor.  A history of addictions – in which money is centrally implicated 
– confronts Trevor with what money actually means to him: simple pleasures and a 
lot of trouble.  Kayla provides another example of such a paradox.  On the one hand 
she is oriented towards money, framed in similar ways to middle-income money 
meanings:  
„Money means I can do things.  Money means I can be independent.  Or 
think that I‟m independent!  It means freedom to me.  It means that I can 
choose more - it gives me choice.  Money is choice.  And it gives me choices 
to do a lot more things.  And buy some more things!  But also provide.‟ 
      (Kayla, 27, Escort Worker) 
However like Trevor, Kayla oscillates between her perception of money as „good‟, 
and the paradox of its reality in her life: 
„The times when I haven‟t had money, and I‟ve actually wanted something, 
my parents would supply the money for me.  And I hated that.  I know people 
would think „oh how selfish‟ and you know, ungracious and everything.  But, 
for them to be giving me money is just pointless because I feel that they 
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didn‟t give me what I needed when I was younger, and that they‟re trying to 
make up for it now.  And like, if they‟d given me what I needed when I was 
younger, I wouldn‟t be in the position where I would need their help now.  
And so it really makes me mad. …Like every time dad and I would have a 
coffee, he‟d always shout [pay for the coffee].  And I‟d try - „no, I‟ll get it, 
I‟ll get it‟, and he‟d be „no, no, no‟.  And that would make me feel like, poor?  
So I didn‟t like that either.‟   (Kayla, 27, Escort Worker) 
As shown in chapter three, the meaning of money to Kayla carries complexities 
related to her own childhood and family history.  Although she views money as 
„good‟; when her parents try to give her some, it makes her feel even more dependent, 
and even poorer than before.  The meaning of money for Kayla is not simply „good‟.  
While she overtly acknowledges her orientation towards money as a means to 
independence and lifestyle goals, the reality of the place that money has had in her 
life sits uneasily with this orientation due to the emotional, relational and physical 
pressures that come to bear on those meanings. 
It is clear therefore that while the static low-income participants may orient 
themselves towards money, it is not a straightforward orientation.  These participants 
demonstrate an often complicated and paradoxical relationship with money that draws 
on either the problems they have experienced with money in the past (whether 
through financial abuse, addictions, the social pressures associated with low-incomes, 
or the difficulties in making ends meet) or the current pressures of living under the 
poverty line with little expectation of change. 
7.5.2. Downplaying money 
The way that static low-income participants downplay money is also a departure from 
the transient low-income group in most respects.  One similarity is that like transient 
low-income participants, the reason that static low-income participants downplay 
money is also borne from the realities of living with a low-income.  However unlike 
the transient low-income group, static low-income participants do not downplay 
money from a sense of pragmatism because they have no reason to expect that their 
low-income is transient or short-term.  Rather, they downplay money because they 
cannot afford to think about money in any other way: 
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„Money‟s just fluff.  I‟ve never had much of it.  I can do pretty much without 
it.  I don‟t need to buy things that I like…I‟m living proof that I‟ll never have 
them.  All my clothes have been second-hand.  Yeah, it‟s, it‟s nice to have 
money so you can pay for things, but most things you don‟t need.‟   
        (Alvar, 30, Unemployed) 
„I‟m not a person that needs a lot of money, I don‟t think.   I don‟t aspire to 
own a big house anytime soon.  Just getting by, being as contented as 
possible.‟      (Anders, 24, Unemployed) 
„I will not buy anything new for myself.  Just nothing at all.  I like op-shops.  
I don‟t feel comfortable in new clothes at all - I really feel very out of place, 
very… undeserving.‟     (Jessica, 38, Part-time Student) 
These participants clearly express how few options they have with money.  With little 
money to spare beyond necessities (if that), one of the primary ways they relate to 
money is through the process of learning to do without it, thereby downplaying its 
importance in their lives as a matter of necessity.  Alvar does this by calling money 
„fluff‟ and Jessica by claiming that she really doesn‟t feel deserving of new clothes.  
However, downplaying money is not always just being dismissive of it: there are a 
number of cases where an almost positive spin is applied to their lack of financial 
resources.  Shaun and Alvar both testify to this: 
„It does feel a little hypocritical at times.  Because I do have it easy:  you 
hear so many stories about people and you‟ve just got to say, you know, my 
life is a piece of piss compared to so many thousands and thousands of 
people.‟       (Shaun, 24, Unemployed) 
„As much as I can complain about being unemployed and CentreLink n‟ stuff, 
I‟m much luckier than a lot of other people.  I‟ve got somewhere to live, a 
loving family, stuff like that.  I don‟t really have any problems financially 
because I‟m living in a family and [have] that support.‟   
      (Anders, 24, Unemployed) 
It can be argued that by downplaying the importance of money and not giving it a 
position of centrality in their lives, the static low-income are seeking to avoid (at the 
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interpersonal level at least) the „subjective sense of insufficiency‟ that Bauman 
(1998a: 41) insists accompanies relative deprivation.  By trivialising the importance 
of money and even finding ways to think positively about poverty, participants seek 
to also escape the humiliation of material insufficiency in a culture which elevates the 
„good‟ of money above many other values.  In other words, in a culture in which they 
feel defined as „insufficient‟, downplaying money is also an attempt to have control 
over how they define themselves. 
7.5.3. Stigma 
To avoid a sense of deficiency is to also evade the „stigma‟ associated with low-
income status.  Goffman (1963) defined „stigma‟ as humans limiting or reducing a 
person from a „whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one‟ - in a kind of 
„discrediting‟ because of an attribute that makes them different from others.  Stigma, 
Goffman wrote, is the „situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social 
acceptance‟(Goffman 1963: 3,i).   
The static low-income of this study feel that the attribute that disqualifies them from 
full social acceptance is their low-income.  It is important to note here that the 
transient low-income do not express this dilemma.  Their low-income status, 
particularly for the tertiary students, is legitimated and normalised as a valid means of 
attaining improved work options.  In this culture, work itself is a primary means to 
becoming accepted as a full member of society (Ezzy 2000: 199).  Warr (2005) 
outlines the effects of a diminished capacity for economic productivity amongst those 
living in poverty: 
Stigma is experienced as negative labelling and stereotyping and is practiced 
against those who are perceived to be outside of social norms.  Poverty tends 
to be construed as being outside of the usual, despite its unrelenting social 
presence.  The non-poor view poverty as a discrediting attribute because it 
supposedly reflects something about the deficient character or culture of 
those who are poor.     (Warr 2005: 199)  
All the static low-income participants in the study reflect in some way on the sense of 
inadequacy they feel related to their low-income, unemployment or welfare 
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dependent positions.   For example, Kayla talks indirectly about how she feels the 
gaze of the wealthier around her, making her feel somehow inadequate.  Talking of 
her son, she says: 
„I couldn‟t afford to buy him clothes, or school clothes.  His school doesn‟t 
care, like they don‟t mind, you can wear anything.  But it still made me feel 
bad because there was all these, you know, there‟s a lot of rich parents that 
go there.‟       (Kayla, 27, Escort Worker) 
Anders talks directly about the „stigma‟ of being unemployed: 
„I think there‟s the whole stigma of being unemployed.  Most of the people 
that I‟m friends with - that‟s not a problem or they don‟t‟ tease you about it, 
well they do but they don‟t really mean it.  But for me, it‟s a problem.  I‟ve 
always been a very proud person, and being unemployed …  It doesn‟t make 
you feel very good about yourself  when people ask you what you‟re doing 
and you don‟t know.  I don‟t like being unemployed.  Just because I feel that 
I‟ve got something to offer and that I want to be working.‟   
      (Anders, 24, Unemployed) 
Anders also has a sense that in being supported through unemployment benefits, he is 
somehow „owned‟ by society, that he is not completely his own, whole, man: 
„I had a dream, I actually thought that on my CentreLink form that I had to 
hand in was an option that I could sell some of my major organs.  So I could 
sell my eyes for three hundred and fifty dollars.  So I thought this is a great 
idea, you know.  Like this weird, „the unemployed and our spare parts‟, for 
the rest of society - and maybe that‟s how I feel.‟     
      (Anders, 24, Unemployed) 
Alvar tires of the social expectations to find work: 
„The only problem is other people … you know „when is Alvar going to get a 
job‟?  You know…family and anybody.‟     
       (Alvar, 30, Unemployed) 
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Jessica relates that for her, she feels as if she has had to „grovel‟ for everything she 
has needed, such as a place to rent and car to drive.  She also expresses that media 
and television advertising make her feel quite „inadequate‟ because she cannot 
provide her own family with any of its goods: „it really brings you down‟, she says.  
Jessica is also clear about how she thinks welfare agencies treat people who require 
their services: 
„I think it‟s degrading.  Yeah, I think we‟re branded as…just not a burden, 
but a hassle.‟      (Jessica, 38, Part-time Student) 
In these words, the static low-income participants show that they feel the weight of 
society judging them for their economic inadequacies.  They feel discredited because 
they cannot match up to the social expectations of other people or social agencies.  
This sense of being stigmatised is then transposed into and compounds the personal 
problems they experience and relate with money meanings.  Warr explains this 
clearly: 
In contemporary contexts of socio-economic disadvantage, where poverty is 
compellingly associated with being reliant on state welfare, diminished 
capacity for economic reciprocity is concomitant with low social value and 
becomes a discredited attribute.  The effects of stigma are translated into 
practical experiences, across a range of psychological, social, and material 
conditions (Link and Phelan 2001) and this serves to deepen and extend the 
difficulties that impoverished people experience.   (Warr 2005: 289) 
7.5.4. Public money orientations 
The sense of being stigmatised is not the only way these participants articulate how 
deeply they are affected by their low-income status.  The matters they raise in 
reference to political and moral money issues also draw on this reality.  Where the 
middle-income participants articulate a large range of political and moral dilemmas 
related to money, and the transient low-income tend to critique the excesses of the 
wealthy, the static low-income refer almost singularly to political and moral 
dilemmas directly associated with the power relations and social structures connected 
with their position as welfare recipients.  And if the transient low-income are more 
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frugal in their comments than the middle-income, the static low-income discussions 
about political and moral money issues are more scant than any group so far.  For 
example, both Kayla and Trevor make just one comment about monetary affairs at a 
political or moral level.  That is, they both acknowledge that the shift to a liberal 
government in Australia has negatively impacted their welfare needs - or as Trevor 
notes, the extent to which „welfare looked after me‟.  Alvar, Shaun and Anders are all 
scathing of the government because of its economic focus, and, in Alvar‟s words, for 
„favouring the rich or big business‟ and „taking away defence for the little people‟.  
And Jessica talks about only one or two politically related issues; again associated 
with her own money experiences: 
„I‟m not really up to speed on much of it.  Because I couldn‟t even keep 
track of it anyway.  And I don‟t trust them, I really don‟t.  I generally don‟t 
trust males at all.  And the majority of them are males. … I mean, they‟re all 
going to change their views.  They change their minds.  Yeah it was great 
John Howard gave us the baby bonus and the incentive to have more 
children.  And the six hundred dollars per child which came in very handy I 
might add.‟    (Jessica, 38, Part-time Student) 
Similarly, discussion is scant on the subject of their own role in the social sphere.  
There is no comment at all from Shaun and Trevor.  Alvar and Anders mention the 
odd dabble in volunteer organisations such as the Wilderness Society, and Kayla 
admits that emotionally she feels she has been unable to help others at all.  Likewise, 
Jessica feels constrained even in her ability to financially help out her own family 
members – although she says that she would, if she could.  Asked if she would like to 
change anything in the world around her, Jessica offers a response that shows clearly 
how far political and social issues are removed from the realities of surviving 
everyday life with little money: 
„I don‟t think I would like to have that choice.  I think that I would be too 
afraid to make the wrong choice, or that I left someone out.  I don‟t know 
what I would change. Because there are so many things.  I mean you could 
say famine, or you could say, just for one day everybody had enough to eat, 
or could have what they wanted to eat.  Heck, I suppose that‟d be alright. 
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But, I don‟t know.  I don‟t know. I‟ve never thought about it.‟   
      (Jessica, 38, Part-time Student) 
7.5.5. Static low-income futures 
Where discussion about the future is central to both middle-income and transient low-
income participants, its relative absence from static low-income discussions is a final 
point to make about this group. 
For static low-income earners, the future is - at best - vague.  Anders is the most 
articulate about his future.  He desires to have his own family and perhaps one day 
become a home owner.  But given his present unemployment circumstance, he can‟t 
see the reality of this and it worries him.  Jessica is less forthcoming.  When asked 
about the future, she replies that she „never really thought that far‟ and that if 
anything, she would like to be „financially ok‟.  When Trevor is asked if he thinks at 
all about the future he similarly replies „No, not really…no, I just think to the next 
payday‟.  The other participants respond with only small degrees of difference.  Both 
Shaun and Alvar equate the future in terms of attempting not to „worry‟ about it: 
„I don‟t really worry that much about the future. … No, I don‟t really think, I 
don‟t think I can really afford to think much about the future.‟   
       (Shaun, 24, Unemployed) 
„It doesn‟t worry me.  I‟ve never been a worrier.  I don‟t fret. … I think I 
tend to take everyday or every task or whatever… you know, so you can see 
that you‟re doing something.  Nothing too far ahead, you know, I 
concentrate on the task at hand.  I find that works.‟ (Alvar, 30, Unemployed) 
Orrange pinpoints the anxiety that both Shaun and Alvar express in relation to the 
future: 
Through the life plan, individuals plan what they will do and who they will 
be; it links one‟s past, present and (projected) future together into an 
overarching meaning.  However, the life plan is typically only loosely 
defined or open-ended.  Plans that are too exacting can lead to frustration, 
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while plans that are overly vague can lead to anxiety.   
       (Orrange 2003: 8) 
Where the present is no guide to the future, the only way to avoid its uncertainty for 
Shaun and Alvar is to not think about the future. However, the unease felt about a 
vague future is not the only problematic issue here, it also relates to the reason why 
the future is so vague.  Shaun articulates it by saying he can‟t afford to think about the 
future.  Shaun doesn‟t mean he figuratively can‟t afford this – he means he literally 
cannot afford to think about the future.  These participants articulate the possibility 
that with no money, the future becomes fuzzy, vague, and uncertain.  Kayla also 
articulates how closely related money and the future are in her experience: 
„It‟s a horrible feeling to be struggling at everything.  And financially, it‟s 
really hard.  Because you know, there‟s no light at the end of the tunnel.‟  
      (Kayla, 27, Escort Worker) 
Envisaging her life through the analogy of a tunnel set before her; Kayla likens a 
moneyless life to a dark, meaningless journey with a future that has no light or shape.  
To Kayla, money gives light.  Continuing her vivid money imagery, she goes on to 
say that „money is like an expansion - it means I can go beyond any limitation‟.  To 
Kayla, money serves to illuminate her future and provide her with a powerful sense of 
agency.  Without it, like all the other static low-income participants, the future is 
burdened with uncertainty and as a consequence, often intentionally ignored. 
Notably therefore, amongst the static low-income is a „future‟ theme not identified by 
Brannen and Nilsen in their study of future orientations amongst young people 
(Brannen and Nilsen 2002).  For the static low-income participant of this study, the 
future is not deferred, adaptable, or predictable.  At most, the future is vague and 
unpredictable, if it is anything at all.   
Conclusion 
The issues confronted by low-income participants in this study indicate that it is 
impossible to generalise money meanings based on income levels.  The source of 
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income - and the social legitimacy of that source - are equally important factors that 
demarcate significant differences between the transient and the static low-income 
participants of this study.  While there are general similarities such as deference to 
money as „good‟ and worth orienting themselves towards and the general 
downplaying of money in their discussions, as generalisations they are only given real 
clarity in their own group contexts.  For example, the money downplaying of the 
transient low-income participant is a pragmatic approach to coping with the short-
term nature of their low-income status.  For the static low-income participants on the 
other hand, such downplaying comes as a matter of necessity and a means to further 
avoid the sense of inadequacy that accompanies the stigma of being unemployed or 
living in poverty.  
The primary difference between transient low-income participants and their static 
compatriots is their ability to see and plan their future.  The transient low-income 
group understand their low-income to be short-term, and are actively planning to 
secure employment and an income upon the completion of their studies.  They see 
their present low-income as worth the current income sacrifice in return for more 
favourable job prospects in the future.  Accordingly, these participants talk about 
money in future terms that closely resemble the dominant money narrative central to 
middle-income money meanings.  On the other hand, the static low-income 
participants do not anticipate their low-income as short-term: it appears indefinite.  
As such, their present provides no guide for their future.  Akin to Nowotny‟s (1994) 
idea of  the „extended present‟, 
…the future is taken into the here and now.  It loses its meaning, in the sense 
that people are unable to think about the long term much less plan for it.  
Lived experience is imprisoned in an all pervasive extended present.  
    (Nowotny in Brannen and Nilsen 2002: 517) 
The differences between the transient and static low-income participants in this 
category place them in different narrative domains.  The following chapter tracks 
these two narratives: first the deferred money narrative of the transient low-income 
participants, followed by the flawed money narrative characterising the stories of the 
static low-income participants.  While they share the experience of a low-income, 
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their narrative forms show how dissimilar they are: the former sharing a common 
storyline with the dominant money narrative, whilst the latter struggles to maintain a 
linear storyline at all.  The concluding comments will highlight that despite their 
differences, all three narratives so far live in the shadow of one: the dominant money 
narrative. 
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8. Chapter Eight: Low-Income Money 
Narratives 
 
8.1. Introduction 
Two types of stories, or narratives, follow from low-income participants‟ 
understandings of money.  First, transient low-income earners draw heavily on the 
middle-income dominant money narrative despite being in financial positions 
correspondent to the static low-income.  As a result of being so closely related, the 
transient low-income narratives parallel the dominant money narrative but with one 
necessary shift.  They tell a story about a deferred money narrative: where deference 
is given to the expectation of a dominant money narrative despite its absence in their 
current experience. 
The second storying theme is of the static low-income, whose experience of money 
plots a starkly different narrative.  These participants have no choice but to live 
without achieving the preferred cultural dominant money narrative, and themselves 
identify a „non-fit‟ between their money meanings and their circumstances.  
Consequently, they lived within a flawed money narrative.   
8.2. A deferred money narrative 
There are two critical dimensions to the storyline of the transient low-income.  The 
first is the deference that these participants pay to the dominant money narrative.  
There is a strong sense of „moving‟ in an obvious direction: towards a life defined by 
„good‟ work, higher incomes and the well-being (material, physical and emotional) 
that flow from it.  The second, but less emphasised dimension is the present: the 
necessity to improve career options through education and the low-income lifestyle 
that currently accompanies it.  In this dimension, their diminished income is 
pragmatically downplayed as „necessary‟ to the eventual achievement of the 
dominant money goals. 
Consequently, the narrative central to transient low-income participants is described 
as a „deferred‟ money narrative.  Their stories do not dwell on their low-income or the 
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downplaying of money.  Rather, their stories emphasis a temporally forward-moving 
focus directed towards the „goods‟ found in a dominant money narrative.  In other 
words, the storyline of the transient low-income defers to the principles of the 
dominant money narrative even when participation in it is withheld for now.   
8.2.1. Temporal realities and perceptions 
Education 
The structure of the deferred money narrative highlights a complex interrelation of 
temporal realities and perceptions about the present and future.  The first relates in 
most cases to the role of current education to the opening up of future opportunities 
central to a dominant money narrative.  The story draws on the actual and perceived 
economic outcomes associated with improved education, in particular that it plays a 
pivotal role in both career opportunities and young people‟s futures (Miles 2000: 41).  
As Ross and Willigan (1997) note: 
We conclude that education gives people access to non-alienated paid work 
and economic resources that, along with schooling itself, increase the sense 
of control over life and explain much of education‟s positive effect on 
psychological well-being.   (Ross and Willigan 1997: 291) 
Central to the deferred money narrative is the sense that the time spent improving 
knowledge skills through education in the present will reap direct economic rewards 
in the future.  Recall Stuart‟s expression of education as a calculated „investment‟ 
through which his projected income would double in six or seven years.  
Consequently, the current reality of living on a low-income is constructed as central 
to increasing the likelihood of achieving a dominant money narrative in the future.   
However, education plays a role greater than just calculating a raised future income.  
Future income possibilities are also linked to a sense of livelihood and a sense of 
„legitimacy‟ that confirms a person‟s location as an „adult‟ in society (Wilson and 
Wyn 1987: 4).  It also establishes a sense of self-esteem.  When Stuart insists that he 
is not happy to remain on a small government supplement throughout his degree, „just 
to go back and be what I was‟, he is referencing his desire to „make‟ something of 
himself.  This „making‟ is part of who he envisages himself to become through the 
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education pathway – something more than what he was.  Bellah et al. comment on 
this perception: 
 The demand to “make something of yourself” through work is one that 
Americans coming of age hear as often from themselves as from others.  It 
encompasses several notions of work and of how it bears on who we are.  In 
the sense of a “job” work is a way of making money and making a living.  It 
supports a self defined by economic success, security and all that money can 
buy.  In the sense of a “career”, work traces one‟s progress through life by 
achievement and advancement in an occupation.  It yields a self defined by a 
broader sort of success, which takes in social standing and prestige, and by a 
sense of expanding power and competency that renders work itself a source 
of self-esteem.       (Bellah et al. 1996: 65-6)   
Consequently, while the deferred money narrative emphasises the future, the 
necessity of the present role of education is pivotal to the direction of that future: 
paving the perceived way toward a dominant money narrative that involves both 
„good‟ income, „good‟ work (as livelihood) and the self-esteem that is given through 
it. 
The ideal of social contribution 
There is another way that the reality of the present affects judgements about the future 
in the deferred money storyline.  Central to the deferred money narrative is a story 
about the reality of low-income living juxtaposed continually with a future-oriented 
desire to live a dominant money narrative.  In other words, the perceived or envisaged 
future looks quite different to the present.  This disjuncture has implications 
particularly for the way value-conflicts are integrated into participants‟ stories.  
Recall the recurring theme of participants‟ ideals towards social justice.  For example, 
Virgil dreams of building a city in Africa, and Mondi desires to change a bank from 
the inside by working in its philanthropic arm.  Here, it is clear that the reality of 
living on a low-income brings the moral issues of poverty into clearer focus for them.  
While they are not socially active, they determine that with access to more money 
they themselves could – and perhaps will - change the world. 
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However, the future-oriented emphasis on the dominant money narrative leaves little 
room for the actualisation of such ideals.  Moderate material aspirations, including a 
comfortable home environment, travel, retirement, and lifestyle leisures, are part of 
their prospective futures.  While social change is also added to this list of material 
aspirations, such idealism is missing from the dominant money narrative itself: 
middle-income participants reflect this reality.  In a study on the relationship between 
income and happiness, Easterlin explains how an income shift accompanies changed 
material aspirations:  
Judgements of well-being at any particular points in time are based on the 
material aspirations prevailing at that time.  As a result, people tend to 
evaluate past lower-incomes less favourable than they did when they were 
actually in that situation and had lower aspirations.  Similarly, they judge 
prospective higher income situations more favourable than when they 
actually are in those situations, because they fail to anticipate the rise in 
material aspirations that will come with the growth in income.  
       (Easterlin 2001: 481) 
Consequently, the deferred money narrative, grappling with low-income living, can 
envisage an increased income as engaging with personal material desires and utilising 
income for the good of others.  Central to the deferred storyline is the aspiration that 
to have more money is to do more „good‟ for self and others.  However, the fact that 
the dominant money narrative (to which they aspire) has little room for social 
contribution of this kind means that, as Easterlin notes above, increased incomes are 
most likely accompanied with a rise in personal material aspirations.  The dominant 
money narrative, for example, is strongly oriented towards the „good‟ of personal 
money for personal use, and quite ambivalent – even quite disconnected – from 
responsibility towards social goals.  In other words, higher incomes do not necessarily 
provide people with the extra money needed to activate social contribution.  Nor does 
additional income fuel idealism to drive social contribution, because as incomes grow, 
so do personal material aspirations with them.  Again, regardless of having a low-
income or middle-income, there is little room for the ideal of contribution towards 
wider social goals. 
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As a reflection on both the deferred and dominant narrative, it is clear that both 
narratives perceive an orientation towards money as providing independence, choice, 
lifestyle options and future opportunities.  However, the deferred narrative provides 
an interesting insight into the fact that the independence, choice, and future 
opportunities identified in the dominant money narrative are not unconstrained.  
Rather, they are constrained by their moral orientation towards money: freedom is 
financial freedom, independence is financial self-reliance; choice is related to 
financial options and future opportunities are pecuniary-related ones.  Again, the 
privileging of one „good‟ above others – money - means that stories become 
increasingly invulnerable to the moral conflicts arising from those stories.  Put 
another way, it reiterates that self-reflexivity - although strongly advocated in the 
idealism of the deferred money narrative – continues to be constrained in the 
dominant money narrative despite higher real incomes. 
8.3. The flawed money narrative of the static low-income 
8.3.1. Interpreting the title 
I have named the static low-income narrative a „flawed‟ money narrative.  The reason 
for this title is two-fold.  First, these participants are very aware of the preferred 
cultural dominant money narrative and that in relation to it, society views their own 
stories as somehow deficient.  In particular, they identify the stigma associated with 
being unemployed or poor as the product of a social gaze they feel because they 
cannot conform to the social norms of the dominant money narrative.  Thus, pushed 
up against cultural money standards, they perceive that their own money narrative is 
flawed.  Second, at a deeper personal level, these participants also communicate that 
something is „wrong‟ or inadequate about the way they relate to money: it is in 
constant tension with their needs and always disappointing their desires.  Again, they 
feel as if their fundamental relationship with money, at present, is flawed. 
The meaning of the flawed money narrative is also congruent to Bauman‟s 
description of the „flawed consumer‟ (Bauman 1998a: 38).  Bauman uses the 
benchmark of the consuming society to argue that poverty, which constitutes the 
exclusion from „normal life‟ and the chances of achieving it, is increasingly defined 
by the inability to consume.  In other words, those who live in poverty are „flawed 
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consumers‟.  The description of the underclass as flawed has not been without its 
critics in the social sciences.  In particular, this language has been accused of 
compounding the image of the poor as a „problem‟ through an overly moralistic 
classification of the poor as flawed.  For example, Hayward and Yar (2006: 15) 
identify the „construction of a new social marginality‟ or an underclass vilified on the 
basis of consumption aesthetics, where terms such as „flawed consumer‟ serve to 
continue the classification of the underclass as somehow pathological.  
While acknowledging this critique, I maintain the title, „flawed‟, for this narrative.  
First, the title is a reflection on how the participants describe themselves, rather than  
my „labelling‟ of them.  In their sense of being cast outside from the „normal‟ because 
of an economic deficiency, they feel somehow discredited and denied full social 
acceptance because they cannot fulfil, or even plan to fulfil, the criteria of a dominant 
money narrative.  As such, the title of „flawed money narrative‟ is not moralistic 
research classification, it is a narrative self-identification.   
As a narrative self-identification, the title also indicates a social issue that is important 
not to overlook: that a group of people describe themselves as flawed.  This title is 
intended to give voice to those who are often silenced due to their lack of social 
influence.  Feeling flawed is a social issue, not a personal characteristic.  This is 
because when culturally preferred dispositions towards money follow the dominant 
money narrative to the point where those who cannot achieve it genuinely feel flawed, 
it points to a social issue regarding cultural preferences, not the poor. 
8.3.2. The flawed money narrative  
Temporal themes lie at the heart of the flawed money narrative, informing most of the 
indicators that make the narrative recognisable.  One of the most significant themes in 
this narrative corroborates Nowotny‟s (1994) idea of the „extended present‟, where 
the future loses meaning because people are unable to think about it or plan for it.  
Rather, experiences are held captive in an inescapable, „extended present‟ (Nowotny 
in Brannen and Nilsen 2002: 517).  Many of the themes in this narrative reflect such a 
reality: a present that looms large and pervading and a future that recedes in vague 
uncertainty.  In particular, the stories of the flawed narrative contrast with the 
dominant money narrative in relation to the everyday rhythms of work, rest and play, 
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which reflect the „extended present‟ rather than an orientation towards the future.  In 
addition, the way the story downplays money and incorporates money conflicts, such 
as stigma, also draw upon these themes. 
Work, rest and play 
The daily experiences of work, rest and play so closely oriented with the dominant 
money narrative shift perspective in this narrative.  For example, in the flawed money 
narrative there is an indication that work, like the other narratives, represents a central 
means to earn money and be involved in a dominant money narrative.  However, a 
lack of work means that rather than experiencing work as a means to open future 
possibilities, it represents unfulfilled desire and the frustration of a vague future.   
Because there is no work, there is also no means to an income, and consequently no 
promise of financial independence.  For example, Ezzy notes that Simmel‟s emphasis 
on the imagined future use of money is,  
…consistent with the observed significance of imagined futures in all forms 
of job loss narratives.  The possession of money, or the assurance that a 
person will be paid, sustains the plausibility of their imagined future.  
        (Ezzy 2000: 226) 
Consequently in a flawed money narrative, work, as an unfulfilled desire, compounds 
the frustrations of the present.  „Rest‟ too, orients a flawed money narrative to the 
present rather than the future.  In a dominant money narrative, rest refers to comfort 
and provisions enabled through money.  In a flawed money narrative, the frustration 
is two-fold.  There is only a little money, and thus the extra comfort or provision that 
„rest‟ could embody is not available to be looked forward to.  Moreover, being 
unemployed forces a culture of rest or inactivity that is regretted by most participants:  
„And part of wanting to get work for me is wanting to put my money where 
my mouth is; wanting to do something.  So I‟m not just sitting back 
complaining, doing nothing constructive.‟ (Anders, 24, Unemployed) 
In a flawed money narrative, participants embody a different relationship with time 
and space.  Brannen and Nilsen, drawing on Bauman (1998b), explain this in the 
following way:    
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Access to resources of space and time are differentiated and shaped by 
relationships to the labour market.  For those with access to the world of 
work and those outside it, space and time become transformed into 
qualitatively different types of resources.  Thus those in the „first world‟ – 
the world of work, - live in time, albeit they feel constantly short of it, while 
space is not important to them because they can transcend it.  In contrast, 
those in the „second world‟ – the world without work – are constrained by 
the space they inhabit and have an excess of time.     
      (Brannen and Nilsen 2002: 518) 
Confined to the present with an excess of time, those experiencing a flawed money 
narrative also find their „play‟ restricted.  As Brannen and Nilsen note above, they are 
„constrained by the space they inhabit‟; they cannot transcend it as those who work 
can.  Both Anders and Shaun for example, desire to travel.  There is little expectation 
of such „play‟ however, for there is no income to fund its reality.  Again, confined in 
space they are also „stuck‟ in the present, without future lifestyle goals to plan.   
Therefore the experiences of work, rest and play amongst those in a flawed money 
narrative contribute to a central temporal theme in its storyline: the tendency to 
elaborate on the present and ignore (intentionally or otherwise) the future. 
8.4. Comments on low-income narratives 
It is clear that despite their low-income similarities, the two low-income narratives 
have little common ground.  It is important to return to Frank‟s comment here that 
stories always „mix and weave different narrative threads‟ and that offering narratives 
is a means by which to „sort out those threads‟ (Frank 1995: 76).  So far, there are 
three narrative threads in this thesis: the dominant money narrative, the deferred 
money narrative, and the flawed money narrative.  Increasingly it has become evident 
that the dominant money narrative is authoritative.  Its threads are far reaching and 
weave their way through the other narratives in greater or lesser degrees.   
To a larger degree, the dominant money narrative threads its way through the deferred 
money narrative.  Of course, the latter has its own, idiosyncratic threads such as the 
need to hold off on plans related to the dominant money narrative, as well as engage 
with the complexities and ambiguities related to living on a low-income.  However, 
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largely drawing on the dominant money narrative, it has a relatively linear, future-
focussed storyline and overarching moral orientation towards the „good‟ of personal 
money.  Consequently, many of the observations made about the dominant money 
narrative also generally apply to the deferred money narrative.  To avoid repetition, 
the comments of this section will focus largely on the second low-income narrative, 
the flawed money narrative. 
A primary observation about the flawed money narrative is that it cannot be defined, 
as the other narratives are, in terms of a linearly directed storyline.  Rather, it is a 
narrative in which the present is heavy or bunched, with only hesitant or vague 
indications of where life‟s journey direction might lead.  Even then, a consistent 
return to the present interrupts the storyline.  Another set of stories recognised for its 
lack of narrative order is Frank‟s „chaos narrative‟. In listening to different illness 
stories, Frank says of the „chaos narrative‟: 
Events are told as the storyteller experiences life: without sequence or 
discernable causality.  The lack of any coherent sequence is an initial reason 
why chaos stories are hard to hear; the teller is not understood as telling a 
„proper‟ story.  But more significantly, the teller of the chaos story is not 
heard to be living a „proper‟ life, since in life as in story, one event is 
expected to lead to another.  Chaos negates that expectation.    
        (Frank 1995: 97) 
The flawed money narrative is not entirely a „chaos‟ story.  In Frank‟s meaning chaos 
stories are actually „anti-narratives‟ because they have no sequence at all, and in true 
illness chaos, words cannot even begin to convey the depth of all that is wrong (Frank 
1995: 99).  On the other hand, there are significant parallels between Frank‟s chaos 
narrative and a flawed money narrative.  If not entirely without sequence, the flawed 
money narrative is nevertheless constantly interrupted.  For example, when asked 
about whether he has future aspirations, Alvar replies: 
„I‟d like to have a cat and a dog I think.  We‟re not allowed to have any pets 
where we live.  We‟re not terribly sure where we‟re going to be either.  Yeah, 
a small dog.  [Girlfreind] wants a cat, I want a dog.  But plans…no.‟  
        (Alvar, 30, Unemployed) 
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Alvar has no real answer to this question.  He begins by naming a desire, which he 
soon realises is just as uncertain as anything else in his future.  He returns to the 
desire nevertheless, and plays with it a moment.  Finally, Alvar admits that he has no 
plans.  Like the chaos narrative, narrative sequence in the flawed money narrative is 
tentative, interrupting itself and tending to bunch the present and turn away from the 
future.  „Narratives‟, writes Mairs (in Frank 1995) „possess the shortcoming that they 
drive towards ends, preferably tidy ones‟.  Interruptions shift the narrative direction 
from these ends, giving them a „confusing or inconsistent quality‟ (Frank 1995: 58).  
The construction of „work, rest and play‟ in the dominant money narrative, for 
example, are driven towards „tidy‟ ends: work has a purpose, to be „good‟ work and 
provide an income.  Rest and play fall into „proper‟ place: money provides a means to 
think about comfort, lifestyle desires and future ends.  This quality is lacking in the 
flawed money narrative: work is frustrated, and rest and play lose their self-fulfilling 
qualities in the direction-less present in which they exist.   
Another likeness to the chaos narrative is what Frank calls the „overdetermination‟ of 
problems, as if the troubles of being ill extend to every kind of trouble.  In a flawed 
money narrative, this overdetermination extends to money troubles.  Jessica, in 
speaking of money says: 
„It does cause me a lot of worry, because I don‟t like money, and I don‟t like 
owing people money.  And my father bought us up with a very strong belief 
that money is evil and it‟s no good.  And you work yourself to death and 
you‟ve still got nothing.  Well, he did, you know.  So I really don‟t like owing 
people money.  I don‟t like not being able to pay for things that we need, like 
food.  It is a worry.  I worry constantly about it.  Yeah.  So we walk where 
we need to, we don‟t go to the city unless we have to.  You know.  I don‟t do 
a lot of things.‟     (Jessica, 38, Part-time Student) 
Here, as in Frank‟s chaos narrative, is a sense that these problems are only the 
beginning of Jessica‟s money troubles.  It is a narrative that feeds off a lack of control: 
Jessica is insistent and repetitive („and, and‟ or „I don‟t, I don‟t) as if she lives in an 
„incessant present‟ with no future to look forward to (Frank 1995: 99).  As Frank 
notes, there is a cultural dislike of these stories because they are such difficult stories 
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to listen to.  Within this type of story is the sense that the storyteller is not telling a 
„proper‟ story, nor living a „proper‟ life (Frank 1995: 97).  Rather, the money „flaws‟ 
are repetitive and bared open by the storytellers themselves. 
Furthermore, Frank argues that „society looks at people in chaos and cannot see them 
as part of the social body‟ (Frank 1995: 113).  In a narrative whose boundaries of 
inclusion involve a strong orientation towards money as 'good‟, along with its future-
oriented „tidy-ends‟, the dominant money narrative gives little room to a flawed 
money narrative.  While it may acknowledge the problem of poverty and offer 
structural solutions, the dominant money narrative has no personal connection with 
being poor.  Moreover, it (at best) marginalises any personal response or involvement 
with the poor.  It is clear that different money narratives are implicated in social 
discrimination, and in the possible undermining of social belonging: 
Individuality and difference result from the unique place that each person 
has in the social structure – how they belong to the society; structured 
inequality ensures that difference becomes a basis of discrimination and for 
the allocation of a less share of the rewards of the society – one‟s sense of 
belonging is perpetually at risk.   (Wilson and Wyn 1987: 101) 
It is here that the deep antagonism existing between these two narratives in particular 
are shown for what they are.  They are not merely different narratives drawing from 
different life experiences with little relationship between them.  These narratives (and 
for that matter, the deferred money narrative also) exist in a society where the 
dominant money narrative is culturally preferred and privileged over any other.  As 
Seabrook points out, those in poverty do not live in an alternative culture to the 
wealthy, rather they inhabit a world that is constructed around benefiting those with 
money (Seabrook 1982).  Undoubtedly, the moral orientation towards money as 
„good‟ means that for those without access to the means for that „good‟ there is 
something wrong or flawed about their lack. 
Put another way, Bauman (2001a) argues that living in a consumer society means that 
all calculation, measurement, evaluation and status are based upon standards oriented 
towards consumer lifestyles.  Indignity thus comes to be seen (and felt) as an inability 
to participate or to muster effort and resources towards the consumer goal - and hence 
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such members are viewed as „flawed consumers‟.  In a consumer society, indignity is 
placed entirely in the lap of the flawed consumer.  Bauman argues that it doesn‟t 
make any economic sense to invest in the poor, as all assistance is an act of individual 
charity and a further indignity to the receiver.  There is no means for dignity for the 
flawed consumer in a consumer society.  And, asks Bauman, „what can they possibly 
dream of?‟: 
Of becoming rich and so earning the dignity owed solely to the flawless 
consumers.  The rich are not enemies, but examples.  Not hate figures, but 
idols.       (Bauman 2001a: 118) 
It would not be surprising to find that being poor with no means of attaining a 
dominant money narrative is an occasion for what Frank calls a „narrative wreckage‟ 
(Frank 1995: 68).  Against the moral standards and cultural dispositions of a 
dominant money narrative, those in poverty are flawed and often alone.  They inhabit 
a narrative in which their storyline is jagged and interrupted, and fades quickly 
beyond the present.  Reflecting on a time when financial difficulty drove her to escort 
work, Kayla recalls a time of „narrative wreckage‟: 
„…there was just no meaning in my life at that stage.  There was no point to 
it, everything was hopeless, helpless and completely devoid of meaning.  I 
had no meaning.  Everything that was happening was just…wrong.  It‟s hard 
to explain.‟    (Kayla, 27, Escort Worker) 
However, whilst Bauman asserts that nothing can be done to alleviate the stigma of 
the flawed consumer (Bauman 1998a: 40), Frank argues for the need to honour chaos 
stories: 
Until the chaos narrative can be honoured, the world in all its possibilities is 
being denied.  To deny a chaos story is to deny the person telling this story, 
and people who are being denied cannot be cared for. (Frank 1995: 109) 
The same can be said of the flawed money narrative.  This story is one reality in a 
culture where multiple narrative threads weave their way through one governing story: 
the dominant money narrative.  To deny the flawed their stories is to contribute to the 
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indignity of the storyteller, to deny care for the poor, and risk remaining blind to the 
price humanity pays for its often single-minded deference to money. 
Conclusion 
One more narrative remains to be discussed.  The fourth narrative uncovers a new 
complexity that engages with a critique of the dominant money narrative coupled 
with an active reflection on the flawed money narrative.  In this narrative the place of 
„choice‟ in relation to the „good‟ life is significant and provides fertile ground for 
further discussion about how young adults engage with value conflicts. 
Previous to the fourth narrative however, the next chapter analyses themes arising 
from money meanings and moral orientations towards money by the final participant 
category of this thesis: the downshifters. 
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9. Chapter Nine: “Accumulating too much 
money? I‟d have to think about all my 
priorities”46 - The Money Meanings and 
Moral Orientations of Downshifters 
 
9.1. Introduction 
Marjorie is an intentional downshifter.  Having moved from a double income lifestyle 
in Sydney to a semi-rural dwelling in southern Tasmania, Marjorie and her family of 
four live on an income she considers on the poverty line (her own income is around 
$8,000 per annum).  Marjorie acknowledges the financial difficulties of the choice her 
family have made, but is positive about their decision: 
„…we try to be cautious in our finances.  We make our own bread; we eat as 
much as we can from our own garden.  We‟ve got spinach, we‟ve got chook 
eggs, you know.  You just deal with what you‟ve got.‟      
      (Marjorie, 35, Part-time Student) 
Family quality of life is the most important thing for Marjorie, which often means 
being creative with little money.  They eat from their own garden, she and her 
husband home-school their children, and place a high emphasis on family health.  
Marjorie acknowledges the sacrifices her family makes to continue living as 
downshifters, for example recently her family had to forgo a holiday because the car 
broke down.  Furthermore, having little money means she doesn‟t think about future 
goals - like expanding her garden - because there is no money to dream with.  Thus 
for Marjorie, money is useful but sidelined in her decision-making about what leads 
to a „good life‟. 
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 Hannah, downshifter. 
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In some way, every downshifter represented in this last category group has made the 
long-term decision, like Marjorie, to re-orient their lifestyles through intentionally 
lowering their income.  This third category comprises ten participants, including 5 
males and 5 females.  The oldest is 36 years and the youngest is 25, with the average 
age of the group being 29.6 years.  All but one downshifting participant has a tertiary 
education, and that one participant is completing TAFE studies.  The income range 
amongst the group is wide: half of the participants lie within the income range of 
$36,000 - $45,000 (and thus in income are more closely aligned to the middle-income 
group), and the other half live well below this figure with a number living on less 
than $15,000 per annum (and thus in income are more closely aligned with the low-
income group).  The average income of the group is $28,000.  The group is also 
representative of a wide range of occupations primarily within the white-collar sector.  
A majority of participants are professionals including a physiotherapist, architect, 
accountant, engineer, lawyer, social worker, musician and nurse; whilst two female 
participants (both with dependents) are primary carers also engaged in part-time work, 
and one participant is voluntarily unemployed.  Six participants are buying their own 
homes, three are renting, and one participant is living with family.  All participants 
have travelled within Australia, most overseas.  For a full list of downshifter 
participant characteristics, see appendix one, table three. 
9.2. Defining downshifting 
The history of terms and definitions associated with „downshifting‟ include 
„voluntary simplicity‟, „cultural creatives‟, „downshifters‟ and in Australia, even „sea-
change‟ (Hamilton and Mail 2003).  While each term carries its own nuances, the 
commonality to each is the voluntary desire to live more simply.  Early recognition of 
lifestyle changes toward simplicity (as early as the late 19th century) are described as 
„voluntary simplicity‟, a term refined and established in research and the media 
particularly through the 1980‟s (Hamilton and Mail 2003: 7). 
In 2002 Johnson and Burton analysed close to 30 works (published between 1977 and 
2001 inclusive) that included definitions of „voluntary simplicity‟ (Johnston and 
Burton 2002).  Through qualitative content analysis, they identified fifteen major 
themes of the voluntary simplicity movement or lifestyle.  They include: the 
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voluntary nature of the lifestyle and its choice as a way of life; the „good life‟ 
identified as finding fulfilment and satisfaction; a focus on life purpose, simple and 
plain living (including material simplicity), ecological awareness, personal growth, 
minimal consumption, human scale and valued relationships; an orientation towards 
the „chosen life‟ (or self-reflection/awareness) and self-determination; and shifts in 
work attitudes towards either less work or more fulfilling work (Johnston and Burton 
2002: 9-11). 
„Downshifting‟, a term first coined in New York in 1994, is a more recent and 
increasingly common term used to describe the voluntary shift to simpler living.  The 
Australia Institute defines „downshifting‟ more narrowly than the broad range of 
themes found in „voluntary simplicity‟ by Johnson and Burton..  According to the 
Institute, „downshifting‟ refers to the voluntary decision by people to affect long-term 
lifestyle changes that include a significant reduction in their income and decreased 
consumption (Hamilton and Mail 2003: 8).  Motivations for downshifting are varied, 
including:  personal reasons, for example greater personal fulfilment, escaping 
growing work pressures, bettering family relationships or health reasons; and 
principled reasons such as concern for the poor or the global/local environment.  The 
most accurate indication of how many Australians are downshifters comes from a 
2002 news poll commissioned by The Australia Institute.  As the first comprehensive 
quantitative study of downshifters in Australia47,  the results indicated that almost a 
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 The Australia Institute Study commissioned Newspoll to conduct a national opinion survey in 2001.  
981 respondents, aged between 30 to 59 years old, were sampled for representativeness of the whole 
Australian population.  The results indicated that downshifting is greater in Australia than was 
anticipated by The Australian Institute (2003). 
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quarter (23%) of Australians between the ages of 30 and 59 have downshifted in the 
previous decade (Hamilton and Mail 2003: 13).48   
Young et al. note that most research (although not all) shows downshifters to be well 
educated, relatively wealthy and have professional skills (Young et al. 2004: 78).  In 
this study, downshifting participants are indeed well educated with a range of 
professional skills, however are not wealthy (although a small number have shifted 
from higher middle-incomes).  The participants of this study are more aligned with 
participants in the study conducted through The Australia Institute (Hamilton 2004: 6) 
whose findings contest existing research claims that downshifters are only the ones 
that can „afford to take the risk‟ because of their accumulated assets.  As already 
demonstrated, while a few downshifters have moved from relatively high earning 
incomes (e.g. as high as $70,000 per annum), most have not. Furthermore, the 
average downshifter in this study currently earns marginally above a low-income at 
$28,000.  
The simple criterion for downshifting in this study is the participant‟s decision to 
earn less income in order to improve quality in some other area of life.  For example, 
in this study, most participants have moved from full-time to part-time work, for 
motivations that include spending more time with family and children or having more 
time for personal development in areas external to work skills.  A number of 
participants continue to work full-time but have intentionally chosen far lower paying 
jobs motivated by the social contribution they allow in contrast to the higher paying 
work they may have chosen.  At the time of interview, one participant has pulled out 
of high paying work altogether in order to invest time into reconsidering future, less 
materially driven work and career options.  Thus, a broad range of the personal and 
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 Note this definition of „downshifter‟ is a narrow one, and includes only long-term life changes, and 
excludes reduced incomes on the basis of starting a business, refusing a promotion, returning to study or 
maternity leave. 
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principled motivations for downshifting identified by The Australia Institute are also 
found within this participant group.  
Therefore, the privileging of alternative life qualities over material wealth by 
participants in this study tends to be more closely aligned in definition to recent 
downshifting trends in Australia since the mid-1990‟s rather than the broader historic 
definitions associated with „voluntary simplicity‟.  As such, the participants of this 
category have been defined as „downshifters‟ and not as practitioners of „voluntary 
simplicity‟.   
Nevertheless, it is not the intention of this thesis to analyse how the participants in 
this category correlate to broader findings in existing downshifting literature.  Rather, 
in line with the previous analysis chapters, analysis of the downshifter category here 
will focus on their meanings of money in relation to the broader question of „what 
makes a good life‟.  This chapter also follows the analytical patterns of the previous 
two analysis chapters.  First, downshifters are investigated for how their descriptions 
of money relate to money as „good‟, highlighting the differences between 
downshifters, middle-income and low-income earners.  Analysis also includes how 
downshifters talk about money in ways beyond the „good‟ of money, including the 
ambivalences and conflicts that arise around its meanings, and values outside of 
money-driven outcomes that directly challenge an orientation towards money as 
„good‟. 
9.3. Downshifters‟ personal money meanings 
For the first time in the study so far, the downshifter category contains one participant 
who does not describe money as „good‟ in any way.  Asked whether money plays a 
part in the 'good life' at all, Lisa, who is a mother and works part-time, replies: 
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„No, it doesn‟t.  It‟s really important to have enough to pay the bills49…[but] 
I find that it gets in the way of things.  … so no, I think I‟d be pretty happy if 
I never had any more money than I do now.‟  (Lisa, 26, Part-time Artist) 
Lisa‟s orientation towards what is „good‟ in life is not focussed or centred on money, 
nor on outcomes that require having money.  Her whole story is consistent in this 
matter.  Undoubtedly, Lisa represents an extreme case both within the broader study 
and also the downshifter group.  For example, like most middle and low-income 
participants the downshifters also orient themselves in some way towards money as 
playing a role in the 'good life'.  However, the orientations that downshifters have 
towards money have three distinct qualities in the majority of cases.  First, the 
instances of downshifters talking about money as „good‟ are far less (in fact less than 
half) of instances of the same amongst the middle-income participants.  As already 
seen, Lisa provides no instances at all, and some downshifters talk about money as 
„good‟ only a small number of times.  Second, downshifters give a strong emphasis to 
only a specific few aspects of money as „good‟ – not the broad range of „goods‟ 
enabled by money found in other categories.  Third, and by implication, other themes 
strongly suggested by middle and low-income participants are omitted altogether by 
the downshifters.  This section will present the data findings in relation to these last 
two themes. 
9.3.1. Downshifter orientations towards money as „good‟ 
There are three clear themes described by the majority of downshifters in their 
understanding of the place of money in a „good life‟.  The first theme is that 
downshifters view money - like many middle- and low-income participants do - as a 
means to an end, or goal.  While some ends/goals were quantitative goals such as 
owning a home or travelling, for most downshifters, these goals were significantly 
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 Rather than a „good‟, this fits with descriptions of money as „neutral‟ (such as a necessity), e.g. see 
9.3.3 below. 
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represented as „necessary‟ or even „pragmatic‟ in nature.  That is, money is a personal 
good because it allows participants to enjoy a necessary standard of living, or to live 
healthily or without fear.  For example: 
„I don‟t appreciate money as an aim in itself.  But I certainly am valuing it 
from the point of view of - I mean you can‟t survive without it.  I mean our 
society is kind of built around passing pieces of paper or pieces of plastic 
across counters, that sort of exchange.  So yeah, it‟s unavoidable.  Maybe 
there are ways of avoiding it, but if you‟re actually gonna choose to live 
within our society, you have to actually deal with money in some way. …   
So I‟ve become much more pragmatic about money.  It‟s kind of a means to 
an end.‟        (Tom, 36, Architect) 
Second, and consistent with other categories, most downshifter participants express 
money as „good‟ because of the pleasure and leisure associated with it.  In particular, 
participants refer to improved social, cultural, and travel life enabled through money.  
This theme is consistent across all categories; specifically in relation to travel.  
Regardless of income or income context, the majority of participants in this study talk 
about the desire to travel for holidays and cultural experience. 
Third, downshifters view money as „good‟ because it enhances quality of life.  A 
wide variety of qualities are discussed by downshifters.  The most common ones 
include lifestyle choices such as social activities, food and wine, or purchasing 
consumables.  Hannah talks about some of them: 
„I like just sitting down and having a nice hot chocolate and eating and that 
sort of stuff.  Like just being able to hang out and relax and do fun stuff as 
well.  It is nice having a home, and good flat-mates and that sort of stuff as 
well.  As much as I‟ve said I could be quite happy living in a tin shed, it is 
nice to have just the comforts of life around as well to some extent.  But 
there sort of things that you think well, I could do without them if I had to 
sort of thing.  But it is nice having them.‟  (Hannah, 26, Physiotherapist) 
In relation to the „quality of life‟ that money affords, downshifters also talk about 
qualities new to the study so far.  In particular, some also talk about health as integral 
to quality of life.  For example, while talking about how money fits into a „good life‟, 
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Marjorie notes that, „being healthy, not starving, is a good thing - having your health 
so you‟re strong‟.  Another new theme that a number of downshifters reference is the 
quality of life money affords as a human right.  Anji highlights this: 
„And I guess at the other end of the scale I suppose some people consider 
that they need a certain amount of money to have a good life.  And obviously 
that‟s something that people aspire to, and it‟s right.  You know, because to 
have those fundamental human rights always comes at a cost, and that cost 
is often just money.  So that‟s something that I guess I would attribute 
towards a good life, and I attribute towards a good life because without 
money I would have none of those fundamental human right things.‟  
        (Anji, 30, Lawyer) 
Here, an alternative expression not found in middle or low-income category is 
emerging: that the reasons that money is personally „good‟ are not limited to the 
personal use of money but rather given social – or even universal - application.  This 
suggests that for some downshifters, personal money may not be disconnected from 
wider social goals, and that the qualities that personal money provides for one person 
should be available for all people.  This is a theme that will be explored later in the 
chapter.   
9.3.2. What downshifters omit about money as „good‟ 
Notably, while downshifter orientations towards money as „good‟ highlight 
similarities to both middle and low-income participants, what downshifters do not 
talk about also draws attention to significant divergences between the categories.  To 
return briefly to the middle and low-income participants, it has been shown that a 
number of themes are significant in describing how money is „good‟.  Among them is 
included the financial control and independence money enables, money as its own 
goal or end, and that money provides personal „choices‟ to participants.   
Meanwhile, not one single downshifter points to any one of these three themes as a 
justification for the place of money as part of a 'good life‟.  They are simply not 
talked about.  The omission of these three themes from the stories of the downshifter 
participants is noteworthy.  First, „control‟ and „independence‟ are major themes for 
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both middle and low-income participants and from it much analytical attention has 
been given to the importance of financial self-reliance within a dominant money 
narrative.  Recall the recurring leitmotiv that „money means your own money‟ (Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim 2001), and that the language and resource drawn upon to 
describe how money relates to a good life is most clearly articulated through cultural 
dispositions towards economic self-reliance.    
Downshifters do not draw on this language or resource of economic self-reliance.  
Through their decision to downshift, these participants have drawn on other types of 
resources, ones that utilise languages alternative to financial self-reliance and in fact 
often undermine its authority altogether.  Take Jarrod‟s case, for example.  At one 
time a well paid computer specialist, Jarrod chose to reduce his earnings and live on 
less than fifteen percent of his previous income per annum in order to re-orient his 
future towards healthier and more sustainable work choices.  Having previously 
experienced high levels of economic self-reliance, Jarrod opts for an alternative and 
by choice moves in with family members in order to sustain himself on a low-income.  
In other words, in choosing to rely on the goodwill of his family support, Jarrod 
chooses against financial self-reliance.  He acknowledges that this family 
arrangement won‟t be long term, but describes the move as a necessary element in his 
reorientation toward healthier work habits.  Thus, in order to implement a strategy 
toward healthier living, financial self-reliance ceases to become a motivating goal.50 
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 I would argue this does not constitute a variant on the deferred narrative, because the „short-term‟ 
nature of Jarrod‟s reorientation is not described primarily as a means to improve work options and 
income level (as in a deferred money narrative).  Rather, Jarrod identifies his reorientation in terms of 
values non-monetary in nature: healthier work options, more fulfilling (less stressful) work, greater 
emphasis on self-fulfilment beyond work, and greater social contribution through work and other 
activities.  Unlike in the deferred or dominant money narratives, Jarrod identifies the possibility that in 
the long-term, a lower-income may suffice if these life-qualities can be achieved.  The principle 
difference between Jarrod‟s and the other narratives is that money is no longer a primary motivating 
goal in his reorientation. 
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It is therefore not surprising that downshifters do not refer to the „good‟ of money in 
terms of the control and independence that money provides: they do not value money 
for this, and their choice to downshift reflects this reality.  The same logic applies to 
the other two themes.  Downshifters do not value money as a goal or end in and of 
itself: indeed downshifting would make little sense if this were the case.  For example, 
the elements Marjorie values in her definition of a „good life‟ (including education, 
health, and family quality of life) do not include a language of financial accumulation 
for its own sake, and once again it is given no value. 
The same is true where downshifters make no mention of money as enabling „choice‟ 
in their lives.  For example, Prince51 has downshifted from a full-time professional 
job and income to join a musical band in which his income is both minimal and 
sporadic.  His income affords him few material choices: he has had to move into 
cheaper share-housing, change his credit cards, sell things off and by his own 
admission, „struggle‟.  But it is these things that constitute his „choice‟ towards a 
good, or better life; not having more money so that material choices exist.  Again, 
money ceases to be the motivating factor in enabling choice because Prince, like the 
other downshifters, values alternative „goods‟ that channel his choices away from 
money-centred ones. 
Thus, while downshifters do highlight the place of money in a „good life‟, they do so 
pointedly: they orient themselves towards money insofar as it provides them with the 
social, cultural and travel pleasures they appreciate and the standard qualities of life 
that they – and every other human being – has the „right‟ to enjoy.  What they don‟t 
include also illuminates a great deal: that in downshifting they orient themselves 
towards goods of non-monetary orientation.  Consequently, goals such as economic 
                                                   
 
51
 „Prince‟ requested this pseudonym specifically.  
  
 
 
209 
self-reliance, economic accumulation, or lifestyle choices cease to become motivating 
life-goals52.  
9.3.3. The place of money as „neutral‟ and „conflictual‟ in 
downshifters money meanings 
Downshifters may talk about the „good‟ of money far less than middle or low-income 
earners, however they do not talk about money less per se.  In fact, downshifters 
generally give as much attention to talking about money as do middle and low-
income earners.  However it is clear that how downshifters talk about money is 
qualitatively different to the other groups.  If downshifters talk less about the „good‟ 
of money, they also talk more (ten times more often than middle-income and double 
the instances of low-income) about money in neutral terms, and by far the most about 
ambivalences and conflicts in relation to money (five times more than the middle-
income and also significantly more than the low-income).  The following section 
tracks the ways in which downshifters talk about money as neutral and conflictual. 
Downshifters all speak about money in various neutral ways, where money is talked 
about neither as a simply „good‟, nor is it viewed negatively.  For example, like many 
middle and low-income earners, most downshifters talk about money being a life 
necessity: 
„I guess you can‟t live without money - in the society as it is now, you can‟t.  
Because you‟ve got to sleep somewhere so, it‟s like you‟ve got to be working 
or earning an income, somehow.‟   (Prince, 25, Musician) 
Another set of themes similar to the low-income group in particular includes most 
downshifters feeling unconcerned about money, or that it is non-problematic in their 
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 It is important to note here that I am not claiming that downshifters entirely reject or shun goals such 
as economic self-reliance or economic accumulation.  Rather, my principle argument is that these goals 
cease to become primary motivating life-goals. 
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lives.  Coupled with this is a strong sense that downshifters are creative or can „make 
do‟ with what they have.  However, the meanings of this sentiment were different 
amongst the downshifters than the low-income.  Rather than a downplaying attitude 
towards money, as the low-income participants conveyed, these participants were far 
more articulate about the place of money in relation to other priorities such as: being 
more concerned with the content of their work than income; that amassing money 
isn‟t the goal; being happy with enough to survive or with less; or that the qualities of 
downshifting have been worth far more than the income lost: 
„But at the end of the day it‟s really the culture of the firm itself and the 
people that are in it that makes it worthwhile to stay.  And to be honest, I 
don‟t even miss - you know I was on sixty-five thousand, so took a twenty-
five thousand dollar pay-cut.  Which is pretty, pretty major.  But I can‟t even 
imagine getting that much money anyway now, and I think I lost most of it in 
tax, so it doesn‟t actually feel like much less, or something.  It‟s never even 
popped into my mind.  You know, I remember when I first took the job, I 
thought oh well obviously I‟ll need to get a pay-rise fairly quickly, but it 
really hasn‟t crossed my mind.‟     (Anji, 30, Lawyer) 
Thera describes a meeting with her boss in which she outlines a number of her work 
concerns: 
„…and then after we‟d had all these wonderful discussions, we got to that 
item on the list and he actually offered to give me a pay rise, and I knocked 
him back and told him I didn‟t want it!  I told him I didn‟t feel that I had 
earned it! So it‟s not really the money aspect, and if I was after the money, I 
wouldn‟t be working for [company] because they don‟t actually, in the 
scheme of things pay very well.  It is more the environment.‟   
       (Thera, 34, Engineer) 
Consequently, where low-income earners engage with a strong sense of pragmatism 
related to the reality of living with minimal incomes and thus downplay the 
importance of money, downshifters tend to sideline the importance of money away 
from a dominant position in a „good life‟.  This becomes more evident as 
downshifters talk about money in other neutral ways not identified as significant 
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themes amongst other categories.  For example, downshifters talk about monetary 
wealth not being necessary, or that a „good life‟ is not about money.  In particular, all 
downshifters communicate that there are better qualities in life than money, such as 
non-monetary rewards, friend and family relationships, time, valuing other people, 
work satisfaction, community contribution, personal health, having the time to enjoy 
life, spiritual growth, generosity, volunteering, life adventures or acting to empower 
others.  For example, Jarrod remains committed to learning the value of alternative, 
non-economic priorities: 
„I need to still convince myself that it‟s better to improve as a person, and 
gain skills and knowledge like becoming better at piano; like becoming a 
leader in the army reserve; like becoming a teacher and learning how to 
impart knowledge to kids …and becoming better at touch football and better 
at badminton.  Sort of self-improvement, not in the bank account area, but in 
the area of life-skills.  And you can do a lot of those without the cost of too 
much money.‟       (Jarrod, 26, Unemployed)53 
Significantly, it is the ambivalence about money that brings most comment from 
downshifters.  Downshifters express far more ambivalences about the place of money 
in their lives than the other two participant groups, with many new reasons included.  
The downshifters are again also far more reflective in their attitude towards money.  
The most significant theme here is one highlighted already by the middle-income 
group: the relationship of money to happiness.  The difference between the middle-
income and downshifters‟ responses lie in the meanings behind their ambivalences.  
While the middle-income group primarily express the phrase „money can‟t by you 
happiness‟ as a generalised cliché (with minimal further explanations for how this 
relates to their lives), downshifters articulate multiple reasons why money is 
problematic to happiness and the changes they have personally affected in their lives 
as a result.  For example, Cian notes that: 
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„Material things are important in terms of needs and entertainment and 
things like that, but they‟re not a huge focus.  But here we have that as part 
of our culture, and it‟s very hard not to be sucked into that.  And I mean 
even things like having the opportunity to go out for tea, and to eat a meal 
that‟s really closer to a work of art than a means to be fed.  Paying extra 
money for that is all a form of entertainment.  …  And I think there‟s a huge 
place for the enjoyment of life.  But, when you think about how people live 
lives of poverty and you don‟t know if they‟re gonna survive to the next day, 
then you‟ve got to think well how do you fit those two things together?  And 
that‟s a constant tension.  So in terms of money…the tension comes more 
from probably having money, to survive in a western culture…but I certainly 
could - with probably just about everything from clothes through to the 
house I live in - do it a lot more cheaply than I do.  I just think that tension is 
always there, and I don‟t think I could actually find myself in a position 
where I earned a lot of money and just used it for myself.  I think that is just 
running really counter to what I value in life.  If I earn a lot of money, I‟d 
really want to make sure that I was using it for something of what I 
believed.‟                        (Cian, 33, Social Worker) 
Other significant ambivalences and tensions towards money by downshifters include: 
concern surrounding the use of their money; uncertainties about the place of money in 
their futures; pressures related to earning money in conflict with personal values or 
ideals; earning money and implications for time and stress; regret or shame over past 
use of money; dangers associated with having too much money; and inner conflict 
over material desires, consumerism and ownership.  For example, Hannah notes of 
money: 
„The more you have, the more you can‟t do without it.  And for myself I‟m 
sure if I had just a big sort of whacking bank account, it would then be 
harder to actually give money away.  Or proportionately anyway.  Like you 
might still say „ok, I‟m gonna give a hundred dollars to this‟.  But actually a 
hundred dollars of your horde is actually not very much at all.  Whereas I 
sort of think if I was accumulating too much money, I‟d have to think about 
all my priorities.  Just because money in the bank isn‟t really useful.  It‟s 
just sitting there - I mean there‟s so much money needed everywhere around 
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the world - I‟d rather it just got used.‟      
   (Hannah, 26, Physiotherapist) 
Whether by speaking about money as neutral or articulating an unease about the place 
of money in their lives or society, downshifters actively sideline the importance of 
money in a „good life‟.  On the one hand, while they note the usefulness of money, 
they also draw attention to a whole range of other non-economic values, and in 
general spend a lot of time questioning the extent to which money should be valued 
or given centrepiece status. 
9.3.4. The sidelining of money: new alternatives for a 'good 
life‟ 
Hamilton (2004) notes that downshifting is „a change in personal values in which 
financial and material success is no longer the dominant motive‟.  It is this very shift 
in the focus of dominant motives that defines the downshifters of this study and 
highlights the greatest difference between them and other categories.  Downshifters 
do this by privileging the choice to downshift itself, and by implication, also valuing 
earning less money.  By doing so, the majority of downshifters expressly 
communicate the diminished priority of money in relation to other life „goods‟.  Such 
other goods included increased personal satisfaction enabled by downshifting, 
improved quality of life, or the ability to invest in social or community projects.  
Prince, for example, becomes a musician because he loves the lifestyle and the ability 
to convey „substance‟ to the world through music.  Lisa is more direct: “when did it 
[work and money] become something that you can substitute for like, having fun?  
How boring!‟  In a few downshifters‟ cases, a „good life‟ is also defined as a spiritual 
or religious one, where the use of money is oriented towards those ends.  As Hannah 
explains, 
„I guess what I was before is… what you learn from picking up around you 
at a public, secular school, from parents who aren‟t Christians.  And then 
just thinking ok, make the best of what you‟ve got and earn money… [Then] 
I became a Christian. It wasn‟t really a conscious thing, I just realise now 
just looking back there‟s a big difference in the way you look at the whole 
world in terms of just money not being important.  In terms of like you‟ve got 
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plenty, and God gives plenty of what I need without actually having to not 
have time for other things to earn money n‟ stuff.‟     
    (Hannah, 26, Physiotherapist)  
This strengthens the claim that the majority of downshifters in this study „sideline‟ 
the place of money in their lives.  For middle and low-income earners, money is 
central to the framework for thinking about a „good‟ life: either as itself a „good‟ or 
downplayed in relation to the ambivalences and tensions arising through lack of 
finances.  For downshifters, money is „good‟ - mostly in a pragmatic, useful sense -  
but also actively sidelined from centre-stage through the elevation of other non-
monetary qualities at the expense of money itself.  Jarrod appropriately summarises 
these themes:  
„Work used to equal money.  I enjoyed most of what I did.  ….  And payday 
would mean a lot more to you then.  And it was always get your bank 
account up, and buy shares.  And sort of make more money.  That was my 
primary focus two or three years ago, was increase my wealth, increasing 
my assets, increasing my material wealth… But I would rather work mean 
more to me than that.  And I think I‟m on a journey to find work that is more 
satisfying.  And I think, I think being a teacher will definitely feel like I‟m 
contributing to society a lot more than what I ever did in making money for 
partners in Chicago who were just taking the cream off the top…driving 
around in their big sports cars.‟    (Jarrod, 26, Unemployed) 
9.4. Public money orientations 
One of the consequences already noted about prioritising non-monetary values 
amongst downshifters is that there is generally far less disconnection between 
understandings about private and public money.  In other words, for many 
downshifters an understanding of personal money is not limited to an individualised 
perspective but incorporates perspectives about needs beyond themselves, be they 
interpersonal, social or environmental.  Consequently, many of the issues that 
downshifters raise about public or social uses of money are a continuation of 
discussions already begun about what money means to them more generally.  
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Interestingly, downshifters had far less to say about political uses of money than 
middle and low-income earners.  Some downshifters feel quite removed from 
political matters.  For example, when the topic of politics arises, Marjorie proclaims 
„so floppin‟ boring, so full of lies!‟ … „I just sometimes wonder how truthful it call 
all be‟.  Hamilton and Mail note this tendency amongst downshifters: 
Unlike middle-class whingers, downshifters do not complain.  The main 
political parties compete with each other to demonstrate concern for 
„struggling families‟, promising tax cuts and middle-class welfare.  The 
political system is geared towards trying to satisfy these noisy demands, 
demands that can never be satisfied because whinging is endemic as long as 
wealthy people feel somehow deprived.  Downshifters, on the other hand, go 
quietly about their lives.  Perhaps a majority are simply alienated from the 
process, because it is preoccupied with economics when they themselves 
have decided to put economic considerations down the list of life priorities.  
For downshifters, the hip-pocket nerve has been cauterized.    
       (Hamilton and Mail 2003: 40) 
When downshifters do talk about political issues, there are only two major themes.  
The first is in relation to the role of the government as distributor of public money, 
and most comments relate to the pros and cons of government services acting as a 
safety net.  Lisa laments ongoing government privatisation: 
„I think … within our system that we‟ve moved so far towards a kind of 
privatising, you know, pay-as-you-go, small government kind of thing.  I 
mean I‟ve seen a lot of it as a result of the emphasis that‟s grown up around 
economic news and economic factors, and even just economics as a 
discipline, which is notoriously just completely unpredictable and stupid.  
It‟s really worrying…‟     (Lisa, 26, Part-time Artist) 
The second, and strongest political theme found amongst the downshifters, relates to 
concerns about the treatment of the environment from a political perspective.  Prince 
talks about his love of the bush: 
„I‟m an outdoors nut, so I‟ve bushwalked forever.  So I‟m really passionate 
about that.  And then I got involved in the wilderness society a little bit, and 
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that sort of stuff.  And a lot of my friends are all green, classified as green if 
you want.  And I guess when you‟re out there it‟s pretty hard to have an 
argument about it with someone who‟s never been in there.  And [the 
government is] seeing it from one person‟s perspective, which is normally a 
commercial perspective.‟      (Prince, 25, Musician) 
Hamilton and Mail (2003: 40) also notes that where downshifters do have a political 
interest, they tend to have a strong critique of existing political structures and the 
powers they wield.  They also note downshifters are more likely to be aligned with 
the „Greens‟ political party54 in Australia.  Of the downshifters in this study, at least 
half fit this description. 
When it comes to talking about money from a social perspective, downshifters are 
much more vocal about moral issues than political ones.  However, the moral issues 
they engage with follow on closely to the issues they already have expressed concerns 
about earlier, in relation to personal money ambivalences and conflicts.  For example, 
downshifters express dilemmas about: workplace morality (for example people being 
overworked and underpaid or stuck in jobs they dislike); environmental sustainability 
and its battle against commercial interests; individualism and excessive consumerism; 
poverty at a global and local level; the breakdown of community and relationships; 
and most participants commented about the apathy or complacency in relation to the 
lack of public consciousness about moral issues or the lack of personal action against 
moral problems in society.  Both Anji and Lisa exemplify a range of these issues: 
„I guess especially now in this current government, we‟re in the minority! 
People that have an education and care about social issues are well and 
truly in the minority.  And it‟s frightening, because ten years down the track, 
there‟s gonna be … a whole bunch of people are just being brainwashed 
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 Broad party values include „commitment to peace and non-violence, social justice, the environment 
and to participatory democracy‟ (Xamon 2007). 
  
 
 
217 
into just care about themselves.  And eventually it‟s gonna lead to a really 
awful society to live in, and that would be tragic thing to happen.  So, I 
guess we have to keep fighting for that not to happen.  You know, and kind of 
do whatever we can so that it doesn‟t.  It‟s scary though, isn‟t it?‟  
       (Anji, 30, Lawyer) 
„Oh, I suppose I still would say underpinning all of that is a basic conflict 
between the needs of others and the needs of the self.  …  I mean I‟m not a 
socialist or anything, but I just think that there seems to be a general tension 
between what you want for yourself, and what you want for other people.  
And people have basically been encouraged to forget about the second and 
the part that worries about other people.‟   (Lisa, 26, Part-time Artist) 
While not all downshifters felt they had a role to play in the social or political sphere, 
most did have a role to play: in fact by far a higher percentage than any other 
category.  Again, most participants talked about their own role as something integral 
to their life choices.  Prince talks about how he uses his music as a social platform to 
raise awareness about environmental issues he feels strongly about.  Anji uses her 
legal work skills to provide services to those who otherwise could not afford them.  
Marjorie and Lisa both view their choices to invest time into the health and education 
of their children as a social responsibility.  Hannah‟s decision to work less reflects a 
desire to invest more time into the faith journeys of people in her church community.  
Cian makes his vision for social responsibility a personal one: 
„I guess poverty is a big issue for me.  Particularly trench poverty, where 
there‟s been a history of three generations unemployed, and a real sense of 
hopelessness, and this is as good as it gets.  And everything that springs 
from that I think is a big thing.  At a global level I just think the fact that 
we‟re part of western society and we‟re part of the one percent who have 
such a great lifestyle, and just our responsibility to do something about that.  
I‟ve been really heartened by the response to what happened with the 
Tsunami, which I think is a great thing.  …   But I think the refugee issue is a 
big thing.  I mean that‟s really personal, because I work with refugees on a 
weekly basis.‟    (Cian, 33, Social Worker) 
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Consequently, the disconnection between private and public money felt so strongly 
with the middle-income group significantly diminishes amongst the downshifters.  
This is because for many downshifters, social (and in some cases political) issues are 
defined to some extent as personal issues for which they take some responsibility to 
change.  The decision to downshift itself is in most cases intimately related to 
improving quality of life for not only themselves, but also for others around them and 
the environment at large.  Etzioni (1998: 647-9) argues that the greater the human 
shift to voluntary simplicity or downshifting, the greater will be the human capacity 
to affect consequential changes within wider society, in particular through the 
protection of the environment and implementation of social justice and equality.  
Pusey concurs, arguing that: 
Civic involvement in volunteering militates against a free-market 
withdrawal of the state from social services and against elite-abetted blame-
the-victim attitudes to those in need.   (Pusey 2003: 121) 
9.5. Downshifter orientations towards the future 
Finally, downshifters‟ orientations towards the future reflect a number of different 
themes, some old and some new.  In a few cases, money is a taken for granted part of 
the future, in terms of future plans for owning a house or travelling overseas.  For 
example Jarrod looks forward to reshaping his future: for him some concrete plans 
exist (such as a family and a house) but he also likes the openness and possibility – 
and the unknown - associated with making healthier work choices.  Amongst the 
downshifters there are also reminiscences to the vague and uncertain futures of the 
static low-income.  For example, Marjorie can‟t afford to consider the future at length:  
„No, I don‟t like to think about the future too much.  Because it comes with 
another sort of feeling, „I wish this‟, or „I hope this‟.  And, and then if it 
doesn‟t [happen] it‟s too much - it‟s enough to think about what you‟ve got 
to do during the day sometimes, let alone… You know, people go „oh, when 
your children go to university‟ …I don‟t want to think about that!  I just 
think about where their clothes are coming from, if I have to buy some new 
shoes.  That‟s enough pressure.‟   (Marjorie, 35, Part-time Student) 
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However, Marjorie also reflects a wider theme amongst the downshifters when it 
comes to how they think about the future.  She may not be able to afford to plan too 
much, but alongside this constraint, Marjorie highly values – and in fact has chosen – 
the day to day challenges of making ends meet, educating her boys, focusing on the 
health and well-being of her family and having a passion for the things she does 
everyday, like growing organic food.   
Thus, amongst the downshifters more broadly is the privileging of life-qualities that 
have diminished reference to money.  Again, it is these qualities that arise in 
discussion about the future that confirm the sidelining of money in downshifters 
money orientations.  For example, Tom claims he is much happier in his thirties than 
he was in his twenties.  Reflecting on the sudden death of his father, he notes that he 
has realised how quickly life can come to an end, and that happiness is about the 
present or now, because: 
„…if you are always in this process of happiness being something you‟re 
going to have, when you‟re succeeding off in the future - well, you may 
never actually get there.  Because you don‟t know what‟s gonna happen.‟  
       (Tom, 36, Architect) 
Similarly, Lisa‟s future is shorter-term in orientation.  She says that often, life is 
„about the next five minutes‟ and at the most, „seasonal‟.  She doesn‟t think about the 
long-term future, but rather has chosen to put her children first and enjoy both their 
company and scale of time.   
Another theme new to the study is a tendency for downshifters to be philosophical 
about future goals and goods rather than oriented towards future lifestyle material 
goals.  For example, Paul has some concrete plans - such as one day working with the 
ocean, and bettering his social relationships – but he also wants where-ever he finds 
himself in the future to be a „happy place and a growing place‟.  Likewise, while 
Hannah feels vague about her future, as if she is somewhat „drifting‟ or „floating‟ at 
present, she is certain that regardless of her circumstances she wants to experience the 
joy and hope of her faith through it.  Even, she states, if it means living in a „tin shed‟.  
Cian is also quite reflective about his future: 
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„I just had this real sense that whatever it was I needed to do in the future, 
I‟d know when I needed to know… So I guess I take the future as it comes to 
a degree… I certainly plan and think through things.  But I‟m not concerned 
about it.‟       (Cian, 33, Social Worker) 
Anji is both reflective and practical in locating her own future within a wider social 
perspective: 
„Just going back to the difference between people that don‟t have money and 
do have money:  people who do have money can plan for the future and do.  
Whereas people who don‟t, can‟t.  And so [there‟s] a big difference I guess, 
in people that are living in poverty that don‟t have an idea of the future.  
Because it‟s so subsistence, they don‟t really have the opportunity to do that.  
So yeah, sure, I plan for the future, like there‟s no tomorrow!  I plan house 
designs, holidays, all those things.  So I definitely think about the future, and 
I think about projects.  I have lots of little projects, and I guess when I‟ve 
finished one project I‟m always kind of on the lookout for the next thing.  So, 
I‟m just thinking probably now that I‟ll take on some other project… 
Probably more in the realm of human rights I think…and I‟m thinking 
maybe the asylum seeker stuff - just try and yeah do something about that, 
because I‟m completely appalled.  And I think that those kinds of issues have 
gone off Australia‟s social conscience radar, and have all but been buried.‟  
        (Anji, 30, Lawyer) 
Therefore, although money-related goods are features of downshifters‟ futures, the 
general emphasis is away from material goals.  Rather, they emphasise non-material 
goods such as privileging the present over the future, inner peace and happiness, 
quality time, spiritual growth, and engaging in social justice. 
9.6. A discussion about downshifting 
Downshifters, like all participants in this study, define themselves in relation to what 
they view to be „good‟ or valuable to them.  They orient themselves, as Taylor claims, 
in a „moral space‟ in which they respond to questions about what is worthwhile doing 
or not, or what has meaning and importance or not (Taylor 1989: 28).  Similarly to all 
participants in the study, they also evaluate and judge the meanings of money in their 
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understanding of what a 'good life' is.  However unlike other participants, they do not 
orient themselves towards money as a dominant „good‟ in their lives.  Money is a 
„good‟ but not a privileged one.  In fact, money is often consciously sidelined 
amongst the downshifters, who tend to acknowledge multiple other goods, usually 
non-material ones, as preferred and valued in a 'good life'.  Hamilton notes this about 
downshifters: 
Downshifters have decided to „seize the day‟ to pursue a more fulfilling 
life. … [They] place much less emphasis on money and much more on 
relationships, their health and a sense of personal fulfilment.  Simplifying, 
downshifters sacrifice money for time…      (Hamilton 2004: 7) 
Downshifters then, share a common moral orientation towards „goods‟ that de-
emphasise money rather that elevate it.  To this extent downshifters differ from both 
the middle-income and low-income participants in this study who all reference the 
importance of money in a „good life‟, through pursuing it (middle-income), deferring 
to it (transient low-income) or defining themselves through the inability to engage in 
it (static low-income).  The question thus arises: do downshifters point to an 
alternative cultural disposition towards money - a widespread, shared disposition that 
sidelines the importance of money as a moral orientation rather than elevates it 
towards the „good‟?  
To a large degree, the downshifters themselves answer this question.  They generally 
do not view their own stories, to use Bourdieu‟s (1990) language, as woven through 
the common histories and convergent dispositions of the wider culture to which they 
belong.  Rather, they all acknowledge– as other participants in this study also have – 
that shared moral orientations towards personal money as „good‟ are the privileged 
dispositions and meanings given to money in Australian culture.  To a large extent, 
downshifters feel their own personal orientations towards money (or away from 
money) are not shared in a wider consensus around their „meanings of practice‟ 
(Bourdieu 1990: 53).  Contrastingly, they feel that by de-emphasising money they 
struggle against the cultural current of money orientations.  As Tom states,  
„It‟s almost like society expects you to achieve at whatever you‟re doing, 
and to be successful - whatever that actually means.  And for me that always 
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meant that I felt like whatever I was doing now was actually about success 
in the future, which ultimately I found really unsatisfying and a recipe for 
actually not being happy.  Because study was sort of focussed towards some 
end which was off in the future and then you start work and you think „well, 
I‟m not earning much money, but, I‟m getting experience, and that‟s all 
about building towards something that‟s in the future‟.  And then eventually 
I started to realise well, if I‟m not actually happy with what I‟m doing now, 
this minute, then you‟re never actually gonna be happy - you‟re always 
gonna be feeling dissatisfied.‟     (Tom, 36, Architect) 
In some way, all downshifters reference the social expectations – or cultural 
disposition – towards financial success.  Lisa reflects on work, and is amazed at the 
social expectation that work is supposed to bring spiritual, political and personal 
fulfilment.  She is perplexed that through work the majority of people aim to „live the 
dream‟ even though for most people this is impossible and ultimately unfulfilling.  As 
for herself, she would much rather be at home, reading, painting or hanging out with 
the kids: “I just don‟t understand the whole work thing, really” she says.  Prince 
admits that for a long time he put off downshifting because he felt tied back by the 
requirement to „get a real job‟, to „get a degree and earn money‟, even when he knew 
it wasn‟t really what he wanted to be doing.  Anji reflects from the other side of the 
fence.  Having downshifted she notes that money doesn‟t equate to greater happiness, 
but that,  
„That‟s probably a mistake lots of people make. You know, in terms of their 
own stress in their lives, and debts and all that kind of stuff – the more 
money you have, the more you spend‟.    (Anji,30, Lawyer) 
Sometimes these reflections give a glimpse of the quandary that confronts 
downshifters in their decision to simplify.  Being very aware of what the legitimated 
social expectations are, downshifters also know what they sacrifice to downshift.  
Cian relates how many of his law school colleagues have now been made partners 
and senior associates in their law firms, and he acknowledges that perhaps that is 
„where I would‟ve been at if I had stuck with it‟.  But, he ponders, „would I be 
enjoying it?‟  Likewise, Jarrod recognises that his history of viewing money as 
equalling success predisposes him to questions like „how girls view me from outside, 
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and if I become a teacher does that mean that some girls won‟t want me because I 
don‟t earn a huge amount of money?‟  He tells himself that if that were true, they are 
not the right women to be going out with anyway. 
Conclusion 
Despite a determination to live alternately, there is a complexity and anxiety in 
making decisions that demand sacrifices.  In particular, downshifters concede that 
they do not live up to the perceived social expectation to live the dominant money 
narrative.  These social expectations also often include the specific expectations of 
family or loved ones.  Hannah relates how conflict has marked her relationship with 
her parents since investing less time at work: 
„It‟s had its hard bits, because my family‟s pretty against the idea.  They  
just want me to grow up and be a successful physiotherapist and get 
promotions n‟ and continue working full-time.  And they didn‟t like the idea 
that I was prioritising elsewhere.‟  (Hannah, 26, Physiotherapist) 
Hamilton notes similar findings amongst the downshifters in his study.  He says that:  
Downshifters frequently report that they feel the weight of social pressure 
because of their decision.  They are seen to be „crazy‟ to reject higher 
incomes.  Or they are accused of trying to cover up failure.   
      (Hamilton and Mail 2003: 51) 
Therefore, although they certainly share alternative moral orientations to money as 
central to the „good life‟, downshifters do not see themselves as sharing a cultural 
disposition towards downshifting with other downshifters.  Rather, they are like all 
other participants in this study who, regardless of income, and regardless of whether 
their income is chosen or not, point to the dominant money narrative as the culturally 
preferred one.  The difference with the downshifters is that while they acknowledge 
that their culture disposes them toward preferring the dominant money narrative, they 
themselves choose an alternative.  They can often feel socially isolated in following 
this alternative.  However, downshifting itself becomes a resource, or language that 
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participants draw upon to morally orient themselves in relation to money.  Hear what 
money means to Anji: 
„It probably means that…firstly, you can pay for fundamental things that you 
expect - so water, power, a roof over your head, food, those things.  Basic 
survival - that‟s the first thing.  And then everything over and above that is a 
bonus…, frivolous really.  I mean obviously people want to have certain 
things, and like art, and you know I like drinking wine, and all of those kind 
of things - I get a lot of satisfaction out of those things.  But do I need it?  No.  
Do I need to spend money on it?  No.  You know if I had half the amount of 
money that I‟ve got, would I be able to live? Yes.  So, it‟d just be a matter of 
scaling most things back.   But it‟s definitely once you get over subsistence 
and being able to survive, then it, everything above that is bonus.‟   
        (Anji, 30, Lawyer) 
A shift has occurred for Anji, from money being something through which she 
envisages a good life possible for herself, to something that is allocated a specific and 
well-defined function in her life.  It does not define her future; rather her definition of 
needs versus wants defines what money means to her.  In other words, values outside 
money become resources that give money its place in the „good life‟ – often a 
sidelined position.  As Hamilton and Denniss note,  
Downshifting is characterised by a psychological transformation, in which 
money and material things are relegated to a much diminished position on 
the list of life‟s priorities.     (Hamilton and Denniss 2005) 
Thus, downshifters do not yet represent a strongly shared „cultural disposition‟.  
However they do, as Hamilton and Mail (2003: 51) note, display resolve in the 
decision to resist the social expectations to follow a consumer path to success, where 
their difficulty is compounded by the conspicuous absence of „everyday role models.‟   
As such, and with the growing numbers of Australians joining their ranks, Hamilton 
and Mail note that perhaps downshifters may yet come to view themselves as „normal 
and level-headed members of society because they have chosen balanced lives over 
ones obsessed with material acquisition‟ (Hamilton and Mail 2003: 51). 
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10. Chapter Ten: Downshifters - A Reoriented 
Money Narrative 
  
10.1. Introduction 
Dominant money narratives broadly describe the good of money in generalised terms 
and to the exclusion of competing moral claims.  Deferred money narratives pay 
homage to the dominant money story even when participation in it is necessarily 
limited.  Flawed money narratives feel drawn into the stigma of living outside the 
dominant money narrative.  Downshifters tell a tale of reorientation toward money: a 
„reoriented‟ money narrative in which moral claims competing with the „good‟ of 
money are elevated, sometimes to the near exclusion of money as a „good‟ at all.  A 
reoriented money narrative is the expression and discovery of alternative ways to 
think about and experience money. 
The reoriented money narrative encapsulates an active re-direction in the valuation of 
money.  The centrality of reorientation to its narrative structure denotes the reflective 
realisation that personal landscapes journeyed have included both struggle and gain.  
The reoriented narrative structure has three elements: challenge, redirection and 
reflection.  The structure of these stories also point to other narrative markers such as: 
the definition of self in resistance to dominant narratives and the moral reorientation 
of „goods‟; a narrative engagement with value conflicts; and a language of social 
connectedness evident in the storyline.  The remainder of this chapter outlines these 
narrative elements. 
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10.2. Challenge, re-direction and reflection  
The typical structure of the reoriented money narrative follows a three stage 
journey.55  The first is the „challenge‟ experienced by the participant in a 
confrontation between values and a growing dissatisfaction with circumstance.  For 
example, it is when Jarrod, burnt out at work, „started to ask questions [about] why I 
wasn‟t enjoying myself‟ and it is Anji‟s „cathartic moment‟ of deep dissatisfaction in 
her work when she says to herself, „what are you doing here‟?  It is Prince‟s re-
evaluation of monetary rewards versus the reward of self-fulfilment, and Hannah‟s 
realisation that „something‟s got to go!‟  Whether decided suddenly or through a 
growing realisation, in reorienting their relation to money through downshifting, 
participants‟ stories are established first in the challenge to rethink their values and 
rethink their circumstances in light of those values.  The dignifying of non-monetary 
values such as time, social contribution, relational investment, or self-development 
increasingly presents a challenge to both the place and significance of money in their 
lives.   
The challenge is unsettling for most, and for some, deeply.  If the dominant money 
narrative was once a strong orientation (prior to downshifting), the conflict of values 
is a collision between two worlds.  Jarrod recalls this collision: 
„As I grew up, it was basically drilled into me that money is great and the 
more money you get, can earn, the better you‟re doing… But in the last five 
years my salary went from thirty-six thousand dollars a year, and ended up 
on seventy.  And I didn‟t see my lifestyle become twice as good.  And in fact, 
it got worse.  My commitments at work went up.  My stress at work went 
through the roof.  I was starting to put on a bit of [weight]. … I wasn‟t 
enjoying myself.‟      (Jarrod, 26, Unemployed) 
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 This three-phase narrative structure is drawn in principle from Frank‟s (1995) „quest‟ narrative, 
although different descriptions are used in all three narrative stages.  
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Anji defines her challenge in the dawning realisation that after her studies, finding 
work as a lawyer was simply not enough.  While working in her first job filing 
bankruptcy claims and suing people for debt recovery, Anji recalls her own self-talk: 
„wake up to yourself!  This is not what you started doing law for‟.  Her conflict of 
values is defined through her sense of responsibility towards a practice of law in 
which a social contribution is made.  In the reoriented narrative, the challenge thus 
becomes the birth of an alternative journey.  Central to the process is the re-forming 
of an orientation towards money, and the dawning awareness of new responsibilities: 
to the self, to others, or to an environmental or spiritual goal. 
At some point in the narrative the conflict of values inherent to the challenge becomes 
unsustainable.  Consequently the challenge is acted upon and the second stage, 
„redirection‟ begins.  This is encapsulated in the decision to downshift and its 
actualisation.  Here, Jarrod walks away from high paying work into a meagrely self-
funded, year-long respite.  Anji finds lower paying work she calls „home‟.  Prince 
leaves his professional work and actualises his long-term dream of being a full-time 
musician.  And Hannah cuts down her work days and begins spending more time with 
women in her church community.  In other words, participants act upon a decision to 
redirect their time or work energies as well as their money priorities. 
In many ways the challenge continues when redirection occurs, albeit in different 
forms.  Goods are forfeited, often monetary goods and the lifestyle, comfort or 
ownership of goods that accompany them.  Earning less often engenders different 
challenges such as making ends meet or rethinking the budget.  Trials are also defined 
through the social pressures to earn more or the loss of some independence or work-
place status.  In other words, the active redirection of values is redefining to the 
person in many ways, including through discovery and trial.  Marjorie calls it a 
„different adventure‟: a comment on both the freedom of starting again (such as 
starting a small business and home schooling the children); and the everyday 
challenge it is to live with little money, a vegetable garden and some chooks. 
The final stage in the reoriented narrative structure is „reflection‟.  This is the telling 
of the experience of challenge and redirection in terms of what has been given or 
added to them through it.  It is a reflective mode in which some of the moral issues 
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surrounding the decision to downshift are communicated.  For example, Cian notes 
that what he has discovered from his experience is that,  
„I don‟t think you can live a good life personally without trying to make a 
difference for other people, and helping them to have that same good life‟ 
      (Cian, 33, Social Worker) 
In this part of the narrative there is a sense that even amongst the jarring nature of 
being out of sync with dominant cultural strategies for living a „good life‟, there is 
inherent worth and value in the alternative path chosen.  What is learned in becoming 
a downshifter gives access to different experiences and knowledges, a shifted moral 
orientation and means to engage with the world with growing depth and breadth.  
Anji feels her downshift is significant because,  
„…at the end of the day what I can contribute to other people – and I can 
assist them to resolve their problems – actually helps them.  I‟m able to give 
as much compassion as I want to people and their lives and circumstances.  
It is very empowering to recognise that you‟ve got a certain level of 
knowledge and ability that you can assist other people with.‟  
       (Anji, 30, Lawyer) 
This narrative phase, Frank notes, is reminiscent of Joseph Campbell‟s idea of the 
„master of the two worlds‟.  Frank acknowledges that while Campbell‟s work is 
largely popularist (Frank 1995), in this instance it is a useful way of describing the 
third narrative phase.  Campbell talks about going „beyond‟ the perceived „normal‟ or 
everyday ways of perceiving something and in doing so discovering alternative ways 
of engaging with it: in other words, mastering „two worlds‟.  In the context of this 
study, having moved in varying degrees beyond or outside of a dominant money 
narrative, participants feel they have gained something – a knowledge, insight or 
wisdom – in the experience.  This does not mean they no longer face money 
challenges or conflicts of interest.  Rather, they feel they have alternative means (an 
alternative „world‟ to use Campbell‟s term) with which to integrate the challenges 
into their lives.  For example, Jarrod‟s worry that as a teacher he will not earn enough 
to attract female suitors is genuine, but his journey of moving beyond the world of 
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high money earning gives him cause to encounter another world of possibility: his 
reflection that women attracted to money alone are not suited to his courtship. 
Thus, the reoriented money narrative is more than just the act of shifting money 
orientations through downshifting.  Reorientation embodies all three narrative stages: 
the challenge or conflict of values, the redirection of thinking and behaviour, and also 
the reflection enabled through them.  The narrative highlights a particular process in 
relation to money, a journey in which struggle and conflict, recognition and 
awareness, change and redirection, and discovery and responsibility are all central. 
The reoriented money narrative, while recognised through these three narrative shifts, 
also includes other markers worth noting.  Many of these markers have been flagged 
here already but warrant more detailed attention.  They include issues about self-
reflexivity, moral orientations, value-conflicts and social connectedness. 
10.3. Self-reflexivity in the reoriented money narrative 
The centrality of challenge, re-direction and reflection in this money narrative sits 
alongside another theme: the reconstructive measures engaged in by participants to 
resist or sideline the dominant money narrative.  As shown previously, downshifters 
acknowledge that their culture disposes them toward preferring the dominant money 
narrative, however they themselves choose or construct an alternative and by doing so 
display resolve in the decision to resist the social expectations to follow a money or 
consumer path to success.   
The language of reconstruction draws once again on Anthony Gidden‟s notion of the 
reflexive biography, or self-reflexivity.  To recall, self-reflexivity refers to the sense 
of control, awareness and constant monitoring and re-shaping of body and mind 
individuals practice in reference to the social systems and knowledge‟s in place 
around them (Giddens 1991: 75-80).   
Earlier, in the context of the dominant money narrative, it was questioned whether 
individuals are actually engaged in a „reflexively organised trajectory of the self‟ 
(Giddens 1991: 85).  For example, as discussed in chapter six, the almost total lack of 
problematising the individual sphere in relation to money within a dominant money 
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narrative raises real questions about the extent to which late-modern individuals are 
able to be reflexively aware of their role in reproducing some major cultural money 
themes. 
Analysis of the reoriented money narrative aids in responding to this question in more 
depth.  First, Giddens himself does respond to the suggestion that the money 
economy shapes self-reflexivity (Giddens 1991: 196).  He suggests that the „self‟ 
project is influenced by the „standardising effects of commodity capitalism‟ and that 
it is the deregulated market that frames the choices available for self-expression.  
Self-reflexivity is found, he argues, in the struggle against the pervasive nature of 
commodification and through the choice and creativity that occurs within the bounds 
of the standardising mode.  The inability to act self-reflexively occurs when 
individuals become so intent on being distinct that they are no longer aware of 
themselves in relation to the responses of others - a form of narcissism (Giddens 1991: 
196-201).  
Thus, Giddens describes self-reflexivity as the ability to engage creatively in choice 
where those choices are framed by the standardising mode of commodity capitalism.  
The dominant and deferred narratives do express this kind of self-reflexivity: for 
example the choice that money provides is central to the myriad of opportunities 
participants view as available to them, in the present and future.  Participants also 
apply some critique to their choices (for example, will it make me happy?) and 
recognise the social inequalities that accompany a deregulated money market.  
However, as shown, their self-reflexivity is still framed within the standardising mode 
– or, as this study has described, by the dominant cultural disposition of a strong 
orientation towards the „good‟ of money and the personal choices and opportunities 
money provides. 
On the other hand, it is evident from the reoriented money narrative that the self-
awareness, critique and re-shaping of body and mind that Giddens describes as self-
reflexivity (Giddens 1991) can apply beyond the dominant cultural disposition in 
relation to money.  First, in this narrative is an explicit awareness of the social 
expectation to engage in a dominant money narrative, including the choices and 
opportunities this narrative embodies.  This narrative also recognises the value 
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conflicts that accompany a strong orientation towards money.  However, in critiquing 
them it also elects (in varying degrees) to reshape body and mind in relation to it.  
Downshifter participants do not choose to alter their choices within the dominant 
narrative, but away from it, in a alternative reoriented narrative in which money is 
sidelined.  Recall Marjorie, who opts for a wholesale lifestyle change from a double-
income city life to very low-income rural life in favour of better health and quality of 
life for her family. 
This is also a form of self-reflexivity.  However, it is not a self-reflexivity limited by 
continuing to act within the standardising mode of the dominant narrative.  That is, 
the dominant money narrative is defined by a limited self-reflexivity, where choices 
are confined to the creative opportunities allowed within the bounds of the 
standardising mode.  Rather, the self-reflexivity found within a reoriented money 
narrative is a broadened or extended self-reflexivity.  This is because it demonstrates 
an ability to be self-reflexive in relation to the standardising, or dominant money 
mode itself.    
Thus, the reoriented money narrative extends the definition of self-reflexivity and 
offers an added dimension to the term.   For example, Giddens (1991: 129-33) argues 
that „integral to modernity‟s unsettling character‟ is „the capability to disturb the 
fixity of things‟ and „open up new pathways‟.  The reoriented money narrative is a 
portrayal of this self-reflexive modern character: capable of reversing the „fixity‟ of 
an orientation towards money and engaging with alternative values and new pathways 
of value orientation.  However, a self-reflexivity that occurs within the standardising 
mode is always constrained within the bounds of that mode, and will always be 
limited in ability to disturb the „fixity‟ of things or open up „new pathways‟.  Recall 
(middle-income) Douglas, who identifies social inequalities but remarks that it is not 
right to try to change things because the „world will always find its own level‟ and 
thus action is about making things better for yourself alone.  Here, the „standardised 
mode‟ is his reference point for how things should be, rather than what (beyond that 
mode) they could be. 
Consequently, the differentiation between a limited (dominant money narrative) and 
extended (reoriented money narrative) self-reflexivity points first, to the need for a 
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deeper understanding of the relationship between self-reflexivity and choice.  For 
example, are individual choices defined in terms of dominant money narratives or in 
relation to them with a view to other alternatives?  Second, the distinction between a 
limited and extended form of self-reflexivity facilitates a fuller identification of the 
constraints on biographical reflexivity.  For example, it conveys that a strong 
narrative identification with the „good‟ of money (as a preferred cultural disposition) 
is far more likely to limit self-reflexivity to choices framed within a dominant money 
narrative: that is, for example, that private money is unequivocally „good‟ and 
disconnected from social outcomes. 
10.4. Moral orientations and value conflicts 
One of the reasons why the reoriented money narrative embodies extended self-
reflexivity rather than a limited one is its ability to view money orientations in moral 
terms.  That is, there is the recognition in this narrative that money is not morally 
invulnerable, but rather that the elevation of money as a primary „good‟ has moral 
implications for self and others, and for other competing „goods‟.  When Anji reflects 
on her downshift to legal work where she can assist and contribute to other‟s 
problems through compassionate means, she implies that her willingness to earn less 
money is directly related to the fulfilment she finds in work to which she feels called 
and from which she can help mend broken lives.  How I view my money, Anji infers, 
is morally oriented. 
Integral to understanding the moral dimension of money is the acknowledgment in a 
reoriented money narrative that value conflicts are central to moral decision-making.  
As shown earlier, underpinning the narrative structure is the challenge characterised 
in the conflict of values between money and other values such as time, work quality 
and social contribution.  Extended self-reflexivity, as shown, is an awareness of what 
dominant or preferred „goods‟ are (e.g. money) and the critique of them through the 
willingness to value alternative goods in their place. 
Here we return to Nussbaum‟s (1987) analysis of Greek tragedies in „The Fragility of 
Goodness‟ as a picture of the reoriented money narrative.  To restate an earlier 
discussion, the dominant money narrative is likened to a Platonic reading of Greek 
tragedy which privileges the elimination of value conflicts by overlaying them with a 
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consistent principle above all others – in this case the dominant moral reasoning that 
personal money is „good‟ money, regardless of the dilemmas left in its wake. 
Analogously, the reoriented money narrative may be also likened to another aspect of 
Nussbaum‟s account.  Nussbaum determines that the reversal of the Platonic view is 
found in Aristotle, that „tragic action is important and a source of genuine learning‟ 
(Nussbaum 1986: 382).  Thus, unlike the Platonic view, the Aristotelian 
understanding of value conflicts (here encapsulated in tragedy) is that they are 
essential to human learning.  Consequently, rather than „fixity‟ and „stability‟ as 
grounding life principles, the Aristotelian picture of what is central to a „good life‟ is 
risk, vulnerability and human fragility: these provide „the best sort of stability for 
human life‟.  In this view, any good human life is given to the commitment to love 
others and to social values, central to which is human vulnerability.  „All excellence‟, 
Nussbaum relates of the Aristotelian view, „has an other-related aspect‟ (Nussbaum 
1986: 418). 
Although set in the context of the Greek tragedy, the analogy is nevertheless useful.  
The reoriented money narrative is similar to the Aristotelian view of the Greek 
tragedy in its recognition of plural ends.  That is, value conflicts - far from requiring 
elimination - are understood as a part of human learning and the path to becoming 
more fully human.  For example in a reoriented money narrative is the sense that 
something (insight, wisdom, knowledge) is gained through the struggle to define what 
is important in life.  Moreover, recognising other values over money also means that 
living a reoriented money narrative opens the self to financial risk and vulnerability, a 
state to be valued in an Aristotelian view of a good life.  For example Prince relates 
that to move into cheaper accommodation,  throw away the credit card, sell „things‟ 
and „struggle‟ financially is difficult, but worth it for the kind of (non-monetary) 
reward he would prefer through a music career.  And finally, like an Aristotelian view 
of the Greek tragedy, a good life in a reoriented money narrative most often includes 
a commitment to other people or social values.  Recall Cian‟s enacted belief that a 
good life for him includes helping others to have that same quality of life. 
Consequently, like the Aristotelian approach to Greek tragedy, the reoriented money 
narrative is an interpretation about money that recognises how important value 
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conflicts are to human learning.  In the tensions that exist between the „good‟ (or 
necessity) of money and other life values, the other values are also given claim and 
are integrated into the journey of discovering what a „good life‟ is.  These same 
principles are also reflected in Taylor‟s (1989) description of „epistemic gain‟.  
According to Taylor, where value conflicts and moral dilemmas are engaged with and 
resolution sought, the basis for shifting moral orientations is established.  Like the 
Aristotelian view that value conflicts are essential to human learning, Taylor reasons 
that value dilemmas form a motivation for moral transitions because only in seeking 
their resolution are new moral goods named. 
It is important to reiterate that value conflicts, by their very nature, involve dilemma, 
struggle and challenge and can be confronting to the very core of the self.  For 
example, as already shown, in the reoriented money narrative there is isolation and 
loneliness in the „loss‟ of money, recurring self-doubts about the wisdom of living 
with less money, the real or perceived social pressure to conform or strive for the 
same money goals as others, and feeling a sense of not quite „fitting in‟ socially.  
There is often material sacrifice too, in the loss of career mobility or status, of 
consumer goods, ownership, lifestyle pleasures or comforts. 
Nevertheless, having less money is not often described as a loss in a reoriented 
money narrative.  Instead, the narrative names challenge, growth, self-development 
and connection with others as the gains of struggle.  Despite the acknowledged 
sacrifices it places inherent value in the alternate, non-monetary dimensions granted 
through the decision to earn less.  Thus, unlike the static low-income participants in 
particular, less money may be a challenge but it is not an interruption.  It may be a 
sacrifice, but it is not a loss.  Rather, it is a shift in moral orientations toward what 
constitutes a „good‟, and hence is consistent with Taylor‟s claim that the very nature 
of moral distinction between goods involves conflict, critique, and challenge (Taylor 
1989: 90). 
10.5. Social and environmental connectedness 
One of those values often in conflict with the „good‟ of money is the desire for social 
and environmental connectedness.  Intrinsic to the reoriented money narrative is this 
desire for connection: with self, with others, with the physical environment or for 
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some a spiritual connection with God or a higher being.  Personal, social, 
environmental or spiritual connectedness is central to the storying of money in both 
thinking and acting.  Remember Hannah, who after becoming a Christian cuts down 
her work hours and income so she can spend more time connecting with other women 
in her faith community, and Prince who uses his music to raise awareness of 
environmental issues. 
By way of clarification, it is not the intended inference that middle-income and low-
income participants do not desire connection with self, others, the environment or 
God.  On the contrary: relationships, personal development and for some, spirituality 
and environmentalism, are features of a „good life‟.  However, by and large these 
forms of connectedness stop short of offering moral alternatives to the cultural 
disposition towards money as central to a „good life‟.  For example Mike (middle-
income) is a Christian whose faith parallels the world of business and money-making: 
connectedness with God translates in his money narrative into financial self-reliance 
achieved through fair and ethical money management.  To Gabrielle, (transient low-
income) her children mean everything to her, and part of her hopes for their future is 
they will „make heaps‟ of money.  For middle and low-income participants therefore, 
often their desires for social, environmental or spiritual connectedness are shaped 
within the parameters of the dominant money narrative without calling these moral 
orientations into question.  Wuthnow (1991) highlights the paradox inherent in this 
reality: 
As a society we pay lip service to altruistic values, but these values must be 
seen in the context of our other pursuits, the majority of which focus on 
ourselves rather than others… If we talk incessantly about „community‟, we 
live our lives in a way that says individual freedom is better. Ours is a 
society that places equally high value on the dogged determination and long 
hours of hard work it takes to achieve individual success.  We are also a 
society in which self-interest, whether in money, physical health, self-
expression or matters of the heart, assumes a dominant role in our thinking. 
       (Wuthnow 1991: 11-12) 
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There are a number of elements that define the drive toward social and environmental 
connectedness in the reoriented money narrative.  The first is the common language 
of social critique found in the narrative.  It has been shown that downshifters, far 
more than any other participant category, are both more reflective and articulate in 
their discussions about money.  They particularly focus their reflection on the 
conflicts and dilemmas associated with money both at a personal and social level.  
Second, this social critique is often related to their general views about personal 
money and sense of personal responsibility in a social capacity.  Third, the 
interrelation of personal and social views about money is identified actively through 
the personal engagement by most participants in social roles directed towards social 
change.  For example Cian‟s personal view of money is closely linked to his choice of 
work (with refugees) and his personal motivations to make a difference in the lives of 
those less fortunate than himself.  Etzioni also identifies the link between social 
change and reorientation in thinking about money: 
The more broadly and deeply voluntary simplicity is embraced as a lifestyle 
by a given population, the greater the potential for realisation of a basic 
element of socio-economic equality.  (Etzioni 2004: 417)     
The environment too, is an important issue within a reoriented money narrative.  In 
particular, environmental sustainability is viewed as a moral issue.  Paul, for example, 
views environmental issues as one of the most serious dilemmas of our time.  He feels 
that destructive and short-sighted government policy as well as a lack of personal 
responsibility taken by citizens is contributing to an environmental crisis.  
Consequently Paul spends a lot of his time lobbying politicians on the issue.  
Hamilton and Mail identify this sense of environmentalism amongst downshifters: 
They are more likely to ask the Government to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
than give them $30 a week tax break.  (Hamilton and Mail 2003: 40) 
In summary, the markers of a reoriented money narrative are clearly recognisable.  
The narrative structure denotes „journey‟ - through challenges, a redirected path, and 
in the reflective disposition about the meaning of money.  A reoriented money 
narrative involves the conscious decision to choose alternative value priorities to 
money-oriented ones, and as such demonstrates an extended self-reflexivity.  In this 
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narrative, central to self-reflexivity is an ability to view money in moral terms, and 
the conflict associated with it as integral to learning and to the goal of connection 
with others, the environment or spirituality.    
Conclusion 
A significant risk in the telling of the reoriented money narrative is the romanticising 
or valorising of the downshifting experience – as if a lower income situation is 
preferable if only the right attitude and moral awareness accompanies it.  One need 
only look to the flawed money narrative as an antidote to this: the profound sense of 
material and emotional loss experienced in this narrative is a good reminder that, as 
Frank (1995: 135) says, „some situations cannot be risen above‟ and that being 
financially poor itself is not a context to even theoretically romanticise.  Dominant or 
deferred money narratives also testify to this: the eagerness with which most people 
organise their lives around the dominant money narrative is a reminder that money 
provides people the means to enjoy good things.  These goods, like travel, home 
ownership, or dinner out with friends are not only pleasures and leisures.  They also 
embody meaningful experiences and are markers of both self-identity and a sense of 
future.  
What a reoriented money narrative gently calls to deliberation is that there are 
meaningful alternatives to the dominant money narrative.  As a narrative which 
commands so much attention (whether by the pursuit of it or in a sense of failure 
through the lack of achieving it), the dominant money narrative omits to ask questions 
that the reoriented money narrative dares to ask.  For example, what is lost in the 
translation of a good life as a financially self-sufficient one?  Without even asking the 
question, the dominant money narrative nevertheless answers this in one way: what is 
lost is a sense self or social worth and the loss of future - the flawed money narrative 
is evidence of it.  Justifiably, there is no heroism in the struggle to make ends meet, 
just a „self-portrait of the society with minus signs‟ (Bauman 1998a: 73). 
The reoriented money narrative answers differently, in a voice reminiscent of this: 
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The offerings of the market no longer satisfy, not because the payoff is not 
large enough, but because it is made in the wrong currency.    
      (Lane in Pusey 2003: 110) 
This narrative asks, „if a good life is defined primarily through financial self-
sufficiency and individual efforts to secure financial security, self-worth and well-
being, what significant non-monetary values and behaviours are rendered obscure in 
the quest for a meaningful life?‟  The reoriented money narrative is a reminder that 
extended self-reflexivity requires awareness that how money is valued is a moral 
concern, not primarily an economic one.  It is moral because primary deference to it 
turns people inwards and with increasingly diminished concern about meeting the 
needs of the wider community.  It is moral because the values of social, spiritual and 
environmental connectedness are so often given greater fullness through the time and 
energy gained in the sacrifice of money.  And money will always be a moral issue 
when the lack of it strips away central human qualities such as self-worth, meaning 
and purpose.  The reoriented money narrative reiterates and brings the Aristotelian 
view back into focus: 
 
 
 
We have discovered that we do live in the world that Aristotle describes; 
that we share, at the same time, a deep longing for another simpler or purer 
world.  But the Aristotelian argument, which continues and refines the 
insights of tragedy, reminds us that we do not achieve purity or simplicity 
without a loss in richness and fullness of life – a loss, it is claimed, in 
intrinsic value.         (Nussbaum 1986: 421) 
Without any illusions of grandeur, the reoriented money narrative moves beyond the 
„simplicity‟ of a world defined strongly by a dominant money narrative.  Not willing 
to forsake the „richness and fullness of life‟ in such „purity‟, it takes the option to 
enter the fray where challenges, struggles and insights that esteem intrinsic human 
values alternative to money are granted. 
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11. Chapter Eleven: Thesis Discussion - Morality 
and Money 
 
11.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I revisit the primary themes of this research: the meaning of money as 
well as its implications for the sociological study of both money and morality.  First, I 
return to the sociology of money and outline some new possibilities for the field.  
Taking a step beyond a cultural view of money, I argue that while monetary meanings 
are shaped through different social and cultural relations as Zelizer proposes, money 
meanings also constitute moral orientations that consequently shape social relations in 
specific ways.  The inclusion of the moral dimension of money meanings provides a 
more complex and incisive theory of money. 
Second, I revisit current debates in the sociology of morality to argue that the 
relationship of money meanings to moral orientations creates a space for bringing 
theories about moral responsibility from the periphery of sociological thought to its 
centre.  First, I return to the question: what is morality?  Drawing on the findings in 
Part II of this thesis and other sociological examples I make the critical distinction 
between what constitutes social morality, and moral/ethical reflections on those 
social-moral orientations.  Second, I highlight the implications of this for the study of 
morality within sociology more broadly and I conclude with some directions for 
further research within the sociology of morality. 
11.2. Implications for the sociology of money 
Mitchell and Mickel (1999) note that in a field of inquiry so diverse in perspective as 
the sociology of money – from individualist to cultural, social, and economic points 
of view – the one most consistently repeated emphasis given the meaning of money is 
its importance to people: 
Money is probably the most emotionally meaningful object in contemporary 
life: only food and sex are its close competitors as common carriers of such 
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strong and diverse feelings, significance, and strivings.  
(Krueger in Mitchell and Mickel 1999: 569) 
The study of money and what money means to people is integral to understanding 
Australian culture.  In hindsight, Simmel is astute in focusing on money 
independently of other social forces, arguing that money can tell us much about the 
wider social mechanisms of society as a whole and insisting on the inter-relatedness 
of all forms of modern culture (Deflem 2003: 86-8).  The limit of Simmel‟s work 
(and for the subsequent sociologists and economists who follow his lead) lies in the 
creation of what Zelizer calls the „twinned stories of separate spheres and hostile 
worlds‟ (Zelizer 2007: 1059).  This consists in the long-held story amongst 
sociologists and economists alike, from Simmel onward, that there is a distinct sphere 
of rational and efficient economic activity that has no association whatsoever with 
personal relations in which „sentiment and solidarity‟ are found.  These separated 
spheres are thought of as hostile in the sense that economic rationality is understood 
to destroy relational intimacy and conversely human intimacy is said to undermine 
the efficiency of economic laws (Zelizer 2007: 1059).  In other words, the imposition 
of money on social relations has destructive tendencies, or, as Simmel notes, is 
„depersonalising‟ (Simmel 1991: 21). 
In Part I of this thesis I joined with Zelizer in challenging this two-dimensional focus 
on what money „does‟ to people.  Agreeing that „monetary phenomena consist of and 
depend on social practices‟ (Zelizer 2007: 1063) I focus on what money means to 
young adults in the context of their everyday understandings of what constitutes a 
„good life‟.  While Zelizer focuses on the domestic sphere in particular, I also show 
that money meanings are constituted in and through personal relations, networks and 
histories that interconnect with cultural meanings found in the family, as well as 
religious meanings or expectations of self-reliance.  For example, Jessica‟s story 
relates how the experience of abuse and gendered inequality shape money meanings 
while for Hannah, religious values and social networks are a primary influence.  And 
Kayla‟s story highlights that a desire to be self-reliant as well as subjective family and 
work history shapes money meanings quite differently than market-generated money 
meanings.  Here, a more nuanced picture of money emerges: that these young adults 
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negotiate money meanings within cultural, social and relational contexts that 
transform economic meanings into relationally-driven ones. 
The implications of this move have already been flagged by Zelizer and others.  It 
exposes the so-called boundaries between the „separate spheres‟ as a false divide and 
establishes the interrelation of economic activity with the creation of economic 
meaning through social and cultural relations.  As such, it highlights important social 
outcomes that would otherwise be viewed as trivial or even overlooked by economic 
sociology: for example the creation and perpetuation of gendered, class, race or ethnic 
inequalities (Zelizer 2007: 1059-60).  It shows that people are always finding ways to 
transform money meanings into forms that are personalised, cultural and even moral 
(Curruthers and Espeland 1998: 1386).  It also opens the doors to apply the study of 
money to other social areas, for example, religious institutions (as I have anecdotally 
done in Part I), or non-profit and community organisations (Baker and Jimerson 
1992). 
11.2.1. The moral dimension of money 
The necessity and importance of consolidating and extending Zelizer‟s view of 
money in Part I provides grounding for Part II of this thesis.  Part II establishes a 
different tone to Part I: in it I engage with a new set of sociological literature, the 
sociology of morality, and embark on an in-depth and systematic data analysis of the 
meaning of money across the three primary participant categories.  The consequences 
of this analysis for the sociology of money are primarily in terms of new possibilities 
for thinking about money meanings as not only shaped by cultural and social relations, 
but also moral relations.  If Zelizer‟s conception of money adds a critical cultural and 
relational dimensional to the sociological study of money, then Part II of this thesis 
uncovers yet another dimension deserving of sociological attention: the moral 
dimension.  The remainder of this section discusses the critical importance of the 
moral dimension to the sociological study of money. 
Money minus morality 
As noted in chapter two, very few sociologists (or economists) who study money 
discuss the relation of money to morality.  This is hardly surprising given that under a 
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classical „separate spheres‟ conception of money, money and morality (or moral 
values) are conceptualised as occupying alternative, mutually exclusive spheres of 
life.  Money theorists who challenge the „separate spheres‟ are more likely to bridge 
the gap between the two subjects.  Recall, for example, Zelizer noting the distinction 
people make between an „honest dollar‟ sourced from legitimately acquired earnings 
and „dirty money‟ sourced through disreputable means.  This, she explains, 
demonstrates that money is not divorced from morality (Zelizer 1998b).  Curruthers 
and Espeland (1998: 1389) similarly argue that terms such as „dirty money‟ and 
„money laundering‟ indicate that money itself may be viewed as „morally tainted or 
purified‟.   In these cases however, the observations do not yet constitute a systematic 
study of the moral dimensions of money. 
Discussion about the moral or ethical dimensions of money, if they exist at all, are 
usually found outside the sociology of money and often subsumed within the broader 
rubric of „consumption‟ and „consumer society‟.  For example, Bauman is probably 
the most prolific such writer who addresses the ethics of consumption and its 
destructive consequences on human togetherness in both Liquid Love (2003) and 
Wasted Lives (2004) among other publications (Rojek and Bauman 2004).  Among 
many others, Bourdieu (1984), Miles (1998), Baudrillard (2000) and Habermas (1987) 
have also questioned the consequences of consumerist forms on social structures 
and/or individual relations.  Once again, the issue of money itself remains anecdotal 
or even incidental to the broader social theme of consumer society. 
Morality in money language 
One of the few works describing money in moral terms is found in Frozen Desire, a 
historic and literary study of money in which Buchan (1997) traces the changing 
history and impact of money to the present time.  He notes that in contemporary 
society, people have redefined the language of the economy into an everyday „civic‟ 
language recognised as an avenue towards choice, prosperity, and a window to the 
future.  He recognises the shift in moral terms: 
For some time, and in many places, money was thought to be bad, but it is 
now thought, on the whole, to be good.  That inversion is the greatest to 
have occurred in the moral sentiments of the west.  Desires that resisted 
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incorporation into money turned pale and lost their power to convince: 
disinterested friendship, love and philanthropy became as suspect as the 
goals of once passionate wishes, honour and salvation.  Miserliness, which 
places potential above actual gratification, had once seemed the disease of 
money, as short sight is the disease of books; gradually, it lost its pathology 
and became the condition of moral health.   (Buchan 1997: 270-5) 
There are two critical observations in this part of Buchan‟s historical account that I 
have found nowhere in the sociology of money, nor incorporated into any systematic 
academic study.  The first is the observation that people are oriented or situated in 
relation to money, in particular ways, at particular times.  In this case, Buchan notes 
that contemporary individuals in the west are oriented towards money as „good‟ and 
equate it with „health‟.  It is clear from his account that people in the west have not 
always felt oriented towards money in this way.  The second observation is the 
implicit recognition that such an orientation is moral in its framing (e.g. „the 
condition of moral health‟), and that moreover, it is a moral sentiment that has taken 
root as a wider cultural and social disposition („the moral sentiments of the west‟).  
These two observations made by Buchan mirror the substantive findings of my 
analysis in Part II of this thesis.  Amongst the middle-income young adults, the 
dominant money narrative runs deep and is privileged amongst them as a means to 
achieve the „good life‟.  This narrative situates personal money as „good‟: as 
something to be attained, benefited from, and invested in.  Similarly to Buchan, I 
have argued that such a stance towards the „good‟ is moral because of its evaluative 
and orienting character.  Related to this moral orientation is the emphasis in the 
narrative on money as central to hopes and dreams about the future and the drive 
towards self-reliance.  Also implicated is the common feeling of deep ambivalence 
about, and disconnection from, social problems and their solutions. 
Low-income participants highlight how money meanings are morally oriented in yet 
another way.  Like middle-income participants, they too assent to the dominant 
money narrative, acknowledging the „good‟ of money as a means to enjoy a „good 
life‟.  However their relative inability to engage in the dominant money narrative 
along with the realities of living on low-incomes lends to the downplaying of money 
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in their lives.  It is only when low-income participants can anticipate future access to 
the dominant money narrative that they become strongly oriented towards an 
optimistic future.  The transience of their present low-income is tolerated as part of a 
necessary and deferred narrative living in future anticipation of a dominant money 
narrative.  Alternatively, without access to a dominant money narrative and with a 
low-income reality stretching ahead indefinitely, money meanings form a different 
narrative thread.  Loaded with a sense of inadequacy and an inability to see or plan 
for a future, the static low-income feel flawed.  They exist in a narrative bunched 
heavily in the present with no sense of control or determination over where life is 
going.  In a context where the dominant money narrative is privileged, those without 
access to money can do little but hope that somehow, sometime, that privilege will 
once again be granted to them. 
Downshifter participants provide a third perspective to the moral dimension of money 
meanings.  They also acknowledge the dominant money narrative as a privileged one.  
But unlike the other narratives, there is an implicit recognition in this narrative that 
the privileging of the dominant money narrative constitutes a morally oriented choice.  
In also seeking other (personal, interpersonal or social) values over monetary ones, 
this is a narrative engaged in a reorientation process in relation to what constitutes 
„good‟ in life.  In other words, the reoriented narrative embodies a moral awareness 
characterised through an engagement with value conflicts in which goods alternative 
to money are named and given claim.   
Here, themes identified across three different income contexts and their related 
money meanings point to one common idea: that money meanings are oriented in 
particular ways, and moreover, in moral ways.  By all accounts, this is not a 
surprising finding.  As already noted in the work of Taylor (1989) and Bauman (1993) 
it is clear that moral capacity is indivisible from being human.  Moral orientations 
towards the „good‟, argues Taylor, establishes human identity, meaning and life 
direction (Taylor 1989: 46-52).  As a widespread „good‟ or disposition in this culture, 
moral orientations towards money also establish human identity, meaning and 
people‟s sense of future and direction.   
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New possibilities 
What is surprising is that this is a new discussion in both classical and contemporary 
sociologies of money.  Although recognised in the discipline as arguably the most 
„emotionally meaningful object in contemporary life‟ (Mitchell and Mickel 1999: 
569), the way money meanings are oriented and the personal and social consequences 
of those orientations have yet to be given significant attention.  This is, in part, the 
legacy of a cultural understanding of money through economic, market driven terms: 
value-neutral, homogenous, commodifying, and unbound by ethical or moral 
considerations (Zelizer 1989: 346-7).  As Wilk notes, „when economics began its 
ascendancy in the late 19th century, it systematically purged its language of morally 
tinged terms‟ (Wilk 2001: 246).  To argue that money needs to be understood in 
moral terms is quite a confrontation to this view. 
Nevertheless, the shift in thinking has already been initiated in no small way by 
contemporary theorists such as Zelizer and Singh who turn money meanings from 
their traditionally conceived flat, two dimensional view of the hostile spheres into a 
multi-dimensional view in which social, relational, and emotional influences are also 
shown to transform money meanings rather than merely the converse being the case.  
The success of findings such as these lie in the ability to pinpoint interpersonal and 
relational influences on money meanings.  However while moving beyond the 
anecdotal, these theorists must still choose highly specific aspects of social culture, or 
money „circuits‟ as Zelizer (2000: 385) names them, from which to make their point.  
Some examples include discussions about how lottery winners treat their winnings 
(Zelizer 1998b) or the prestigious New York $24 award as a discussion about the 
economic value and symbolism invested in social contribution (Curruthers and 
Espeland 1998).   
Thus, on the one hand classical sociological conceptions of money claim to identify 
what money (as a value-neutral, independent object) means in society and what it 
does to human relations, while on the other hand contemporary theories challenge this 
view but can only do so within the specific money contexts – domestic money, lottery 
winnings, a prestigious prize – in which interpersonal relationships can be explored.  
In other words, the sociological challenge to view money in general cultural terms as 
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heterogeneous, laden with cultural, social, or „moral‟ values remains constrained by 
either the (classical) inability to view money qualitatively at all, or the contemporary 
limitation of being able to do so only in terms relative to specific money „circuits‟.  
The identification of money meanings as deeply morally oriented in this study opens 
up new possibilities within the sociology of money for making claims about the 
cultural, social and moral consequences of money meanings without limiting money 
to a value-neutral object or being confined to a narrow sphere of economic exchange, 
such as „dirty‟ or „laundered‟ money (Curruthers and Espeland 1998: 1389).  In the 
following section I outline the scope of these possibilities, first in relation to 
contemporary theories, and then classical ones. 
11.2.2. Contemporary theories: Zelizer 
Understanding the moral dimension of money augments contemporary sociological 
claims about money.  For example it contributes to Zelizer‟s claim because it 
systematically demonstrates how non-pecuniary values, such as moral orientations, 
deeply influence everyday money meanings.  While Zelizer‟s work has focussed on 
the non-pecuniary values generated through social and relational practices around 
money, this work draws on her findings and then extends them into a focus on the 
moral-value dimensions of money meanings. 
The moral dimension of money also contributes to Zelizer‟s work because it can 
apply specific concepts of her work in more general terms.  For example, some ideas 
central to her argument, such as „earmarking monies‟ could be seen to only apply to 
specific forms of money relations that are in danger of being criticised as „marginal‟ 
economies.  Zelizer identifies „earmarking‟ as the „marking of money with distinct 
qualities and values‟ through different networks of social relations.  In other words, 
otherwise identical monetary media – depending on its use and the social relation in 
which it is used – can serve entirely different functions: from a wage to tip to bonus, 
gift, or charity.  Thus, she argues, social practices order what are otherwise identical 
forms of money into distinctly different categories that involve „restrictions and 
distinctions that are as influential as the rationing of primitive money‟ (Zelizer 1994: 
24; Zelizer 2007: 1062).  This argument has come under criticism, as Zelizer herself 
notes (Zelizer 2007).  It has been sidelined as the study of „quasi‟ monetary 
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phenomena, not „real‟ money because of its focus on small-scale processes and 
economies (family, gift, welfare) that are considered peripheral to the „serious‟ 
economies (Zelizer 2007: 1062).   
However, the identification of the moral dimension of money extends the idea of 
„earmarking‟ to a far more general sphere of money meanings to which the critique 
that it does not address „real‟ money circuits cannot apply.  From a perspective of 
moral orientations, I argue that moral orientations arrange what are otherwise 
identical forms of money into distinct categories, or money meanings.  For example, 
deference to a dominant money narrative (orientation towards money as primarily 
„good‟) situates a person in particular ways towards money meanings: towards self-
reliance, personal well-being, and future material aspirations.  On the other hand, 
living within a flawed money narrative situates money meanings differently: people 
feel flawed or stigmatised in some way in relation to money, unable to plan beyond 
the present and with little sense of direction.   
Thus, when understood in moral terms, money meanings can be seen as arranged in 
socially distinct ways, depending on those orientations.  Moreover, the focus here is 
not on so-called „marginal‟ economic spheres56.  The focus is on everyday young 
adults engaged in a large range of economic activities – from the employment 
economy to welfare economy to household economy to student, part-time, volunteer, 
charity economy and so on.  They constitute not peripheral or marginal meanings 
when it comes to the market, but the human negotiation of money meanings 
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 It should be noted that I differ with claims that Zelizer‟s focus on family, gift or welfare economies 
are „marginal‟ or „quasi‟ forms of money.  As Zelizer notes, theorists are wrong to sideline these 
economies as beyond or outside the „real‟ economy, because „households, kinship groups, friendship 
networks, neighbourhoods, and ostensibly non-economic organizations such as churches and voluntary 
associations play significant parts in a wide range of economic activity.‟ (Zelizer 2007: 1065).  Rather, I 
make the point to illustrate that when understood in terms of the moral dimensions of money, such 
criticism can no longer be made at all.  
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themselves in a wide range of contexts of everyday living.  Thus, not only is it not a 
marginalised economic sphere, but it is a site of the active creation of culture (as well 
as economic culture), because as Zelizer notes, „people create culture relationally‟ 
(Zelizer 2007: 1063). 
Therefore it becomes possible to identify some of the patterned or even structured 
money meanings that exist in this culture.  As Curruthers and Espeland note:  
Like all other social objects, money has meaning that depends on its use and 
context.  Such uses are not, however, idiosyncratic.  Nor is context ad hoc.  
Both are socially structured in patterned ways we can discern.   
      (Curruthers and Espeland 1998: 1386) 
This is important, because although Zelizer establishes this patterning through 
specific examples (such as analysis of gift exchange), there has been some contention 
over applying her argument to broader social (or economic) structures.  Here, I 
identify that more generalised money meanings are shaped by a moral deference to 
money that differentiates the way people understand themselves, their relationships 
with others and their sense of responsibility towards others.  At its very heart, money 
is „earmarked‟ in moral terms in addition to the earmarking through social relations 
that Zelizer identifies. 
Thus, analysing money in moral terms creates new opportunity within the sociology 
of money to again comment and critique the place of money meanings in society – 
something that contemporary theorists have not focussed analytical attention on.  For 
example, Zelizer‟s analysis is a critique of classical conceptions of money that fail to 
reference the social and relational sources of their meanings, and thus her attention is 
on the way money is given meaning through social relations.  In doing so, she also 
challenges the basis of the classical argument that money is in any way corrupting, 
depersonalising or implicated in the depletion of social relationships.  On the one 
hand, Zelizer and other contemporary theorists are right to challenge the assumptions 
upon which earlier critiques about money stood: money meanings are constituted 
socially and relationally, not merely in market terms.  On the other hand however, 
moral and ethical questions about the meaning of money in society tend not to be 
asked more recently in the sociology of money, for example questions about how 
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money is implicated in issues of social justice, equality, or human rights.  In other 
words, questions about how money meanings are shaped by social relations are 
increasingly common, but have yet to questions whether those money meanings 
(regardless of how they are constituted) are „good‟ for social relations or not. 
In this thesis I have shown that how money is valued is a moral concern: that money 
meanings are constituted morally and that this has moral implications for personal 
and social relations.  Here, it becomes possible once more to discuss what these 
findings may mean for this society, for this time.  These critiques do not need to 
assume that it is money that „does‟ things to social relations, but nor does it assume 
that because money meanings are socially constituted that they are by implication, 
„good‟.  While this is an important point to be made in relation to the sociology of 
money, it will be explained in more depth in section 11.3 of this chapter. 
11.2.3. Classical theories: Simmel 
The second critical point is that recognising the moral dimension of money allows a 
re-reading of classical conceptions of money in a far more nuanced way.  In particular, 
rather than refuting some of the claims Simmel made about money, I am able to agree 
with them – but from a different sociological perspective.  I have already critiqued 
Simmel‟s claim that money represents an absolute means, is the ultimate expression 
of all values, and is itself value-neutral (Simmel 1978: 120-8).  Rather, I argue that 
money meanings are deeply implicated morally, the antithesis of Simmel‟s claim.  
However, the conclusions Simmel arrives at about the consequences of money 
meanings in our culture remain worthy of discussion.  For example, Simmel argued 
that money affects social relationships, impersonalising relations between people.  He 
argues that money distances one person from the next.  He also claims that money 
creates the desire for independence from others and a greater reliance on oneself 
(Simmel 1991: 21). 
I have made similar claims in Part II of this thesis.  However, this is not because 
money occupies a separate, economic sphere and acts in these ways upon personal 
relations.  Money does not impersonalise relations between people because of its 
morally indifferent and objective nature.  Rather, money meanings – constituted in 
and through personal relationships (Zelizer 2007) and social histories that converge 
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(Bourdieu 1990), are morally oriented.  The outcomes identified by Simmel - social 
disconnection and distance, or the drive for economic self-reliance - are consequences 
of these moral orientations and not merely the corrupting character of money.  
To clarify, the orientation in our culture towards the acquisition and attainment of 
money and monetary goals is understood as a „good‟.  Money itself does not destroy 
social relations, rather money meanings are constituted through the social and cultural 
valuing of personal money over other goods.  That is, social relations are shaped 
through money meanings as much as money meanings are shaped through social and 
cultural relations.  What is so significant about this is that moral orientations towards 
money carry a lot of weight in how those social relations are shaped.  For example, in 
this culture (as this thesis has shown) personal money meanings are generally not 
morally oriented towards the „social‟ or „communal‟ good: if they were, money 
meanings and behaviours would be oriented toward entirely different outcomes.  
Rather, I have noted that personal money meanings (for example in the dominant 
money narrative) are oriented towards personal ends, and as such social relationships 
(as well as goals, lifestyles and aspirations towards what constitutes a „good life‟) are 
also implicated in this reality.   
In other words, money does not „do‟ things to people: rather our moral orientations 
towards money are laden with personal and social consequences.  From this 
perspective, money issues are moral issues.  That young adults understand personal 
money accumulation as a „right‟ is a moral issue because it represents an active 
orientation that provides them with identity, meaning and direction (Taylor 1989).  
Similarly, the valuing of the dominant money narrative is a moral issue in which all 
participants are implicated.  A sense of disconnection from social problems also 
constitutes a moral issue: the consequence of a general moral orientation towards 
money as „good‟.  The way those with little money are stigmatised and left to their 
own devices is, again, a moral issue in which all participants play a part: not least the 
consequence of the felt inability to orient oneself towards money.  Hence, Simmel 
was not mistaken when he identified some of these consequences of money meanings.  
It was in defining money meanings themselves that Simmel did not identify that a 
central component of being human is to be morally orientated.  These findings show 
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that regardless of, even despite, the so-called value-neutral „logic‟ so endlessly 
applied to money, money meanings are intimately shaped in moral terms. 
Therefore, the cultural privileging of money points to the existence of a patterned 
moral valuing of money that carries social and relational significance.  As such, it 
gives voice to a critique of the consequences of money meanings without falling back 
on a fictitious, two-dimensional view of money spheres that are hostile to one another. 
The implications of the moral dimensions of money also challenge the sociology of 
money – and economic sociology – in more general and social terms.  Shearer 
explains why: 
…as a discourse, economic theory can never be merely descriptive, but 
rather it always already serves to constitute the human subject as a sovereign, 
self-interested maximizer.  But when all human subjects are so construed, 
self-interest becomes the means to the attainment not only of the actor‟s 
private good, but of the collective or interpersonal good as well.  In other 
words, economics is not an ethically neutral discipline that might be brought 
to moral rectitude by the simple addition of a few regulatory or prohibitive 
norms; rather, and more insidiously, economic theory first creates a 
community of sovereign and independent subjects, and then instantiates 
those ethical norms and moral codes appropriate to such a community.  So 
long as the discourse that constitutes the economic subject remains 
unchallenged, so too will the ethics that govern that subject.   
       (Shearer 2002: 569) 
This research provides new possibilities for the sociology of money to engage with 
money in its moral dimensions.  This is not just necessary as a means to properly 
theorise the properties or characteristics of money, or to outline the processes 
whereby money becomes meaningful to human actors.  It is necessary so that readers 
may conscientiously grapple with the human consequences of the moral dimensions 
of money: how money meanings (and economic theories) themselves are morally 
oriented and carry not only personal, but interpersonal and social implications.   
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11.2.4. Future directions in the sociology of money 
Consequently, recognising the moral dimension of money both broadens and deepens 
the cultural analysis and critique of money meanings from early to contemporary 
theories.  It also opens opportunities for further study and even new disciplinary 
directions within the sociology of money.  As a topic of inquiry with little 
prerequisite, there are numerous possible avenues through which to explore the 
relationship between money meanings and moral orientations.  In particular, talking 
about money in moral terms allows a fresh look at how money is morally oriented in 
a wide range of social contexts, from the family to religious groups to the legal and 
welfare system, in the context of poverty or extreme wealth, in rural communities or 
in communes where sharing possessions is a necessity.  Cross-cultural comparisons of 
moral orientations towards money would also be insightful: from extremely wealth-
driven cultures to simple-living cultures (e.g. Amish); from the slums in Bangkok to 
war torn cities in the Middle East.  Some specific research directions might include:    
 To what extent do the more „market-like‟ or more rationalized, impersonal, 
efficient systems (Zelizer 2007: 1066) engage in the language of moral 
orientations? 
 What moral orientations drive philanthropic organisations and to what extent do 
these languages influence mainstream corporate cultures? 
 Do moral orientations towards money change over time or generations?  E.g. 
adolescent or retiree age moral orientations? 
 To what extent are marketing and media strategies implicated in the generation 
of cultural money orientations?   
 To what extent is family socialisation or educational programs implicated in the 
generation of money orientations amongst children and adolescents?  
 Are there critical gender or ethnic differences in moral orientations towards 
money? 
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 What is the impetus for changing moral orientations? For example, is a shift in 
moral orientation followed by a behavioural shift (such as downshifting) or the 
converse? Do significant life events shift money orientations? 
 How do dominant moral orientations shape political landscapes?   
One of the benefits of analysing the moral dimensions of money is that it bridges key 
concepts found in the sociology of money with more general sociological processes, 
such as social morality.  Through this continuity, broader sociological concepts such 
as agency, materiality and the role of inequality can be analysed more deeply in 
relation to economic contexts (Beamish 2007: 993).  The next section highlights some 
of these themes through a specific discussion about the implications of the thesis 
findings for the sociology of morality. 
11.3. Implications for the sociology of morality  
As Bellah et al. write, „Our problems today are not just political.  They are moral and 
have to do with the meaning of life‟ (1985: 295).  The identification of money 
meanings in moral terms is implicated in far more than a rethinking of how sociology 
treats the issue of money.  It also testifies to the centrality of moral issues in everyday 
life and meaning-making.  Primarily, it requires a re-thinking of the question, „what is 
morality?‟ and „how does sociology engage with this issue‟?  First, I will return to the 
question of what constitutes morality and critically engage with it in light of the thesis 
findings.   
11.3.1. What is morality? 
In Part II of this thesis I found that people have common dispositions towards money 
through which money meanings and practices are co-ordinated and shared in relation 
to what constitutes a „good life‟.  I have described these dispositions as morally 
oriented, or as evaluative stances taken towards what is „good‟ and important or 
conversely, negative, not good or insignificant.  These moral orientations towards 
money, while shifting with personal income context, tend to privilege a particular 
money disposition, the dominant money narrative.  Deference to this money narrative 
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tends to be shared or at least understood and acknowledged by all participants in this 
study.  
In many ways, the description of this shared moral orientation mirrors Durkheim‟s 
model of morality, the „morality of co-operation‟ (Durkheim 1972: 8).  In his model, 
morality is a product of the „social‟.  The solidarity formed through, for example, 
shared money orientations, would be described as a „function‟ of bringing about 
social cohesion.  In other words, from a Durkheimian view, this form of social 
morality is a normative moral standard and ideal for the best function of society 
(Durkheim 1972).  In this study, the data does describes a social form of morality that 
people commonly share or at least acknowledge as a dominant and normative money 
orientation (the dominant money narrative), and this can be understood in part to 
mirror Durkheim‟s model of social morality.   
At this point, the question arises: does this Durkheimian „social morality‟ in the form 
of morally oriented money meanings adequately address the question of „what 
constitutes morality?‟  The findings of this study suggest that sociologically, defining 
morality is far more complex than this.  In 1991, Niklas Luhmann posed a question 
that addresses the heart of this theme.  He asked, „Is social morality „good‟ without 
question? (Luhmann 1991: 87).  In other words, are the „normative‟, shared moral 
orientations towards money in our culture „good‟ or moral simply because they are 
normative, shared and socially legitimated?   
On the one hand the data does point to a normatively understood „social morality‟ as 
described above.  On the other hand, the data also shows that this „social morality‟ 
carries consequences that lead to both individually and socially negative outcomes.  
For example, those who live by a dominant money narrative feel disconnected from 
social problems and often empowered only to act in relation to bettering their own 
lives, not others.  Conversely, those who cannot live by the dominant money narrative 
feel stigmatised or flawed by their inability to live up to normative money 
expectations.  In other words, if such „social morality‟ is a social „ideal‟ as Durkheim 
argues, who is it „ideal‟ for?  Certainly not for the low-income, who live in the theatre 
of expectations of a „good life‟ but can never quite make it on stage.   
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These consequences frame the question in another way: within a „social morality‟ 
where deference to the dominant money narrative is constituted as „good‟, what 
values and goals are forgotten or overlooked?  The downshifters of the study give 
some insight here.  They recognise dominant money orientations as a form of social 
morality, but that other important values are lost in deference to it.  They recognise 
that the ends of this social morality can suppress personal moral responsibility rather 
than enable it.  They recognise that the „good‟ of the social morality is often 
construed only in individualistic terms, and that sometimes little good is even found 
for the „self‟ because alternative values that are sacrificed are too costly (e.g. Jarrod).  
They recognise that the „good‟ found in the dominant money narrative is generally 
not for others, and especially not for the poor or the disadvantaged.  They realise that 
investing in other people is so difficult to do when investing in the dominant money 
narrative.  They also understand that to take personal moral responsibility for others 
often means choosing against the „social morality‟ in question.   
Once again, the question of whether „morality is „good‟ without question arises.  
Asked in an alternative way, this is the same question posed by Davydonva and 
Sharrock: „what is the moral significance of the fact that morality is (allegedly) social 
in nature?‟ (Davydova and Sharrock 2003: 373).  I draw on other research to help to 
address this question.  In describing the „moral order of a suburb‟, Baumgartner 
(1988:133-4) found what appeared to be a picture of social order and cohesion within 
the suburb, including the avoidance of conflict, self-reliance, high mobility, and 
keeping to oneself - something he names „moral minimalism‟.  However, 
Baumgartner found that this apparent social order actually undermines the growth of 
strong social bonds and harmony between neighbours because it is characterised by 
weak social ties that breeds indifference and a lack of care for one another.  In 
conclusion he questions the normative social notion of „harmony‟, and challenges the 
reader to consider that moral indicators of social cohesion may actually include what 
is generally viewed as disintegrative.    
Perhaps one of the most stark examples to give some clarity to the question of 
whether or not social morality is inevitably „good‟ comes from Bauman‟s Modernity 
and the Holocaust (1989).  Here, Bauman considers the „social production of immoral 
behaviour‟ through the example of the Holocaust (Bauman 1989: 169).  Bauman‟s 
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central thesis is this: that the indescribably horrific events of the Holocaust were 
made possible and even reasonable through the „spirit of instrumental rationality, and 
its modern, bureaucratic form of institutionalization.‟  He writes that the vast majority 
of perpetrators of the Holocaust were „normal‟ people who were following 
legitimately sanctioned, established standards of normalised, modern rational action 
(Bauman 1989: 18-19).  Living within a particular „authorised‟ and „routinised‟ 
bureaucratic administration like any modern institution would have been, these were 
„good‟ Germans - at least hard working, conscientious and efficient bureaucrats who 
did their jobs well according to the social morality of that time and place (Bauman 
1989: 21)57.    
Nevertheless, it is obvious that this form of „social morality‟ was not „good‟, in fact it 
generated a period of violence, genocide and inhumanity on a scale previously 
incomprehensible.  As a form of social morality then, it did not produce moral ends.  
Within a society that excelled at maintaining social cohesion, it is clear that the 
human capacity to differentiate between right and wrong lay outside this conscience 
collective, to use Durkheim‟s term (Bauman 1989: 178).  In the context of the 
Holocaust, Bauman writes that some people did act against the social rules of Nazi 
Germany, and that there were no political or religious „determinants‟ that can help 
describe why they chose to act this way, most often at the risk of their own lives 
(Bauman 1989: 168).  What this invites sociological theory to grapple with is that 
moral behaviour may manifest in the resistance to or insubordination to social norms, 
in „openly defying social solidarity and consensus.‟(Bauman 1989: 177).  
Bauman‟s discussion critiques the long held sociological assumption (drawing on 
Durkheim) that society gives birth to moral behaviour, maintains it through its 
institutions, and is given to „humanizing‟ and „moralizing‟; or that immoral conduct is 
a malfunction of „normal social arrangements‟ (Bauman 1989: 198).  What the 
                                                   
 
57
 Cf. Arendt (1964), Milgram (1974), Gordon (1984) 
  
 
 
257 
Holocaust highlights in all its tragedy is the possibility that „society‟ may act as a 
„morality-silencing‟ force‟ (Bauman 1989: 174).  My intention by using this critique 
is not to claim that moral orientations towards money provide a contemporary parallel 
to the human devastation of the Holocaust.  My intention is to raise the sociological 
question about whether people‟s moral orientations towards the dominant money 
narrative as integral to a „good life‟ is, in fact, humanly „good‟.  Or are such money 
orientations actually also implicated in „morality-silencing‟?   
The data itself suggests so.  It suggests that money is as deeply morally orienting as it 
is related to economic concerns.  It suggests that primary deference to money turns 
people inwards and with increasingly diminished concern about meeting the wider 
needs of community.  It proposes that the lack of money strips away central human 
qualities such as self-worth, meaning and future purpose.  And it also shows that 
other values, such as social, spiritual or environmental connectedness are often given 
greater depth and fullness through the time and energy granted in the letting go of 
monetary goals.  As such, money orientations are not merely shared moral 
orientations that fulfil the function of social cohesion.  They are also implicated in the 
dulling, numbing, or even forgetting about personal moral responsibility.  In other 
words, the result of moral orientations towards money can suppress personal moral 
responsibility rather than enable it. 
The consequences of these findings point to the need to address the earlier question:  
„what is the moral significance of the fact that morality is (allegedly) social in 
nature?‟ (Davydova and Sharrock 2003: 373).  It points beyond Durkheim‟s concept 
of morality as purely social, or that human beings are moral only because they live in 
society and that it is society that brings about moral behaviour amongst people groups.  
Of course, social morality is clearly visible, for example in the moral orientation 
towards a dominant money narrative.  But the moral significance of these shared 
orientations is also shown to be significant here.  Thus, I concur with Davydonva and 
Sharrock (2003: 374) who argue that the „social character‟ of morality is not an 
„external basis for establishing the framework of morality‟ but rather more simply is 
an „input‟ into discussion about what constitutes morality.  In other words, morality is 
both more complex and consequential than its social form/character, and it is this 
complexity that requires discussion. 
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11.3.2. The complex parts of morality 
My intention in this discussion is not to outline what definitively constitutes 
„morality‟ from a sociological point of view: this task is too great for this thesis.  
However, the data does provide a basis from which to at least suggest what elements 
may require further exploration in such a task.  In doing so, I revisit the earlier 
definitions of morality made in chapter four in the context of the work of both 
Charles Taylor and Zygmunt Bauman and in particular their insistence that the „self‟ 
is moral.  
It is clear so far that morality is part social in character, but that this is not enough for 
a discussion about what constitutes „morality‟.  The data points to different responses 
to shared moral orientations such as the dominant money narrative.  Most participants 
participate in the dominant money narrative in some form: most often actively 
participating in it (e.g. middle-income), looking forward to such participation 
(transient low-income) or feeling flawed in some way through being unable to 
participate (static low-income).  Other participants however, in particular the 
downshifting participants, recognise the dominant moral orientations but do not 
participate, choosing to prioritise other values above them. 
What this demonstrates is the evaluative character of moral orientations by 
individuals.  Returning to Taylor‟s stance, humans are moral because culturally and 
historically they have continued to grapple with questions and behaviour towards 
what is right, good, evil, inconsequential, or of serious importance.  Accordingly, 
morality is defined as the capacity of humans to evaluate and judge between 
distinctions, and is related to orientation: knowing where „I‟ stand in relation to what 
is important or inconsequential (Taylor 1989: 28).  In other words, as Taylor argues, 
it is the notion of self and identity that arises through the embodying of moral stances 
– and thus morality is intrinsically tied to the human „self‟, not just a product of 
human sociality.    
However beyond this, the data points to the need for a more complex understanding 
of how the moral „self‟ is constrained or enabled by the „social‟ character of morality.  
For example, I have indicated in chapter seven that subjective moral evaluation may 
be limited or narrowly constrained by social moral repertoires such as the dominant 
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money narrative.  I call this constrained evaluative behaviour a „limited self-
reflexivity‟.   This refers to the ability to engage creatively in choice where those 
choices are framed by the standardising mode of the money economy (Giddens 1991: 
196).  On the other hand, the downshifters indicate that a different evaluative 
capability exists.  In these cases, the meaning of money is constitutively shifted and 
defined in modes alternative to the standardised one.  In chapter ten I name this an 
„extended self-reflexivity‟, because here participants demonstrate an ability to frame 
moral stances outside of the dominant money narrative, and moreover demonstrate an 
evaluative critique of the standardising mode itself. 
Thus, while Taylor is right in arguing that the „self‟ is moral, he does not engage 
deeply with any social limits or constraints to the moral self - for example 
standardising modes of money meanings.58  Here, Bauman provides more clarity.  
Many of Bauman‟s works (for example Bauman 1989; Bauman 1993; Bauman 1998a) 
are directed towards the argument that it is (modern and post-modern) social 
processes that suppress moral expression59.  Bauman pinpoints something central to 
this data: that social moral forms such as shared moral dispositions towards a 
dominant money narrative may diminish, or at least constrain, personal moral 
                                                   
 
58
 In Ethics of Authenticity, Taylor (1992) does engage with what constitutes a distortion of moral 
sources, e.g. excessive individualism or narcissism.  However, Taylor notes that to rediscover an 
„authentic‟ moral orientation is to rediscover the historical moral transitions that lead to the moral 
stances of today: for example the idea of being true to oneself, liberalism, self-determination and self-
control, the human need to be recognised and treated with dignity, having self-responsibility and the 
desire for the improvement of well-being and better living standards for all.  Thus, for Taylor, moral 
authenticity is about rediscovering historic moral sources – not engaging with the way that present 
social forms constrain the moral self. 
59
 For example, recall the Holocaust as an example of how modern processes of rationality, bureaucratic 
social control, and human distance all diminish personal moral capacity because they remove individual 
proximity to the Other and thus diminish capacity to take responsibility for the Other.  I have provided 
many more of Bauman‟s examples in chapter four.   
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capacity and extended self-reflexivity.  For as long as moral evaluations are limited to 
the standardising mode of money meanings, people are more likely to give priority to 
money over other values, feel disconnected from needs of others, or feel inadequate 
as human beings unless they have enough.  By resisting the moral principles of the 
standardising mode, however, some people make qualitatively different choices.  
Exercising extended self-reflexivity through an ability to critique the standardising 
mode, participants are more likely to choose proximity to others over disconnection.  
They choose to take responsibility for those in need, for the environment, for their 
spirituality.   
What Bauman helps to clarify is that moral capacity does not necessarily lie in the 
choice to follow social moral systems.  In this thesis, some people demonstrate far 
greater moral capacity through the often-times difficult and vulnerable position of 
choosing to live with less money rather than more.  The ability to engage in a critique 
of the standardising mode and choose values alternative to it opens up new avenues 
for taking responsibility for social, environmental and spiritual needs in ways 
otherwise difficult to do so.  In other words, an „extended self-reflexivity‟ is an 
important part of enacting moral capacity.  In this study it is those with extended self-
reflexivity who recognise that shared morally oriented dispositions do not enhance 
moral capacity, but rather may render it diminished or inaudible.  Confronted with 
this awareness, these participants choose to enact moral capacity in a myriad of 
alternative ways. 
In summary, a number of elements are shown here to be important to any concept of 
morality.  The first is to acknowledge that „social morality‟ in a Durkheim sense does 
exist: shared moral dispositions, such as money meanings, do shape prevailing and 
standardising cultural norms.  The second, however, is to not assume that „morality‟ 
is limited to the „social‟.  The data also demonstrates that moral stances are far more 
personal than this: subjective moral evaluation is central to identity-formation and 
life-direction (Taylor 1989).  Third, the data suggests that social forms of moral 
orientation may constrain and diminish individual moral capacity and self-reflexivity 
by limiting choice to within the standardising mode.  Fourth, the application of 
„extended self-reflexivity‟ through the ability to critique and choose alternatives to 
the standardising mode combine to motivate moral capacity and moral responsibility. 
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Most importantly, these elements begin to address the two crucial sociological 
questions already asked: is money simply „good‟ without question? (Luhmann 1991: 
87) and „what is the moral significance of the fact that morality is (allegedly) social in 
nature?‟ (Davydova and Sharrock 2003: 373).  The findings of this thesis point to an 
understanding that money is not simply „good‟, because as a form of social morality, 
it can significantly diminish and limit personal moral capacity on a widespread scale.  
The following section briefly addresses the significance of this for sociology as a 
discipline. 
11.3.3. The place of morality in sociology 
At some levels, sociology has treated morality in a similar way to money: as 
phenomena that sits uneasily, or even outside the traditional narratives of the field.  
Most traditional narratives within sociology have had little reference to morality, as 
Bauman notes.  Their relationship is, at best, he writes, „awkward and ambiguous‟ 
(Bauman 1989: 169-70).  Bauman explains that following the lead of science in 
general, sociological discourse has developed languages specifically devoid of any 
religious or teleological content.  As a consequence, moral theory could no longer 
draw on any non-social (e.g. existential) reference for moral norms (Bauman 1989: 
170).  Or as Tjeltveit notes, science is supposed to be involved in the description of 
facts, not the prescription of values: including an assumption that there is an 
„unbridgeable divide‟ between the two (Tjeltveit 2003: 397). 
As a result, most moral theory is limited to discourse about the social forms of 
morality that arise when there is widespread conformity to an idea of what is „good‟ 
or „moral‟.  I do not propose that social institutions or the widespread conformity to 
particular behaviours has nothing to do with morality.  On the contrary, I have shown 
in this thesis that the existence of the dominant money narrative constitutes a socially 
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and institutionally legitimated moral orientation.60  My argument is that morality is 
far more than this: that the self is „moral‟ and that moral capacity also lies outside 
(and sometimes in spite) of social forms of moral orientation.  It is in the discussion 
that arises about the relationship between these two forms of morality that sociology 
has yet so much scope to explore.  There is huge potential within sociology to 
examine, discuss and debate the way that social forms of morality (whether in the 
forms of institutional structures or standardising cultural norms) may diminish – or 
even enhance, if that be the case - personal moral capacity.   
This is significant because it also indicates something about the discipline more 
generally: that sociologists often refrain from making moral evaluations regarding 
whatever it is other people treat as moral (Davydova and Sharrock 2003: 372).  
Davydova and Sharrock identify this perceived neutrality as a product of the 
„fact/value distinction‟: 
…which operates on the assumption that there is a privileged vantage point 
from which a sociologist can observe society‟s morality without making 
personal commitment to any judgement.       
     (Davydova and Sharrock 2003: 373) 
                                                   
 
60
 As a point of clarification on this issue, I do not fully concur with Bauman‟s theory of morality.  
Bauman argues that morality cannot be social because a social morality does not lead to moral ends.  
Therefore, moral capacity is defined as the substantive nature of morality, independent of the social 
(Davydonv and Sharrock 2003).  My argument is similar, but I maintain that morality does exist in its 
social form (where it is moral because of a widespread conformity to the evaluation of something as 
„good‟, e.g. the dominant money narrative).  However this form of social morality cannot be assumed as 
„good‟ and resulting in personal moral capacity.  Like Bauman and Taylor, I agree that human beings 
are evaluative beings with personal moral capacity.  The difference then between the social morality 
and personal moral capacity is that social morality does not by the necessity of most people agreeing 
with it produce a flourishing personal moral capacity.   The relationship between the two (socia l 
morality and personal moral capacity) becomes the critical point for sociological discussion in my 
understanding. 
  
 
 
263 
Some writers have challenged this fact/value distinction, and by doing so have shown 
how a social form of morality can serve to mute individual moral capacity.  One such 
collective voice arises from feminist writings.  In Mapping the Moral Domain, 
Gilligan et al. (1988) challenge traditional psychological conceptions that male 
thought is an adequate reflection of the human moral voice.  In privileging the „justice 
perspective61 and male speaker as normative‟, they ask, „what is omitted in research 
by leaving out the moral voice of women and girls?‟  They argue that a focus on the 
justice perspectives is the silencing of care concerns and encourages the tendency for 
people to lose sight of human connection and ways that people can affect each other‟s 
lives.  Consequently, they explore the implications for incorporating a care 
perspective as well as the inclusion of the female voice in research, and find that it 
„changes the map of the moral domain‟ (Gilligan et al. 1988: ii-v and 290). 
I have already noted that Zygmunt Bauman‟s sociological account of the Holocaust 
develops a theory of morality, central to which is the identification of the ways in 
which modern social processes are implicated in the silencing of individual moral 
capacity.  Perhaps more widespread is the growing recognition in sociological 
discourse that consumption is, as Wilk notes (2001: 258), a „central moral problem‟.  
In this sub-discipline at least, there is a growing acknowledgement (if only implicitly) 
that normative social standards found in consumer culture are having adverse affects 
on the future sustainability of ecological environments, and of course will have 
negative flow-on effects on the well-being of human beings.  Being increasingly 
confronted with signs of long-term damage to the planet, theorists (e.g. Bauman 
1998a; White 1967; Wilk 2001) are discussing and debating the need for individuals 
to enact their moral capacity, for example in taking responsibility for their own 
reduced consumption. 
                                                   
 
61
 A justice perspective is a particular „moral voice‟ focusing on rights, equality, reciprocity (or equal 
respect), self-sufficiency, good judgement and independence.  On the other hand, a moral voice 
focussing on a „care‟ perspective gives attention to relationship, the value of care, connection with and 
response to others (Gilligan et al. 1988: xviii). 
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These examples show that in some sociological discussions, the relationship between 
both social morality and personal moral capacity are grappled with as significant 
issues.  However, there is still wide scope for this in sociological discourse, not least 
in relation to the sociological study of money meanings.  Not unlike the issue of 
consumption in contemporary culture, money is also a „central and encompassing‟ 
(Wilk 2001: 253) phenomena, pervasive in almost every aspect of human existence.   
The fact is that sociologically, money has been measured from almost every which 
way: in economic terms from historical to contemporary forms of money; money as 
social status, the money market as social institution; money as both dependent and 
independent variable; money from a structural and cultural perspective; the way 
people earmark monies for different purposes; how money reflects social organisation; 
or money understood from a micro (interpersonal) and macro (national or structural) 
level (Baker and Jimerson 1992: 678-82).  Undoubtedly, one of the ways that money 
still has the possibility of being analysed in far greater depth is in moral terms.  
Having done so in this study, it is clear that researching the moral dimensions of 
money meanings is important in clarifying what money means to people as well as 
the consequences of those meanings.  It accentuates how moral orientations towards 
money meanings are shaped socially and become culturally shared dispositions that 
have consequences for the way individuals negotiate identity, meaning and their 
futures.  The study shows that social forms of morality are also capable of restricting 
the moral capacity of individuals.  However, it demonstrates that individual moral 
capacity can be enacted outside the standardising norms of shared dispositions, too.   
Thus, the sociology of money is a good example of the fact that when sociological 
narratives omit the moral dimensions of a phenomenon, sociology is limited in what it 
can say about that phenomenon; and moreover, what it may actually say about human 
existence.  Thus the task is more than merely acknowledging the moral dimensions of 
a social interest: the depth of task lies in addressing the moral significance of those 
moral dimensions.  This, to use an analogy taken from my findings, is sociology 
engaged in „extended self-reflexivity‟: the ability to look beyond the standardising 
norms of the discipline, and critically engage them with fresh alternatives found in 
discovering the moral significance of social phenomena. 
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11.3.4. Future directions in the sociology of morality 
Consequently, one of the primary opportunities within the sociology of morality is to 
engage with moral issues as central to the sociological task, rather than marginal to it.  
This requires turning even seemingly „value-neutral‟ phenomenon (like money and 
economic activity) into a site for the analysis of how those phenomena are morally 
oriented.  It means asking questions about how everyday moral orientations shape 
cultural norms and what the consequences of those norms are for individual moral 
capacity.  It creates scope for engaging with a more nuanced understanding of self-
reflexivity (limited or constrained?) in the context of how social morality shapes 
moral capacity. 
More generally is the invitation to further map what Gilligan and others (Gilligan et al. 
1988) call the „moral domain‟.  If structure / agency debates are central to the 
sociological discussion about what constitutes being „human‟, sociology has the 
potential to grapple deeply with what may constitute being „moral‟ by more fully 
analysing the relationship between morality constituted „socially‟ in a Durkheim 
sense, and personal moral capacity.  It is clear that the „moral domain‟ constitutes a 
complex interrelation of cultural and social norms along with an individual capacity 
to think in moral, orienting terms: understanding more about this relationship is an 
important sociological task.   
This also constitutes an opportunity for sociologists to engage with questions about 
the moral significance of their findings.  Of course, this raises the underlying question 
of what is the sociologists‟ task.  Some sociologists (e.g. Luhmann 1991; Tester 1997) 
argue that moral reflection on the social conditions that modernity calls „good‟ is not 
up to the sociologist to judge.  For example Luhmann writes that the task of sociology 
is simply to identify „morality as a distinction, that is, the distinction between good 
and bad or good and evil‟ (Luhmann 1991: 37).  Here we cross into the realm of the 
sociologist‟s role, or more precisely, the personal value-position and motivation of 
the individual sociologist.  I have already named my research value-position in 
chapter one: that social critique is intrinsically worthwhile because it is concerned 
with the dignity of what it means to be human.   
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I return to Lash‟s stated desire (in Haimes 2002: 98) to „bring ethics out into the 
streets‟.  It is worthwhile, as noted by Luhmann above, for sociologists to be able to 
identify how people make distinctions between good and bad or good and evil.  
However there is always greater scope for greater discussion to come „out into the 
streets‟ about the moral significance of those distinctions, and what they mean for us 
as human beings.  What is actually „good‟ for humans and constitutes responsible 
moral action will always be up for debate.  However, the invitation is also there for 
sociologists – who have the privilege of being able to look carefully at social forms of 
moral action – to add their voices to discussions and dialogue about what responsible 
moral action could be or to question what standardising norms indicate moral action 
should be.  What our society gains from these discussions will at the very least be 
vigorous debate about issues that are centrally important to being human.  It will open 
doors to fruitful research and the implications for social inquiry and life itself will be 
significant (Smith 2003).  And, as Smith (2003: 158) also notes, it is not least 
important because this „is what scholarship is all about‟. 
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Appendix One (Participant Characteristics) 
 
 
      
Interview Interview Sex Age Education Occupation Income $ Marital   Dependents Resident   Travel   
No. Name         per annum Status   Status History 
1.01 Saskya Female 26 Tertiary Administration 26,000 - 35,000 Single None 
Living with 
Family Overseas 
1.02 George Male 27 Tertiary Engineer 56,000 - 65,000 Partnered None Renting Overseas 
1.03 Ruth Female 25 Tertiary Government Employee 46,000 - 55,000 Single None Buying Overseas 
1.04 Lucy Female 26 Tertiary Accountant 36,000 - 45,000 Single None Renting Overseas 
1.05 Osser Female 31 Tertiary Graphic-Designer 36,000 - 45,000 Married None Renting Overseas 
1.06 Douglas Male 34 TAFE Building Contractor 36,000 - 45,000 Partnered None Buying Overseas 
1.07 Hank Male 34 Tertiary Architect 36,000 - 45,000 Married 3 Dependents Buying Overseas 
1.08 Stephanie Female 31 Tertiary Lawyer 56,000 - 65,000 de Facto None Buying Overseas 
1.09 Peter Male 28 Tertiary Manager 36,000 - 45,000 Single None Renting Overseas 
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Interview Interview Sex Age Education Occupation Income $ Marital   Dependents Resident   Travel   
No. Name         per annum Status   Status History 
1.10 Edgar Male 34 TAFE Building Contractor 46,000 - 55,000 Married 3 Dependents Buying Overseas 
1.11 Mark Male 28 Year 12 Administration 46,000 - 55,000 Partnered None Buying Overseas 
1.12 Carin Female 31 Tertiary Nurse 56,000 - 65,000 Single None Buying 
Overseas 
Extensive 
1.13 Sally Female 35 Tertiary Administration 46,000 - 55,000 Partnered None Buying 
Overseas 
Extensive 
1.14 Mike Male 35 Tertiary Accountant 101,000 - 150,000 Married 2 Dependents Buying Overseas 
1.15 Winona Female 32 Tertiary Accountant 46,000 - 55,000 Partnered None Renting Overseas 
1.16 Candy Female 27 TAFE Upholsterer 46,000 - 55,000 Partnered None Renting Within Australia 
1.17 Damien Male 27 Year 12 Administration 36,000 - 45,000 Single 1 Dependent Renting 
Overseas 
Extensive 
1.18 Charlie Male 36 Tertiary Teacher 36,000 - 45,000 Single None Buying Overseas 
Table 1:  Middle-Income Participant Characteristics
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Interview 
No. 
Interview 
Name 
Sex 
 
 Age 
 
Education 
  
Occupation 
  
Income $ 
per annum 
Marital 
Status 
Dependents 
 
Resident 
Status 
Travel 
History 
2.01 Virgil Male 30 Year 12 Full Time Student 0 - 15,000 Partnered None Renting Within Australia 
2.02 Stuart Male 27 Year 12 Full Time Student 0 - 15,000 Single None 
Living with 
Family Within Australia 
2.03 Mondi Female 26 Year 12 Full Time Student 0 - 15,000 Married None Buying Overseas 
2.04 Leon Male 29 Year 12 Full Time Student 0 - 15,000 Single None Renting Overseas 
2.05 Kayla Female 27 Year 11 
Primary Carer & Escort 
Worker 0 - 15,000 Single 1 Dependent Renting Within Australia 
2.06a Anders Male 24 Tertiary Unemployed 0 - 15,000 Single None 
Living with 
Family Overseas 
2.06b Shaun Male 24 Tertiary Unemployed 0 - 15,000 Single None 
Living with 
Family Overseas 
2.07 Gabrielle Female 36 TAFE 
Primary Carer & Part-
time Musician 26,000 - 35,000 Divorced 2 Dependents Buying Within Australia 
2.08 Fred Male 31 Tertiary Full Time Student 0 - 15,000 Single None Renting Within Australia 
2.09 Alvar Male 30 Tertiary Unemployed 0 - 15,000 Partnered None Renting Overseas Extensive 
2.10 Bethany Female 23 Tertiary Unemployed 0 - 15,000 Single None Buying Overseas 
2.11 Jessica Female 38 Year 11 
Primary Carer & Part-
time Student 26,000 - 35,000 Divorced 5 Dependents Renting Within Tasmania 
2.12 Trevor Male 38 Year 10 Unemployed 0 - 15,000 Single None Renting Within Tasmania 
Table 2: Low-Income Participant Characteristics 
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Interview Interview Sex Age Education Occupation Income $ Marital   Dependents Resident   Travel   
No. Name         per annum Status   Status History 
3.01 Prince Male 25 Tertiary Musician 36,000 - 45,000 Single None Renting Overseas 
3.02 Tom Male 36 Tertiary Architect 16,000 - 25,000 Single None 
Living with 
Family Within Australia 
3.03 Lisa Female 26 Tertiary 
Primary Carer  & 
Part-time Artist  16,000 - 25,000 Married 2 Dependents Buying Within Australia 
3.04 Anji Female 30 Tertiary Lawyer 36,000 - 45,000 Partnered None Buying 
Overseas 
Extensive 
3.05 Paul Male 27 Tertiary Nurse 36,000 - 45,000 Partnered None Renting Overseas 
3.06 Jarrod Male 26 Tertiary Unemployed 0 - 15,000 Single None Renting Overseas 
3.07 Hannah Female 26 Tertiary Physiotherapist 26,000 - 35,000 Single None Buying Overseas 
3.08 Cian Male 33 Tertiary Social Worker 36,000 - 45,000 Married None Buying Overseas 
3.09 Marjorie Female 35 TAFE 
Primary Carer  & 
Part-time Student 0 - 15,000 Married 2 Dependents Buying Overseas 
3.10 Thera Female 34 Tertiary Engineer 36,000 - 45,000 Married None Buying Overseas 
Table 3: Downshifter Participant Characteristics
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Appendix Two (Ethics Requirements) 
(a) Information Sheet   
 
 
 
My name is Julia Verdouw, and I am undertaking this research project to fulfil the 
requirements for a Doctorate of Philosophy in the department of Sociology and Social 
Work at the University of Tasmania. In this project I will be working under the 
supervision of Dr Douglas Ezzy.     
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Through this study I hope to better understand what young people aged 23-38 years 
feel to be a „good‟ life.  In other words, what ways of thinking and acting are 
important, valuable, significant or worthwhile to young adults? Alternatively, what 
behaviours are insignificant, not worth pursuing or even reacted strongly against?  I 
am also interested how these values are influenced by some of the big „themes‟ in our 
society at the moment, such as „consumerism‟.    
 
The aim for this project is to bring the real experiences of everyday young Tasmanian 
men and women into this debate.  The realities of how young adults make sense of 
everyday experiences in a consumer society will be valuable for future government 
and non-government discussions about youth, unemployment, community initiatives 
and issues of social justice. 
 
Who is being asked to participate? 
There are a few simple requirements for taking part in the project.  First, as mentioned 
earlier, you must be aged between 23 and 38 years.  Second, you must be able to fit 
one of the following three criteria: 
 
1. You receive a wage/salary of at least $499 including tax per week; or 
2. You receive your primary income from a government pension or 
allowance (such as study allowance); or you receive a single wage/salary 
of no more than $250 per week (or household wage/salary of no more than 
$499 including tax per week).  
3. You have chosen to receive less income per week than you used to because 
of a decision related to quality of life - for example, to live more simply, or 
have more „family‟ time. 
 
Whichever applies to you, it is a basis from which I can talk with you about how you 
choose to live your life and the things that are most meaningful to you. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
291 
How can I be involved? 
You can participate in a relaxed one-on-one interview.  The only requirement for 
taking part in an interview is to „tell your story‟ with the guidance of some relevant 
questions from the researcher.   The interview duration will be anywhere from half an 
hour to one and a half hours in length.   Interviews can take place in any location that 
it suitable for both parties. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
In whatever way you are involved in this project, any information you provide will be 
treated confidentially.  It is understood that information you give may raise emotions 
or anxiety and so your information will be treated with sensitivity.  There will be no 
pressure for you to answer sensitive questions, and if you become uncomfortable you 
may choose to not answer questions, or leave at any time.  Participation is always 
entirely voluntary and may be withdrawn at any time without prejudice.   
 
Your privacy will also be protected.  Your real name or any features that may identify 
you will not be used in the thesis – you will remain anonymous at all times.  For 
example, if a direct quote from you is used in the thesis, you will be given another 
name. 
 
What happens to my information? 
If given your permission, interviews will be audio taped.  This information will be 
transcribed and you will be given the option of looking through the transcript and then 
approving or withdrawing the transcription of your interview before thesis writing 
begins.  The taped interview session is stored securely for a required period of five 
years from the time the project is finished. After this, the tapes will be destroyed. 
 
Your consent 
Before the interview, you will be asked to sign a consent form to make sure that you 
understand what the research is about and that you are happy to take part in the taped 
interview or focus group.    
 
Contact persons: 
If you have any question about this research project or your involvement in it, please 
feel free to contact either Julia Verdouw at (w) 6226 2950, (m) 0421 607 521, or 
project supervisor Dr Douglas Ezzy at (w) 6226 2330.  
 
This project has received ethical approval from the Southern Tasmania Social 
Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee.  If you have any ethical concern or 
complaint in regards to the manner in which the project is conducted, you may contact 
the Chair, Associate Professor Gino DAL Pont on (03) 6226 2078 or Executive 
Officer of the University Human Research Ethics Committee, Ms Amanda McAully 
on (03) 6226 2763. 
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Appendix Two (Ethics Requirements) 
(b) Statement of Informed Consent 
 
 
 
 
Participant Statement 
 
Please read carefully through the following statement and if there are any areas of 
doubt, please ask before signing: 
 
 I have read and understood the „information sheet‟ for this study.  The 
project has been explained to me, and I am aware that the duration of this 
interview will be from 1 to 1.5 hours in length.  Any questions I have asked 
have been answered to my satisfaction.   I also understand and agree that:  
 
 All data collected from this interview will be treated as confidential.   
 
 Data gathered from this interview may be published provided that I cannot 
be identified as a participant.   
 
 Should I wish to, I may read the transcript of my interview and withdraw 
any information I have provided. 
 
 The interview will be recorded. Once the recording has been converted into 
written form, it will be stored securely to protect my anonymity.  I am aware 
that the recording will be stored for a required minimum of 5 years after 
project completion and then destroyed.  I also understand that the 
information I provide in this recording will be treated with utmost 
confidentiality. 
 
 If I have any other questions, I can contact the research team. I can also 
contact the chair of the Southern Tasmania Social Sciences Human 
Research Ethics Committee on (03) 6226 2078 if I have any concerns about 
the ethical conduct of the project. 
 
 
Based on these understandings, I agree to participate in this investigation and I 
understand that I am free to withdraw at any time without prejudice. 
 
Name of Participant __________________________________________________ 
 
Signature of Participant __________________________Date _________________ 
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Statement of Informed Consent continued…. 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigator Statement 
 
 
I have explained this project and the implications of participation to this volunteer. I 
believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of 
participation. 
 
 
Name of Investigator __________________________________________________ 
 
Signature of Investigator __________________________Date ________________ 
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Appendix Three (Interview Tools) 
(a) General Participant Information Sheet 
 
Participant (Interview) Reference: 
 
Participant Pseudonym: 
 
Sex:  M  /  F 
 
Age:     23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30   31   32   33   34   35   36  37   38   
(Circle one) 
 
 
Occupation / Position Title: 
 
 
Wage / Salary Earnings (approx / per annum gross) $: 
 
 
Educational History: 
(Highest level completed – circle one) 
 
 Primary / High School TAFE  Tertiary  Postgraduate 
 
Employment / Unemployment History: 
 
 
 
 
Brief Personal History: 
 
 Family: 
 (E.g. family history, marriage, divorce, children etc) 
 
 
 Geographical History:  
 (E.g. Are you Tasmanian? Have you Travelled or lived elsewhere?) 
 
 
Miscellaneous: 
(E.g. additional information related to any above issue you wish to provide) 
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Appendix Three (Interview Tools) 
(b) Interview Schedule 
 
Introduction: 
 Aim: your understanding of what you think is a „good‟ life 
You are the expert - there are no right or wrong answers -  and I would like to 
hear your point of view! 
 
General Information Sheet  
(Separate: Fill out) 
 
General Interview Theme: 
 
 What do you think makes a „good life‟? 
 
 -„Good‟ = worthwhile, significant, better way to live 
 - The whole interview will keep coming back to this question 
 - By implication, what is insignificant, trivial and inferior to strive for? 
 
Themes to draw on during the interview: 
 
 Values and Attitudes:  
-Significant values, passions, deep feelings, securities and insecurities, what is „happiness‟? and strong 
beliefs 
 
Moral Issues: 
-How should people live, „wrong‟ ways to live, the most profound moral dilemmas today, the relation to 
religion to morality, have you examples of actions you consider „wrong‟? 
 
Consumer Society: 
-Desired lifestyle and income goals, future desires, job loss and gain, house ownership, where should 
taxpayer money go? Connection between money and „good life‟? Opinions of unemployment and 
welfare. 
 
Identity and Self: 
Is self-identity important to a „good life‟? What are your inner conflicts? What distresses and disturbs 
you the most in life? Do you have a „big‟ meaning or direction in life?  What would you like your future 
to hold? Issues of happiness and anxiety. 
 
Three Generic Questions: 
 If you could change anything in the world, what would you do?  Why? 
 Can you give me 5 or 10 responses to the question „who are you‟? (what 
defines you as a person?) 
 Is there anything else you think is important to mention in this interview, 
that I may have missed? 
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Appendix Four (Coding) 
Example of Nvivo Coding Tree for categories 1, 2 and 3 
 
MONEY- 
 MONEY FRAMEWORKS 
  MONEY AS „GOOD‟ 
 
   HAPPINESS 
   CONTROL - INDEPENDENCE 
    Independence from Others/System 
    Independence from Financial Constraint 
    Independence providing Opportunity 
    Financial Control 
   MEANS TO END / GOAL 
    Quantitative Goal 
    Qualitative Goal 
    Able to save Money 
    Pragmatic or Necessity 
   ITS OWN GOAL / GOOD 
   ACHIEVEMENT 
    Money Success 
    Achieving Goals 
    Security 
   PEOPLE 
    Friends and Leisure Lifestyle 
    Travel and Meeting People 
    Spouse or Family Quality of Life 
    Trust 
   PLEASURE and LEISURE 
    Travel/Holiday/Recreation/Relaxation 
    Social Life 
    Cultural Life 
    Reward 
    Freedom 
    Escapism / Boredom 
    Fun 
   QUALITY OF LIFE 
    Lack of Financial Constraint 
    Financial Stability 
    Lifestyle Choices 
    Comfort 
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    „Home‟ 
    Human Rights 
    Health 
   CHOICE 
    Open choices 
    Lifestyle choices 
   MORE IS BETTER 
   FUTURE 
   
  MONEY NEUTRAL 
 
   NECESSITY 
   BALANCE 
   TAKEN FOR GRANTED / ASSUMPTION 
   UNCONCERNED / NON-PROBLEMATIC 
   CREATIVE / MAKE-DO 
   IT‟S NOT ABOUT MONEY 
   BETTER QUALITIES THAN MONEY 
   POSITIVE ASPECTS OF LESS MONEY 
   MONEY USED TO HELP OTHERS 
   HAS LITTLE MEANING 
   WEALTH NOT NECESSARY 
 
  MONEY TENSIONS 
 
   AMBIVALENCE 
    Money and Means 
    Money and Happiness 
    Money and Social Inequality 
    Consumerism 
    Money and Power 
    Future 
    Money and Use 
    Having little money 
    Money Management 
    Just getting by 
    Regret over use of money 
    Money and Time 
    Shame 
    Money and Stress 
    Downshifting 
    Danger of too much money 
    Desires 
   FINANCIAL WORRY 
   MONEY RELATED TENSIONS 
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    Tensions with Work Quality 
    Tensions with Values / Ideals 
    Tensions in Relationships 
    Tensions with work Type 
    Tensions with Self Esteem 
   BLACK ECONOMY 
   MONEY „BAD‟ 
   NEGATIVE DEPENDENCY 
   POSSESSIONS 
   MONEY CAUTION 
   GAMBLING 
 
  MONEY MISCELLANEOUS 
 
   CONTRADICTIONS 
   COMPARISON STORIES 
    Wealth Negativity 
    Poverty negativity 
    Other 
    Positive stories 
   SHIFTS IN THINKING 
    Less Money focussed 
    Changed Money focus 
 
  OTHER: DOWN-SHIFTING „GOOD‟ 
    
   PERSONAL SATISFACTION 
   COMMUNITY BETTERMENT 
   LESS MONEY IS ENOUGH 
   WORLDVIEW SHIFT 
   QUALITY OF LIFE 
 
  OTHER: INFORMED BY SPIRITUAL BELIEF 
 
   STEWARDSHIP OR RESPONSIBLE USE 
   PROVIDING FOR OTHERS 
   PROVISION FROM GOD 
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MONEY- 
 MONEY CONVICTIONS 
  POLITICAL 
 
   GENERAL 
   DILEMMA 
   SOLUTION 
   GOVERNMENT AS DISTRIBUTOR 
   DECLINE TO COMMENT 
   OWN ROLE 
   GLOBAL OR SOCIAL CONFLICT 
   ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS 
   IMPACTING OWN POSITION 
  
  MORAL 
 
   STATUS QUO 
   DILEMMA 
    Global or Social Conflict 
    Workplace Morality 
    Too much wealth 
    Money Theft 
    System Abuse 
    Moral Behaviour 
    Environmental Conflict 
    Poverty 
    Apathy or Complacency 
    Expenditure or Consumerism 
    Individualism 
    Breakdown of Community or Relationships 
   SOLUTIONS/ OWN ROLE 
    Ideal World  
    Realistic 
    Personalised 
    Problematic 
    Unproblematic 
    Active 
    Desiring 
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Appendix Five (Money as „good‟) 
 
The following table is a supplement to analysis in chapter 5.1.1 ‘Money as ‘good’’.  
Each quote provides one participant example taken from a number of level three 
and four codes (see coding tree, Appendix four) under ‘money frameworks’/’money 
is good’. 
 
 
Participant 
Name 
 
 
Coding Type 
(money as „good‟) 
 
Participant Quote 
Douglas Achievement / 
Money Success 
„I‟ve got a trade, and that helps me make money from week 
to week, and I can always do it, now I‟m just building on 
that to develop a business of my own and I‟m more in 
control of how I affect that trade on what my industry will 
become.  More able to make more money.  And give me 
more opportunity.‟ 
 
Saskya 
 
 
Achievement /  
Achieving goals 
„I just want to have a working life that satisfies me in an 
emotional sense, so that I‟m happy, I‟m confident, I‟m 
relaxed, I‟m challenged, I‟m excited, and that I also have 
the financial gain to do the things that I want to do‟. 
 
 
Osser 
Control – Independence 
/ Independence from 
the system 
„Yeah, so I don‟t sort of rely on the government to have any 
affect on the way I live.  I‟m not gonna go, „oh the budget‟s 
really crap because there‟s no money in our age-group‟, 
because I don‟t feel that it‟s that real anyway. You know, 
you‟ve got to make it for yourself; you can‟t worry about 
what those little men do!‟ 
 
 
Mark 
Control – Independence 
/ Independence from 
others 
„What attracts me about being self-employed?  Well, you 
can always boil this back to what I used to, what I‟ve said 
previously.  [softens voice] Um, you make money.  You 
never make the good money working for someone else‟.   
 
 
 
Control – Independence 
/ Independence from 
„Well, the house is a pretty big thing financially and that 
uses up a lot of time and money resources for me.  So I 
guess, the short term objective is to get to a point with the 
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Ruth 
financial constraint house where I can rent it out and not worry about it 
financially and go somewhere else and do something else.  
So, that‟s about it financially.  I don‟t have you know a 
desire to be earning one hundred thousand dollars by 
twenty-ten or anything like that!  You know, not to be in 
financial difficulty is just fine‟ 
 
 
 
Carin 
 
Control – Independence 
/ Independence 
providing opportunity 
„So the nursing home offered me care assistant work which 
was the lowest paid job, ever.  And I was looking at these 
nurses thinking „I could do that, that‟s nothing, I could do 
that and they‟re getting heaps of money compared to me‟  
So then I realised that it was a really good way to do what 
you want.  A really flexible job to do, and once you‟ve got 
it, you can do whatever you want.  So that‟s the reason I 
did it‟ 
 
 
 
Mike 
 
Control – Independence 
/ Independence 
providing security 
„What is security? I guess, having a house and an income 
is certainly part of that.  … You know I,  certainly like to be 
the provider for the family, and all those sorts of things.  
Yeah, I‟m certainly conscious of all those issues.  Albeit, at 
a point you know sort of when I do retire that I can throw 
caution to the wind a bit more.  But, look I probably 
wouldn‟t do that unless I had everything pretty much set 
up‟ 
 
 
Peter 
Control – Independence 
/ Independence 
providing financial 
control 
 
„I don‟t personally believe in going into debt.  I‟ve never 
had a loan‟ 
 
 
 
 
George 
 
 
Means to end or goal /  
Quantitative goal 
„I think everyone works for a reason, that‟s to earn money. 
And I‟m reasonably lucky I guess in that I earn a decent 
amount compared to most.  I think having some level of 
financial security, in you know, owning a house or 
something like that, actually owning it outright, and 
basically being able to get to a certain level, and then not 
have to work long hours and all that sort of thing after that 
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- after you get to a certain point where you‟re static.  
Where you  can work for play money, and work for your 
retirement sort of thing.  Where there‟s no pressure in 
where you want to go‟   
 
 
 
Hank 
 
Means to end or goal /  
Qualitative goal 
 
„What is it that we really want out of our life?  What-
what‟s going to make life, good? And  we wrote those down 
as well.   And the things that I wrote down were I want to 
spend time with my family, and my wife, whom I love 
enormously.  And my beautiful children.  I want to, earn 
enough money so that we can live happily, but I‟m not that 
focussed on being a wealthy person‟.   
 
 
Lucy 
 
 
Its own goal 
I: So what was it about  accounting that when you were 
twelve years old you thought accounting was the thing for 
you? 
P: [grins] Money. 
 
 
Ruth 
 
 
Happiness /  
People and social life 
„There are certainly things that I enjoy that you can‟t do 
unless you‟ve got some disposable income.  So, when you 
think of you know the good life, being able to go out and 
have a few drinks with friends, you know go out for a meal, 
or go to the theatre, you know - can‟t really do that, unless 
you‟ve got a bit of cash‟   
 
 
 
Saskya 
 
 
Happiness /  
Pleasure and Leisure 
„Actually, for me I unfortunately have a certain lifestyle, 
that being a twenty-something woman in a very small town 
I have a huge group of friends, and have a certain way  -
my leisure is involved in going out drinking, smoking, you 
know, travelling, all that sort of stuff, so I associate all 
those things with pleasure and time and relaxation, and if I 
can‟t achieve them… it‟s awful! You actually, you feel 
really cut-off, you know….its one of those really difficult 
things‟ 
 
 
 
 
 
„Yeah, being comfortable… I think  my opinions on this 
one‟s changed a lot, I used to think that it was all about, 
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Mark Happiness /  
Quality of Life 
being ludicrously wealthy.  But, my opinion has sort of 
come to the point where, you lead a life where, you don‟t 
have to work too much.  Where you earn, where you have 
an income capacity.  You have leisure‟ 
 
Stephanie 
Happiness /  
Choice 
„And even just  the sense of being so privileged that I could 
say well,‟ oh I could do this or that, or I could downsize, I 
could upsize‟ - I could  do all sorts of things.  It is very 
fortunate.  Yeah, so I don‟t underestimate that‟ 
 
 
 
Damien 
 
Happiness /  
other 
„Oh, Money, I love thee, I hate thee!  Money is, obviously 
it‟s a necessity.  Ah, I have this fiscal disease that I‟ve 
genetically inherited from my father.  That‟s I could be 
earning fifty thousand dollars a week and I‟d probably try 
and bum ten bucks for a bottle of wine before pay day.  It 
just, it doesn‟t matter … I have a very bad habit of getting 
paid, and then for three or four days living like a king… 
Oh, and I love it.  But, I know that by this time next week, 
I‟m gonna be having my vegemite on toast, that‟s all there 
is left.  And, it is an issue and it‟s a problem.  But, I‟m 
happy with it.  Because it works for me!‟   
 
Charlie 
 
More is better / 
„Oh, that‟s another reason to come here, actually, that I‟m 
technically able to do some consulting whereas in 
[previous job] I wasn‟t.  So I can, you know sort of top up 
the piggy bank a little bit‟   
 
